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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT
AN ERROR OF LAW OR MISAPPLY
THE LAW?

IS THE DECISION OF THE LOWER
COURT TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF
THE STIPULATION SUPPORTED BY
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE?

4

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a petition to modify a divorce decree case.

The

plaintiff appellant, Mrs. Brown, seeks a review of the district
courts decision to treat an oral stipulation as dispositive of
all issues.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties were divorced in February, 1980.
was contested, but settled by stimulation.

The divorce

In the divorce decree

the appellant was awarded child support in the amount of three
hundred dollars ($300.00) per month for each of three (3) children,
and nine hundred dollars ($900.00) per month alimony.

The respon-

dant, who is a medical doctor, engaged in private practice as an
OB-GYN, was earning approximately sixty thousand dollars ($60,000)
ner year at the time of the divorce. (T12,22) (References to the
transcript follow the assertion made, and contain both page and
line number.)
Three years later, the appellant, believing the respondants income had increased dramatically, and having the increasing financial burdons associated with growing children, caused a
petition to modify the decree of divorce to be filed.
The petition to modify was filed February 28th, 1983.

In it

the appellant asked for an increase in both child support and
alimony, among other things. (T3,4) The respondant answered, and
filed a counterpetition in which the asked for a reduction in child
5

support, the elimination of alimony, and changes in the visitation,
among other things. (T3,6)
Both parties commenced discovery, and extensive discovery was
scheduled and completed. (T3,8 and 6,8) It appeared from the
discovery that the appellants beliefs concerning the respondants
income were correct.

Documents supplied by the respondant showed

his income having risen from approximately sixty thousand dollars
($60,000.00) per year in 1980, the time of the divorce, to over
one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) per year (this includes
monies put in a pension and profit sharing plan), at the time of
the discovery.(T12,22)
The appellant was told by her then counsel that her position
had merit, and that she should prevail.(T6,19)
appellant

Although the

realized that compromise is always a factor to be

considered, she concluded, along with her then counsel, to reject
various settlement proposals made by the respondant during the
period from filing in February of 1983, to the spring of 1984. (T
6,19)

Sometime between early 1984 and June 5th of 1984, unbe-

knownst to the appellant, something went arwry between her and her
then counsel in terms of communication.

Discussions about various

options for settlement were still being had.

Both appellant and

respondant were proposing settlement terms to one another.
The respondant scheduled the deposition of the appellant
to be taken on June 5th, 1984. (T6,19) The appellant had never
had her deposition taken before. (T7,18)

It appeared at the

time of scheduling the deposition, that the matter would go to
6

trial.

A trial date was set for August 12th, 1994. (T3,12)-

(T6,5) Although there had been considerable discovery^ settlement
negotiations did not produce a settlement.
Sometime shortly before the appellants deposition was to
be taken, the appellants then counsel, either entered into a
settlement agreement with opposing counsel, or indicated that
the appellant would be ready to tenter into a stipulation, dispositive of all issues, by the deposition date of June 5th, 1984. (T3,16 and T6,l)
Counsel apparantly agreed with opposing counsel in advance that
the deposition scheduled for June 5th, 1984, would be used for
purposes of recording the stipulation only. (T3,17)
The appellant did not know, was not told by her counsel
or anyone else, and did not understand that an agreement for
settlement had been promised by her attorney.

She did not know,

and had no way to know, that the deposition time was going to be
used to record a stipulation, what the terms of the stipulation
were, or why her counsel would agree to the terms of a stipulation, which they had previously rejected, until she appeared at
opposing counsels office for the deposition. (T7,5)
When the appellant appeared for the deposition, she then, and
only then, learned from her counsel for the first time that:
1.

He had reached an agreement with opposing counsel
depositive of all issues, an agreement that he
thought she should accept;

2.

Although the proposed agreement contained terms
7

appellant and her counsel had previously

rejected,

that she should agree to them;
3.

That although she had always been assured by her
counsel that they would do better

in court than the

terms the proposed agreement provided for, she
should accept them because she would do no better in
court;
4,

and

If she would accept the terms of the proposed agreement she could avoid having her deposition taken.

The appellant, because she had never had her deposition
taken before, was afraid of it. (T7,19)

She was in opposing

counsels office, (T7,3) and had the respondant, opposing counsel,
and the court reporter waiting while her counsel informed her of
the four points listed above.
The appellant was disappointed, dismayed, confused, and
felt abandoned. (T7,13) She was disappointed

becaue she had

been assured by her lawyer during the entire proceedings that
the facts warranted an increase in both child support and alimony,
and yet, the net effect of the proposed stipulation was to decrease
her total support and create an ambiguous and unworkable visitation
schedule.

The appellant was dismayed because her attorneys

position had changed drastically without notice.

She was confused

because she could not understand why a dramatic increase in her
former husbands income should warrant a decrease in her support,
and confused because her attorneys assessment of the situation, and
8

advice was almost the opposite of what she had last heard from
him.

The appellant felt abandoned because if she chose not to

accept the proposed stipulation, she would face deposition, an
unknown to her, with what she thought would be unsupportive
counsel.
Although a college graduate, in the face of her attorneys
advice, a man she had paid more than two thousand dollars and had
put all of her faith in for seventeen (17) months, the appellant
went into an adjoining room where her counsel, opposing counsel,
and her former husband, the respondant, stated an agreement and
stipulation dispositive of all issues on the record.(T7,21)

The

appellant said nothing on the record.(T8,2)
Opposing counsel prepared a written stipulation and sent
it to appellants counsel.(T8,18)

Appellants then counsel did

not send her a copy or notify her that he had received a proposed
written stipulation for her to sign until mid to late August of
1984.

Upon receiving a copy, appellant immediately contacted her

lawyers office.

She made an appointment to see him to go over the

proposed written stipulation at the earliest possible date.
appointment, however, was three weeks away. (T9,8)

That

She was

informed just before the appointment that he had been called out of
town unexpectedly, and that he would have to cancel the appointment. (T9,10)

The appellant could not get another appointment to

see her lawyer for approximately a months time due to his busy
schedule.(T9,11)

When the appellant was finally able to meet

with her attorney, three and one-half (3 1/2) months after the
9

deposition date, late September, 1984, she discovered that there
was no room for adjustments as she had been led to believe.
appellant refused to sign the written stipulation.

The

Her then

counsel withdrew on November 7th, 1984. (file page 151)
In the interim period the respondant began paying the appellant
two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) per month, which was two hundred
dollars ($200.00) per month higher than the obligation under the
original decree.
1984.

He began paying said amount commencing in July,

That was the date the stipulation was to take effect.

The

stipulation provided that the decree be amended to provide that
instead of the appellant receiving nine hundred dollars ($900.00)
per month child support and nine hundred dollars ($900.00) per
month alimony, the appellant should receive five hundred dollars
($500.00) per month, per child for a total child support obligation
of fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500.00) per month.(T8,2)

With

regard to alimony, the stipulation provided that it be cut immediately from nine hundred dollars ($900.00) per month to five hundred
dollars ($500.00) per month, and be eliminated entirely in July,
1986.

The net effect of the stipulation was to increase total

support two hundred dollars ($200.00) per month for two years and
to decrease it three hundred dollars ($300.00) per month in 1986
and thereafter, a net loss to appellant.
The appellant obtained the services of present counsel and
after some delay, a copy of the file was obtained.

Appellants

present counsel wrote to respondants counsel requesting delivery of
formerly requested, but as yet unsupplied documents on the 30th day
10

of November, 1984.

This letter called upon respondants counsel to

make a motion to enforce the stipulation if he was going to.

(A

copy of the letter is attached hereto as part of the addendum as
Appendix "A".)
Respondants counsel made a motion to enforce the stipulation of June 5thf 1984, as dispositive of all issues on 14th of
February, 1985.

A hearing was held on April 15th, 1985, at which

time the appellant objected to the motion.
Having heard proffers of evidence, Judge James S. Sawaya
granted respondants motion and signed an order dated May 1st, 1985,
disposing

of, and terminating all issues raised in both the

petition and counterpetition.

Said order adopted the terms of the

June 5th stipulation.
It is from that decision and written order of the district
court the appellant appeals.

11

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The court has authority to hear this case.

Section 9, Article

VIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah; Section 78-2-2, Utah
Code Annotated

(1953 as amnd) ; Rule 72A, Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure.
There is no Utah Statute on point.
summarized in
(Utah 1954);

Utah Case Law on point is

Madsen v. Madsen, 276 P.2d 917, 2 Utah 2d. 423,
Klien v. Klien, 544 P.2d 472, (Utah 1975);

First

Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel, 600 P.2d 521, (Utah
1979); and Higley v. McDonald, 685 P.2d 496, (Utah 1984).
These Utah cases provide that a person should not be bound to a
previous settlement agreement or stipulation "if there is any
justification in law or equity for avoiding or repudiating it, if
timely made." Klein. [Emphasis Added]

In First Denver, the court

said a stipulation can be set aside "if entered into inadvertantly
or for justifiable cause."

In Higley the court recited a "well

settled rule" that stipulations are typically conclusive and
binding "unless upon timely notice, and for good cause shown relief
is granted therefrom".

Certainly the court is not bound by the

stipulation of the parties in a domestic matter, and can make such
adjustments as are fair and equitable. Madsen.
The appellants argument in summary is that the overwhelming
weight of the credible testimony at the time of hearing was that
she felt emotionally ambushed on June 5th, 1984, the date the
stipulation was recorded.

If ever there were a set of circum12

stances that constituted "good cause" under Higley "inadvertance or
justifiable" cause under First Denver or "any justification in law
or equity" under Kleiny

those circumstances outlined in the

appellants statement of facts above do.
The appellant was timely within her power to be timely.

The

respondant knewf or should have known within sixty (60) days of the
deposition date when the written stipulation did not come back
signed, that there were problems.
thousand dollar

Instead, he sent the two

($2,000.00) stipulation amount instead of the

eighteen hundred dollar ($1,800.00) decree amount from July, 1984
on, ignoring the delays, the withdrawal of his opponents counsel,
the entry of new counsel, and request for continued discovery, and
a request for a motion to enforce if there was going to be one.(Addendum, Appendix "A")

The respondant did not reasonably rely on

the stipulation to his detriment. He continued to send the extra
two hundred dollars ($200.00) per month despite actual or constructive notice, because it was easy for him to pay, and might provide
him an estopple argument later.(T12,1)
The appellant inadvertantly, by mistake, inappropriately,
through acquiesence in the face of authority figures, and time
pressure, has gotten caught in the terms of a fundamentally unfair
stipulation.

This was the clear, uncontroverted evidence at the

time of hearing.

The court below, either had too restrictive a

view of the law on setting aside stipulations, or misunderstood the
weight of the evidence.
The appellant should have been relieved from the stipula13

tion instead of having it enforced against her.
ARGUMENT

Carol Brownf the plaintiff and appellant, waited three years
from the date of the decree of divorce to file a petition to
modify.

In those three years, her former husbands income shot up

dramatically from approximately sixty thousand dollars ($60,000.00)
per year to over one hundred thousand dollars($100,000.00) per
year.(T12, 22)

Her older children were becomming more expensive,

and yet the youngest was not yet in school.

She would have filed a

petition to modify earlier, but by stipulation she agreed to wait
at least 36 months.

When she first approached her lawyer she told

him what she expected discovery would show her ex husbands income
to be.

Both she and her counsel were encouraged by the respondants

answers to interrogatories and requests for production of documents
concerninq his income.

The appellant was not concerned about the

respondant filing a counterpetition for reduction of alimony.

Her

previous award was without condition or limitation, and her former
husbands income had roughly doubled.

She did not fear a counter

petition requesting a change in visitation.

She assumed the court

would hear both sides of the visitation issue at trial and make a
fair decision.
It took from February, 1983 to spring of 1984, and more
than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) in legal fees to get to the
point where trial was set for August of 1984.

As the trial date

approached, the settlement negotiations began in earnest.
14

To the

best of the appellants knowledge, the parties were never close to
settlement.
Although a trial date was set in August, 1984, the respondant
wanted to take the appellants deposition in June, and scheduled a
deposition for June 5, 1984.
As respondants counsel mentioned at the time of hearing,
he exchanged letters with appellants counsel concerning a possible
stipulation in May, 1984. (T16,1)

The uncontradicted proffer of

testimony at the time of hearing was that the appellant never
understood, from anything her lawyer said or did, that she would be
asked to enter into a stipulation at the time of the scheduled
deposition.

The uncontradicted testimony further was that the

appellant had no knowledge from any source, that she would be asked
to stipulate or what the terms of the stipulation might be until
the deposition date, the day she was confronted with it.
The further uncontradicted proffered testimony of the appellant
was that she and her counsel had never come close to embracing the
terms of the June 5th stipulation in thier prior discussions.

In

fact, the proffered testimony was that she and her counsel had
rejected similar proposals as unfair and as less than they should
expect as an outcome at trial.
Judge Sawaya

indicates in his written notice to counsel

of his decision on the motion to enforce that
"...it would appear that in spite of the plaintiffs protestations, the settlement agreement was fully negotiated between
the parties and counsel... and that all parties and counsel
agreed to its terms". (File page 190, Addendum Appendix "B")
The only evidence given at the time of hearing on these points
15

was the appellants testimony, which was absolutely contrary to the
Judges finding.

The appellants testimoney was that she had never

heard the terms of the stipulation until the day of the deposition,
and did not know she would be asked to enter into such an agreement
until that day.

Judge Sawaya's finding that "all parties and

counsel consented to the terms" is completely baffling.

The

appellant never said a word when the court reporter took down the
purported agreement. (T8,2)

Bert Dart is recorded as speaking as

attorney for defendant, Dr. Jerome Brown, the defendant-respondant,
is recorded as speaking.

Paul Laipis is recorded as speaking as

counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, but no where did the appellant
agree, consent, or say anything.

This was pointed out to the court

when the motion to enforce was argued.(T8,2)
At the time of hearing, respondants counsel proffered testimony
that he counsel would have given if called to testify.

On the

other hand, appellants counsel proffered the testimony appellant
would have testified to.

The testimony of Carol Brown and Bert

Dart crossed, but it did not collide.

Respondants counsel's

testimony concerns his dealings with appellants then counsel, Paul
Laipis.

The appellants testimony concerns her dealings with Paul

Liapis.

The respondants counsel's perceptions of what had gone on

were obviously different than the appellants.

Neither knew

the impressions appellants then counsel was giving the other.
It would have been very unlikely that appellants proffer, and
respondants proffer given at the time of hearing would contradict
each other.

Neither was privy to the communications the other had
16

with Paul Laipisf appellants former counsel.

Hence, the proffers

do not contradict one another, but rather explain two different
perceptions of the same events.

Hence, the assertion that Carol

Browns testimony is uncontradicted and should be believed.

There

is not one reason to believe that it is not a completely accurate
account of her perception of what happened.

Mr. Darts testimony is

worthy of the same belief.
To be relieved of the binding effect of the settlement agreement, the appellant must demonstrate "good cause" or "any justification in law or equity" Klein, for so relieving her, and needs
to have been timely in bringing up the issue to prevent a claim of
reasonable reliance to the detriment of the respondant.
Of the three cases cited earlier in the Summary of Argument
section above, only Klein is a domestic case.

In domestic cases,

the district court has wide discretion, and the broadest equitable
powers.

In Klein the test imposed on those who would repudiate a

stipulation is stated.

It is stated in forgiving terms.

The Klein

requirement is only that "any justification in law or equity
be shown".

There are cases reported in a number of other states

concerning when a party can be relieved from a stipulation previously entered into, whether in writing or in open court.
Baird v. Baird, 494 P2d. 1387, (Wash 1972)?
Chemical Industries Inc.,

Cartwright v. Atlas

593 P.2d 104, (Oakla 1978);

v. Marker, 403 P.2d 588, (Idaho 1965);
v. Bialac, 529 P.2d 1185, (Ariz 1975);

Call

Harsh Building Company
Runyon v. City of Neosho

Rapids, 585 P.2d 1069, (Kansas 1978); and Thompson v. Turner, 558
17

P.2d 1071, (Idaho 1977).
These cases, although on point, are no better at articulating
what is a good enough reason to set aside a stipulation, than are
the Utah cases.

They all allow a party

to be relieved from a

previous stipulation if there is a good reason, and if the question
of repudiation arises early enough.
A petition

to modify a decree of divorce is essentially the

reopening and reconsideration of a divorce, based on new materially
and substantially changed facts.

Although there are contitutional

provisions, statutes and case law involved,

the district

court,

hearing a petition to modify a divorce decree, sits for the most
part as a court of equity.
The appellant deserves an equitable outcome to her petition,
both as to substance

and procedure.

So does

the

respondant.

Although the appellant believes the terms of the stipulation are a
very bad deal for her, and although your author agrees, the equitable question to be decided is not concerning the substance of the
stipulation.

It is simply whether or not, under these specific

circumstances, the appellant can be relieved from the depositive
and binding effect of it.
Judge Sawaya asked of appellants counsel at the time of hearing
"Did she feel intimidated to the point she
felt she could not object at that time?"(T9,25)
Appellants counsel responded
"I believe she did."(T10,2)
It is difficult

to argue from the known

facts exactly how

disappointed, dismayed, confused, and abandoned the appellant felt
18

while sitting in opposing counsels office June 5th, 1984, waiting
for a scheduled deposition.

What she should have done was tell her

then counsel she absolutely would not agree, and get up and leave.
But because of the time invested, the trust relationship developed
with counsel, the money spent, the authority figure counsel represented to her, and the obligation she felt to stay and complete a
scheduled deposition, she stayed.
She was afraid of the deposition itself, and especially afraid
to go through it with counsel who obviously did not want to go
forward.

She caved in.

She failed to say no.

She silently let a

stipulation be read into the record.
Clearly, under the circumstances, the appellant meets the Klein
test of "any justification in law or equity" for setting aside
stipulations in domestic cases.
With regard to timeliness, one only need look at the sequence
of events, to see that that the appellant was timely within her
powar to be timely, and that the respondant did not reasonably
rely on the stipulation.

Even if he did reasonably rely on the

stipulation, it was to his benefit, not detriment.
The stipulation recorded at the scheduled deposition was on
June 5th, 1984.

Shortly thereafter respondants counsel sent a

written version of the stipulation to appellants then counsel for
signature.

On July 5th, 1984, one month later, the respondant knew

the stipulation had not been signed and returned.

The respondant,

however, hoped the terms of the stipulation were in effect, and
sent the appellant two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) instead of
19

eiqhteen hundred

dollars

($1,800.00) as support.

On August

5th, two months later, respondant still knew the written stipulation was unsigned.
ing it.

His counsel was contacting Paul Laipis concern-

Respondant, again hoping the stipulation was in effect,

chose to send the extra two hundred dollars ($200.00).

On Septem-

ber 5th, three months since the stipulation was recorded, both the
respondant and his counsel knew the proposed stipulation was
unsigned and unreturned.

Both should have been concerned.

The

respondant again chose to send the extra two hundred dollars
($200.00).

On October 5th, four months later, the written stipula-

tion was unsigned and unreturned.

There should have been serious

concern on the part of respondant and his counsel.

Respondant

again chose to send the extra two hundred dollars ($200.00).

On

November 7th, 1984, five months later, appellants then counsel
withdrew as her counsel, sending notice to the respondant.

The

written stipulation had been neither signed nor returned.

The

respondant and his counsel knew or should have known the written
stipulation would not be signed.

The respondant again chose to

send the extra two hundred dollars ($200.00) in November of 1984.
On November 30th, 1984, appellants present counsel wrote respondants counsel and asked for items of discovery owed, but undelivered.

That letter requested the respondant make a motion to

enforce the stipulation if one was going to be made.

The letter of

November 30th, 1984 notified the respondant that the appellant did
not intend to be bound by the stipulation.

Again, in December,

1984, the respondant chose to send two thousand dollars ($2,000.00)
20

instead of eighteen hundred dollars ($1,800.00).
The respondants motion to enforce the terms of the stipulation
was not heard until April 15th, 1985.

In the months of January,

February, March and April of 1985, the respondant again chose to
send the extra two hundred dollars ($200.00) each of those months.
The respondant agrued at the time of hearing on April 15th,
1985, that he had reasonably relied to his detriment, that the
stipulation would be signed, and that he had expended eighteen
hundred ($1,800.00) (nine months at two hundred dollars per month)
in reliance upon the stipulation.(T16,25)
Obviously, the respondant wanted to rely on the stipulation,
w_ante<3 to send and have recieved the extra two hundred dollars
($200.00) per month, and conciously chose to ignore all indications
that there would be a dispute about it.

It was to the respondants

great benefit not detriment to send the money each month.

The

terms of the stipulation were most favorable to him, and acceptance
of the money each month by the appellant might provide him an
estopple agrument later.
Of course, the appellant kept the money sent each month.
Her only source of income was the support.

If she had not needed

more, she would not have petitioned to modify.
The appellant did all she could, and as soon as she could,
assuming as she did, that she should work through counsel to
examine the proposed written stipulation, and to noify the other
side she would not accept.

The respondant, on the other hand, sent

the extra money each month, without regard to the notice sent him
21

actual constructive

or implied.

It is reasonable to believe he

did so because of the potential benefit to him.

He did not rely on

the stipulation, but rather hoped it would be accepted.

If he did

rely, it was not reasonable reliance in the face of the notice he
had

recieved.

If he did reasonably rely, it was to his benefit,

not detriment.

22

CONCLUSION
An unusual set of circumstances led to the recording of a
stipulation in the office of respondants counsel on June 5th,
1984.

For all of the reasons outlined above, the appellant was

unprepared to enter into a stipulation that day.

Those unusual

circumstances, which led to her being surprised and overwhelmed on
June 5th, effectively kept her from being able to communicate
effectively with her lawyer, and from having sufficient time to
make an informed, prudent decision.
Any of the unusual circumstances outlined above, if taken
alone, meet the "any justification in law or equity" [Emphasis
Added] of the Klein case.

When taken in combination, we believe

they meet the "aood cause" test of any common law case on point
which the court may choose to apply.

Appellant was as timely as

she could be, and the respondant clearly did not reasonably rely to
his detriment.
Both the appellant and respondant were cut off just short of
trial, with virtually all discovery completed.

The decision of the

lower court should be reversed, as an error of law, misapplication
of the law, or as a decision not supported by the preponderance of
the credible evidence.

The matter should be remanded for further

proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of August, 1985.

AW6?**
David A. McPhie, Esq.
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hererby certify that I hand delivered two copies of the
foregoing Brief to attorney for respondant, Bert L. Dart, at his
office located at 310 South Main Street, Suite #1330, Salt Lake
City, Utah, on this 20th day of August, 1985.
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on this the 15th day of
April, 1935, the above-entitled and numbered cause came on
for hearing before said Honorable Court, Honorable James S.
Sawaya, Judge presiding, in Salt Lake City, Utah, County of
Salt Lake, whereupon the following proceedings were had,
to
wit:
w w
»» -»_ w •

rnynr
J. u u

COURT:

Back to number one, Carol A.nn Barker

Brown ver sus Bryant Jerome Brown, defendant's motion for
order approvi ng and enforcing a settlement agreement.
Mr. Dart, you appear for the defendant?
MR. DART:

This is the defendant's motion.

representing the def endant and making the motion.

I am

Has the

Court had an opportunity to read the motion and affidavit
in supper t thereof?
THE COURT:
MR. DART:
THE COURT:

I have to confess I haven't.
I will lay out the facts very quickly.
David McPhie appears for the

plaintiff , and do you want this reported, counsel?
MR. DART:
MR. McPHIE

I don't think a record is necessary.
It may be necessary to have it

reported.
MR. DART:

Your Honor, the facts are that Mr. and

Mrs. Brown were formerly married to each other and were
divorced under the t erms of the decree of divorte, which

2

gave to Mrs. Brown custody of three children, provided her
support, alimony and visitation rights.

And in February of

'33, over two years ago, Paul Liaois representing her,
filed a modification asking for an increase in alimony and
child support.

On behalf of Mr. Brown, I filed a counter-

petition asking for an elimination of alimony and for
modification of visitation rights.

Through a year and

quarter's time frame, we engaged in substantial discovery
in the form of interrogatories, interrogatory answers.

I

had noticed the deposition of the plaintiff on the 5th of
June and Paul Liaois had filed a request for trial setting.
We were dealing against I think an August 12 trial date last
summer.

Mr. Liapis and I exchanged letters on that

settlement.
forth.

There were several letters that came back and

On the day before the deposition, which was set for

June 5th, Paul called me and said, "We are settled.

Why

don't we utilize the deposition time to make an agreement*
That agreement will then be put into a written form to
conform with an order."

On the 5th of June the court

reporter, all parties being present, related that we were
there to set down the agreement that we had reached and did
so.

The agreement effectively put a terminus point on

alimony.

However, it also reduced alimony, however,

increased support.

Instead of paying eighteen hundred

dollars a month, nine hundred dollars alimony and nine

3

hundred dollars support, the doctor's obligation, defendant's
obligation would be increased to a two thousand dollar
figure, two hundred dollars a month increase by stepping
up child support five hundred for a total of fifteen
hundred in the form of support, five hundred for alimony.
There is also a comprehensive agreement with
regards to visitation, what circumstances, holidays.
prepared a stipulation based upon that transcript.

I

There's

no question what the stipulation accurately reflected the
agreement of the parties.

I sent it to Paul Liapis.

We

had some problems in September I talked to him about.
stipulation was not signed.

He said he would get it signed.

He sent a letter to his client at that time.
time in July it took effect.

The

In the mean-

He started making the

increased payments of two hundred dollars a month, now,
ten months paid of two hundred more a month, a total of
two thousand dollars more than he's paid above what the
original order was based upon the stipulation, which amounts
have been received by the plaintiff without objection.
In addition, the trial date for August was
stricken.

I think the Court would find a letter from myself

indicating the case nad been

settled.

In November, I wrote

to Paul again saying, ,fI need a stipulation so we can close
this file out."
a withdrawal.

Next thing I received from Paul Liapis was
Then the next thing I received was

4

communication from Mr, McPhie indicating that he was

1

representing the plaintiff in this action and he wanted to

|

continue with discovery, and I inferred from that he did

j

not ax: that time—the plaintiff did not at that time acceot <
j

• the stipulation.

We were five months from the dav we sat

!
i
i

down and agreed, three or four months from the date that a
written stipulation had been presented, with no objection
being made, no indication that the stipulation wasn't
acceptable, with summer visitation based upon the stipula-

|

tion and with the payments, as I say, having been made by
Mr. Brown having the effect of the two thousand dollar
increase in the amount paid over what he was ordered to

1

under the original order, but also a reduction in the amount
that constituted alimonv.

So for this oast ten months, he's

1 been caving three hundred dollars a month less alimonv that
he cannot take as a deduction for his taxes. The short and
1
tall of it is the agreement is not—does not claim to be
unconscionable, does not claim to be contrary to what was
discussed and oresented in the presence of the olaintiff.
I There's only the claim that she doesn't want to at this
time.

Her conduct, sitting on it the last ten months,

accepting the benefits of it, should be basis for estoppel.
She should be bound by it.
j

The Court should enter an order.

THE COURT:

Mr. McPhie.

MR. McPHIE:

Thank you.

Mr. Dart's representations

5

of the facts essentially are accurate.

As far as his

recitation of facts went, this was commenced a couple years
ago.

There has been extensive discovery.

formerly represent Mrs. Brown.

Mr. Liapis did

There was a trial date set

in the summer of '34, I believe.

And prior to that, there

were in the spring of '84 negotiations for settlement;
offers being sent back and forth.

There was a deposition

for Mrs. Brown scheduled by Mr. Dart and I have no reason
to disbelieve Mr. Dart's assertion that Mr. Liapis called
him prior to the day the deposition was set for, which was
June 5 of '84, indicating chat he believed there was a
settlement and that Mr. Dart expected that when Mr. Liapis
and his client came to that deposition, they would be
stipulating.

That's where the facts diverge, however.

Brown would testify—she has an affidavit m

Mrs

the file to

the effect that aitnough they were discussing settlement
offers being made by xr. Dart and they were responding to
them with counteroffers and they were going back and forth,
she was always being assured by Mr. Liapis that the things
that she had asked for in her original petition in the way
of increases in support were justified.

This was the basis

for her retaining him at the outset and that was her
position throughout, including the spring of '84 when they
were discussing the possible settlements that were being
discussed back and forth.

6

Her further testimony would be that on the actual
day of the deposition, June 5th, f 34, at his office, being
Mr. Dart's office, Mrs. Brown learned for the first time
that her former counsel essentially no longer believed chat
she would come out as he had led her to believe throughout
the entire period, that: he not only had received the
settlement offers from Mr. Dart but that he believed that
she should accept them.

This is the—I suppose the

disconcerting item to her is it was that day that she first
learned or came to understand that he not only was reciting
to her what: they were offering.

He had changed his

position and felt that she should accept it and she did noi;
understand that until up to that time and was very dismayed
about: it, felt that she was being pur in the position of
"If you agree to this, you can avoid having your deposition
taken."
Now, you and 1 would not fear having our deposition
taken.

Mrs. Brown had not, I believe, had her deposition

ever taken before, was afraid of it, did not understand what
it exactly entailed, apparently, and in the face of having
spent a lot of time with Mr. Liapis, acquiescing somewhat
in the face of authority figure to her, being very dismayed,
being very confused, not knowing what to do, then proceeded
into a room where this deposition was reported.
pages in length.

I have read it carefully.

It is ten

Mr. Dart

7

speaks on the record.
the record.

The defendant, Mr. Brown, speaks on

Paul Liapis speaks on the record.

Carol Brown, my client, speak on the record.

Never does
Her testimony

would be that she did not understand the agreement.
wasn't in agreement with it.

She

She felt bushwhacked and

ambushed on the day of the deposition.

She, for the first

time, had her attorney advising her that she had to do it
under the pain of having her deposition taking, which she
didn't understand and she was not in agreement with it and
said nothing about it on the record.
Mr. Dart argues that my client has taken the
benefit of the two hundred dollar increase for ten months
now and acquiesced and benefited from the stipulation while
she seeks to get out of it.
simply this:

The facts surrounding chat are

Mrs. Brown would testify that after having

left Mr. Dart's office, it was her understanding that Mr.
Liapis would be preparing a stipulation, turns cue that it
was agreed that Mr. Dart would prepare it.

Mr. Dart sen: a

written stipulation, which I have also read and which does
fairly reflect that which was taken down an the deposition,
to Mr. Liapis and asked him to have his client sign itQ
Mrs. Brown was not contacted by Mr. Liapis until two ana a
half months after the deposition—was the first time she ^as
ever notified that he had produced a written document of
what ourported to be the stipulation and that she was to

8

When she got notice that he had it, it was because

1

sign it.

2

he sent h er a letter wi th the copy which she immediately

3

read and was di.smayed to see what ;Lt said and tried to make

4

i an appointment to see M r. Liapis to discuss i t.

Her

testimony wouldI further be for the first time she tried to

5

j
6 I get in to discuss in she was told she wouldn't get an
i

appointment for three weeks.

8

went to go to the appointment three weeks later, she was

9

told when she got there that they had been trying to get

The next time she went—she

10 ahold of her not to come because Mr. Liapis was out of town.
11 J There was approximately another month or more delays in
12 getting together with Mr. Liapis.

So you are now three and

13 I a half months from the deposition date when she finally got
14 I to him with a written copy and discussed it and said she
15 felt the terms were very unfair and unreasonable.

I will

16 indicate to the Court in a moment what the terms are—is
17 J when the dispute arose between them. She would not sign.
He did not want to continue to represent her.
18

THE COURT:

Wasn't she present when the terms of

19

the stipulation were stated for the record?
20

MR. McPHIE:

She was.

21

THE COURT:

Did she recant or object at that tLme'^

22

MR. McPHIE:

She said nothing.

23

THE COURT:

Well, I suppose what we ought to d o -

24

why not?

Did she feel intimidated to the point she felt

25

9

sae could not object at that time?
MR. McPHIE:

I believe she did.

Then is when

Mr. Liapis withdrew as counsel and that was the first
notice that Mr. Dart had really that the stipulation would
never be signed, but you are now talking four months since
the stipulation was entered into on the record, and in
fairness to Mr. Dart, he didn't knew for four months.

He

knew—I should say he had reason to suspect when he didn't
get a signed stipulation from counsel.

Since that time it

is true she's taken the additional two hundred dollars and
frankly she's asked if she should continue to take that,
and that's eighteen hundred dollars moved up to two thousand
dollars, and she may have been advised to hang on to that
money because the result of this was not yet clear. Vie
filed a request for additional discovery.

Coviously, Mr.

Dart then discovered that certainly we were not intending
to sign the stipulation and he mace this motion to confirm
the stipulation which was previously taken on June 5th, as
per order of the Court.
We seek now to avoid that, after two years time
and many many thousands of dollars on both sides and being
nearly ready for trial to simply try the case, and there's
a case, Your Honor, cited by the Utah Supreme Court in 19 75Mr. Dart already has a copy and, in fact, may have a copy
in the file alreadv because I believe Mr. Dart submitted

10

a copy of this case when it was argued before the
Commissioner—it's a divorce case.

The facts are not

exactly the same but: the Supreme Court: of the State managed
to articulate, in Kline, a number of points of law
surrounding stipulations, especially in domestic cases.

I

think that some of the things that are pointed out in the
!

Kline case are the differences between stipulation of facts

j

and stipulations to outcome i n a domestic case, which is
essentially equitable in its nature.

The difference between

jwhether you should let a person out of a stipulation in a
| domestic matter based on reasonable reliance of the party
! who has relied on the stipula tion and timeliness.

1
i

It makes I

distinctions in terms of whether the Court thinks that a
stipulation is fair.

One of the things that I discover in

this work of domestic work, the Court is not bound by the
stipulation in domestic cases
{can enter different rulings.

He can take them as advisory,1
We see that where a wife

wants to take too little chil d support or where parties want
to have joint custody of the children and the Court simply
won't approve.
Let me just address those for a second.

This is

a stipulation totally with regard to outcome, not a single
fact is stipulated to.

There was no information in this

about the income of Dr. Brown , whether it did increase or
whether it didn't increase.

With regard to him having relied

11

to his detriment, it is true he has paid according to the
stipulation that was entered into ever since July of 1934,
but he's known since some rime in the late fail of

'84 that

4 ! that was not accepted by Mrs. Brown, yet: he's chosen to
I
5 I continue it. Why? Well, he would like to be able to argue
6

day past conduct and in the course of dealing and it's an

7

insignificant amount to Dr. Brown.

8

dollars moved up to two thousand dollars.

9

explained the terms of the stipulation.

It's eighteen hundred
Mr. Dart has
Mr. Brown formerly

10

had in the divorce decree nine hundred dollars alimony,

11

nine hundred dollars child support.

12

that her alimony decrease immediately four hundred dollars

13

and drop off completely to zero in another two years.

The stipulation provides

But

H i it does provide for an increase of two hundred dollars per

i
15 j child in child support.

Child support goes up six and

16 ! alimony goes down four, and she ends up with two hundred
17 j dollars a month increase but in two years she ends up with
18 J a four hundred dollars a month decrease.
If that's a good
!
19 ! outcome for Mrs. Brown, in the face of the discovery that
20

was already in the file when the stipulation was taken or

21

recorded, I don't know what a bad outcome would be.

22

The documentary evidence is that Dr. Brown's

23

income has gone somewhere between fifty and sixty

thousand

24

dollars at the time of the decree to up between ninety and

25

a hundred thousand dollars at present.

That's not including

12

money he pays into a pension and profit-sharing plan that

«

would kick it up over a hundred thousand dollars.

j

came out behind it wasn't a good deal.

If she

I don't think this

is binding in the case of equity upon this Court.

;
!

With regard to the argument that she wasn't

j

timely, it was four months before she could even get

j
I

together with Mr. Liapis and find our what the stipulation

]

that had been sent to her was.

She knew as soon as he with- i

drew, which was as soon as she could talk to him, that she

I

didn't want to be bound by that, that she didn't agree to

j

it.

I

She thought she had been bushwhacked and if they sent

the money, additional monies, the Kline case clearly states

|

it is within the discretion of the Court to relieve either

J

of the parties of a domestic matter where just cause exists. I
I don't think he's relied to his detriment, certainly an

j

adjustment can be made at the time of rrial.

j

Ir's nor hard

to make an adjustment if this case is tried rhar will make

j

up to the two hundred dollars a monrh he has senr by simply

\

reducing ir, will reduce in his favor.

We think he will be j
I

!

obligated to pay more.
be timely.

She was timely within her power to

j

I think that it's unfair because if in the face j

of a massive increase by Dr. Brown gives her less money
overall, that's the reverse of what she went to counsel for, |
not a good deal for her, not fundamentally fair.
What it boils down to in my opinion is whether or
13

|

not in a domestic case where the parties are getting
together for the purpose of stipulating to outcome, where
this woman is going to get stuck with an agreement ore-made
between her attorney which she never understood or agreed
to, now, you can say she was there and she heard.

All I

can say to you is having had many divorce clients try to
recite back to me what they just agreed to in domestic
matters and not having them even come close, I can tell you
that it is very easy to misunderstand for a layman.

It is

very easy to misunderstand your attorney telling you what
proposed offer and what your own attorney tells you what he
thinks you should accept.

She didn't understand when you ar

in a case where a great deal of discovery has been done,
there is almost nothing left to do and she simply should
have the trial on the merits at this point.
As a back-up position, let me argue this.

The

stipulation should have some value but it shouldn't have the
value of her being held to it right now.

Let them put it

on at the time of trial, the evidence of what she was
willing to agree to on July 5, but if that is taken along
with the evidence that I would be able to present about
Dr. Brown's income and if the Court takes the stipulation
for what it is worth in comparison with all the other evidence, I am not afraid of the outcome.

But to simply order

that she is stuck with that, under the circumstances, I thir

14

if
we have shown some just cause and/the Supreme Court said
she could be believed from that, I think it simply is
setting us up to have another petition to modify and putting
her off for another period of time so that she can come
5

back and claim some change of circumstances.

We are too

i

6 J close to -he final outcome to waste everything that's been
7

done because of what was said in the stipulation.

8
9

MR- DART:

Very briefly, it needs to be kept in

mind that the settlement was reached in circumstances where

10

there was an August trial date, where there was a petition

11

for termination of alimony at that time, where the plaintiff i

12 | in this action has a college degree, had a teaching
13 ! certificate at one time, has a real estate license, where
14 ! the children at the time of the divorce were from three to
15 ! nine—by the time of the trial last August would be between
16 fourteen and eight and that the exposure of termination of
17

alimony while she was receiving counsel with Paul Liaois

18 | baraained for a two-vear alimonv award and two hundred
19

dollars step up, she came into the deposition afraid of the

20

deposition and for the first time, in her language, that

21

it completely amazed and bedazzled her, that it wasn't

22

until she got the stipulation two months later, she didn't

23

understand until then-

24

setting down all the issues and our position on all the

25

issues.

We wrote a letter to Mr. Liaois

Mr. Liapis sent us a four-page reply letter dated

15

May 10 talking about termination of alimony and a time
frame concerning alimony and support, visitation rights.
A copy of that letter was sent to Carol Brown on the 10th
of May.

Then sent another letter on the 30th of May with

some final adjustments.

Those letters were in the file and

apparently in the possession of the plaintiff before the
time of this deposition.

If she was surprised at the time

of the deposition, I think she had a duty to respond a
little quicker than she did.

She knew what had been said.

She could have contacted her attorney and let her know of
her reservation by phone, letter or some manner.
did do that.

She never

My last letter to Paul was the 2nd of

November saying, "Where are we on the stipulation?"
only after that that I received his withdrawal.

It was

The Kline

case does indicate—Mr. McPhie is correct this is an ared
where the Court has substantial discretion.

It is within

the Court's discretion to accept the stipulation and enforce
it or set it aside.

But in circumstances if this is not an

unconscionable stipulation, there is a situation that is in
the interest of justice that it be enforced unless there is
a justification for avoiding it.

As they say in the Kline

case, if there's any justification in law or equity for
avoiding or repudiating a stipulation and he timely does so.
he's entitled to be relieved from it, otherwise not.

We

have ten months of receipt of benefit, five months with not

16

a word.

We have had the loss of a trial date.

circumstances, there should be an estoppel.
THE COURT:
me.

Let me read this case.

Under the

Thank you,
It is new to

I will have you a ruling within a day or two.
MR. DART:

Thank you.
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Appendix "D1

S T I M U L A T I O N

1

MR. DART:

2

For the benefit of the record that

3 we're staring, we have been discussing with both clients
4 and both attorneys various settlement proposals that: have
5 gone back and forth over the past month and a half, two and
6 a half months, excuse me, and we now have reached a point
7 where we have a settlement understanding that we're all desirous
8 of having put down in writing.

And to that end we're going

9 to read it into the record, and then we'll obtain a transcript
10 so that any confusion that might exist in the future can
11 be clarified by that transcript and then there will be a
12 formal written stipulation and a formal order drafted based
13 upon the agreement we reached today.
The stipulation would be that in connection

14

15 with the currently pending petition for modification, that
16

that petition will be resolved by amendments and agreements

17

as follows:

18
19

Number 1, the alimony award currently existing
shall be modified to provide that Mrs. Brown, commencing

20 with July of 1984, will have her alimony payment reduced
21

from the current level of $900 to the sum of $500, and that

22

that payment shall continue for a period of two years, at

23 which time it will terminate.
24
25

And that this payment of alimony

shall be payable on or before the fifth day of each month.
It's been expressed that there are difficulties
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1

in the house payment being paid, and as an accommodation,

2

if the doctor can make payment before the 5th, he is of an

3

awareness that there is a desire that that be done.
I think it also ought to be expressed that the

4
5

moc ification of alimony is made on the contemplation that

6

by two years from now Mrs. Brown will have been able to have

7

SOUight

8

of the alimony award.

and obtained employment sufficient to allow a termination

9

The support will be modified commencing with

10

the month of July to be increased from the current amount

11

of $300 pe r child to the sum of $500 per child for each of

12

the three children.

13

on or before the 5th, and the payment of support shall continue

14

to age 21, on the same terms that existed in the decree of

15

divorce as to the conditions of which payment would continue.

16

I think th ose were that the children be, unless they became

17

mar ried or emancipated or not continue with their school.

Payments of support are due and payable

DLL BROWN:

18

It's eighteen unless they serve

19

a mission or go to college, aiid then it continues to age

20

twenty-one

21

MR. DART:

Whatever the terms of the decree

22

are , they will provide, except with the modification chat

23

any child not living at home will have the payment of support

24

pai d directly to the child after age eighteen.

25

MR. LIAPIS:

with the proviso that the Plaintiff

n/\iu\iv.N S M L N D L I ^ W O
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1

will have the right for enforcement of collection if they are

2

not paid directly to the child.
MR. DART:

3

The doctor also will agree to pay for

4

orthodontia treatment which has been provided to this time

5

by Dr. Gary Stephens, the outstanding bill at this time, and

6

I think it also should be expressed that he will have to possibly

7

make some arrangements to possibly make some installments,

8

but I don't know what it is.

9

That he, further, will be responsible so long

10

as there is an obligation for support, to pay the children1s

11

orthodontia and dentist expenses.

12

to continue to maintain the children on his health and accident

13

insurance, which has a $100 deductible.

14

or covered by insurance would be the responsibility of Mrs.

15

Brown for her health and treatment.

He shall further be responsibi

Any expenses not describ

The doctor also will continue in force his current

16
17

existing life insurance that has the children as beneficiaries,

18

and that obligation will continue so long as there's an obligatio

19

for support.

20

existing life insurance on Mrs. Brown so long as he has an

21

obligation for alimony.

22

on this, it's a $50,000, and also the children's is a $50,000

23

policy.

24
25

He will also continue in force his currently-

MR. LIAPIS:

It's my understanding that the policy

Further, the doctor will pay against

attorney's fees that have been incurred by Mrs. Brown in
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1
2

this proceeding.

The amount of these fees to the sum of $1,500.
l

\

! When?
MR. DART:

3

Within thirty days of billing.

And

4

I think that covers all of the financial items that we've discussed]

5

If it doesn't, let me know.
The agreement relating to continuation of health

6
7

insurance should have, as part of it, the understanding that

8

Mrs. Brown would have the obligation of providing to Dr. Brown

9

the medical and dental and orthodontal bills within a reasonable

10

time not to exceed thirty days of when they are received.

11

and I discussed this, assuming there is an item that has not

12

been discussed and not mentioned here, and so it is an item

13

of oversight, that either side would have the right to get

14

an agreement on that or have the Court solve ic.

15

MR. LIAPIS:

16

MR. DART:

Paul

That's correct.

The next item that has a financial

17

component is that the original decree of divorce provided chat

18

the Jordan Credit Union, Valley Bank, Olympus Branch, and Draper

19

Bank accounts that were accounus for the children be transferred

20

to Mrs. Brown.

21

it's his recall that he had provided you with signature cards

22

sufficient to do that and thought that that was an accomplished

23

fact.

24

of course, do that.

25

Dr. Brown thought that he had done that, and

If it is not an accomplished fact, he's willing to,

The stipulation will be that Mrs. Brown will
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1

provide to Dr. Brown the account numbers on each of the involved

2

accounts and that Dr. Brown will take whatever steps are necessai

3

to have his name removed from the accounts so that Mrs. Brown's

4

name can be placed on the accounts.
The next area is the area of Dr. Brown's rights

5
6

of visitation, and the understanding and agreement relating

7

to that visitation is that he will have reasonable rights of

8

visitation with the minor children, and that his rights of

9

visitation, in addition to anything we describe, will include

10

anything that the parties can mutually agree upon.
I put that in so that you're both aware that

11
12

you're not locked into this if you both agree to something

13 1 different.

But beyond that, his rights of visitation would

14

be to have, A, the children with him on alternate weekends

15

with that visitation right being altered from its current full

16 iweekend period to provide from Friday evening at 6:00 p.m.
17

to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m.

18

Two, the agreement is that Mrs. Brown will not

19

schedule any activites for the children which will in any way

20

conflict with Dr. Brown's visitation time without first consultir

21

with Dr. 3rcwn, and in the event that the parties are not able

22

to agree on such an activity being scheduled for Dr. Brown's

23

visitation time, then either party would have the right to

24

bring the matter before the Court for a determination.

25

Upon scheduling activities occurring at Dr.
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1

Brown's visitation time that he agrees that he will do whatever

2

is necessary to see that the children participate in that

3 1 activity.

And another element of that, Mrs. Brown will provide

4

reasonable advance notice of any of the activities that the

5

children are involved in, and that there be at least some

6

advance notice, as much as possible, of any of the activities

7

the children are participating in in which they are performing

8

in a competitive activity or in which they are participating

9

in front of an audience that includes adults or other parents.

10

Dr. Brown would have the right to have the children

11

on alternate holidays, and I think that's scheduled in the

12

decree of divorce.

13

which come on the weekend he has visitation, he'd have the

14

full weekend for three days, including Sunday.

15

have visitation on those weekends would be from Friday at

16

6:00 until Monday at 6:00 p.m.

And when those holidays are Monday holidays

So he'll

17

He would have the right to have the children

18

each New Year and during the Christmas holiday commencing

19

Christmas Day at 1:00 o'clock, that that visitation will

20

continue through the remainder of the Christmas vacation

21

unless there are less than five da3/s of Christmas vacation

22

before Christmas, and in that event, then the time will have

23

to be worked out so that she has at least five days during

24

the Christmas break.

25

j

That in the summer he will have the right to
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1

have them with him for a month, and this year that will be

2

the month of July.

3

provide an itinerary, and a reciprocal is that when Mrs.

4

Brown takes the children out of town, she will also provide

5

an itinerary for Dr. Brown.

That while he is out of town he will

That during the month of July while he is in

6
7

town

3

by phone and they will have the right to contact hei" by phone,

9

and she'11 be entitled to have one visit with them during

10

Mrs. Brown will have the right to contact the children

thac time.

11

The visitation each summer will be agr<Eied upon

12

with Dr. Brown to notify you at least sixty days in advance

13

of when he would like to have the month, and at the same

14

time you and he work out an agreement as to one day during

15

that period chat you would have the right to have them.

16

the same understanding on the right to converse with them

17

while they' re in town by telephone would exist and <=.lso the

18

need to provide you with an itinerary would also exist.

19

And

The understanding is that the parties will consult

20

at least ninety days before the beginning of the summer of

21

their anticipated schedules to make sure that there are no

22

conflicts and to try and flex around potential conflicts

23

that might exist.

24

have the right to ask the Court to resolve it if it gets

25

to that point.

If there is a conflict, either party would
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1

And further, Dr. Brown would represent that

2

as soon as he knows when he might be going, even if it's

3

five or six months in advance, he'll provide you with that

4

notice.

5

opp ortunity to register for summer activity that requires

6

an early registration, you'll notify the doctor so he can

7

let you know whether that might conflict with his plans.

8

And again, the hope is there will be mutual accommodation.

Also, if the children are going to be offered an

|

!

The next item is the doctor will have the right

9
10

to visit with the children frequently at times other than

11

tho se outlined provided that the visitation does not conflict

12

wit h important activities in which the children are involved.

13

The next, Mrs. Brown will allow either Dr. Brown

14

or his present wife to pick up and return the children, but

15

in the event that it's the current Mrs. Brown picking them

16

up, that she will honk for the children and drive away.

17

the children do not come or she's notified when the children

18

will be there within five minutes, then she'll have the right

19

to go to the door and get that

If

!

i

information.

We'll provide, relative to the life insurance

20
21

on the children, that the three children will remain as

22

beneficiaries on that policy so long as there's an obligation

23

for support of any child.

24

for support, then the obligation to maintain the policy will

25

terminate.

As soon as there's no obligation
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1

That so long as the policy is in force, if any

2

of the children are no longer supported, Mrs. Brown would

3

have the right to notify Dr. Brown of her desire to elect

4

that the policy have the names of the non-supported child

5

removed from the policy so it enters the benefit of only

6

the supported children.

7
8

The doctor will provide evidence that both of
his life insurance policies are currently in force.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
10
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C E R T I F I C ATE

1

STATE OF UTAH
i
3 j COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
2

§
§
§

ss.

4
I, Cecilee Gruendell, do hereby certify that

5
6

I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in

7 the State of Utah; that as such Rep orter I attended the hearing
8 of the foregoing matter , and thereat reported in stenotype
9 all the statements and proceedings had therein; that thereafter
10 I caused to be transcribed my said stenographic notes into
11 typewriting, and the foregoing pages numbered from 2 to 10 ,
12 inclusive, constitute a full, true, and correct report of
13 the same.
14

Dated at Salt Lake Ciuy, Utah, this 15th day

15 of June, J 984.
16
17
18
19
Cecilee Gruendell
C.S.R. License No. 167

20
21 My commission expires:
22 March 10, 1986.
23
24
25
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of any material fact, cannot change his
relationship to the coiporation and to
appellants. The objection which appellants may urge to respondent's position is
not that respondent wrongfully assigned
the lease to Ansonia, but that he now contends that, because of such assignment,
he is, from the date of the assignment,
free from the obligation to pav rent
The court held the assignor was obligated
to pay rent up until the time he divested
himself of the ownership of the assignee's
stock.
A uniquely comparable situation exists
fiere. It is obvious the sole purpose oi
Gregory's assignment to the corporation
was to escape his personal responsibility
and liability under the lease. This clearly
is precluded under National Bank of Commerce v Dunn, sup}a. The onl> distinguishing feature would be the 55,000 payment provision. Since the assignment is
noperatue so long as defendant (Iregorv
•etains controlling interest in Gra> Building, Inc there is no occasion for the defendant to pay the $5,000 pursuant to the
ease provision. The fact that he paid
.he $5 000 does not make the assignment
operative
fudgrnent is ievened md the case is renanded to the trial court to enter judgment in accordance with this opinion
EVANS and GREEN, J J , concur
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A l e x a n d e r SAIRD,

Respondent.

No. 1067-1.
Comt ot Vppoils of \V tshutifton.
Div Mini 1, IMiu'l One
M.ucli JO 107J.
[Divorced wite moved to vacate decree
is it pertained to division of property
The "Miperor Lourt K ng ( ountv B [
vfeLean } , denied motion and piamt'tf ip-

pealetl The Court of \ppeals. Callow, 1 ,
held that evidence supported tmding that
stipulation concerning property had been
entered into with understanding of parties
Affirmed.

1. Stipulations C»6, 7
Stipulation is binding on parties if it is
arrived at pursuant to rule requiring
agreement between parties to be made and
consented to m open court before court reportei and statute granting attorney authority to bind his client by his agreement
dul\ made, but providing that court should
disregard stipulation unless it is made in
open court or signed by part) against
whom it is sought to be enforced or his attornev RCWA 2.44.010. CR 2A.
2. Appeal and Error G=»i25
Onl> if fraud, mistake, misunderstanding or lack or jurisdiction is shown will a
judgment in consent be reviewed on appeal. RCW \ 2 44 010, C R 2 \
3. Stipulations 0=^5
With tespect to stipulation, function of
trial court is to ascertain that parties and
counsel understand it and to implement it
RCW \ 2 44010, CR2A.
4. Stipulations C=M3
A trial court's decision that a stipulation was entered into with understanding
and agreement of parties will not be disturbed where it is supported b\ evidence
RCW \ 2 44 010 CR2A
5. Stipulations C»I3
\ trial court has discretion to relieve
a party from a stipulation when it is
shown that relief is nece^an. 'o pi event
in justice and that granting of relict will
not place adverse party at disadvantage bv
having acted in reliance upon the stipulation RCW \ 2 44 010 CR 2 \
6. Divorce C=249(2)
\ stipulation disposing of propcrtv in
t divorce case is subject to court ipproval.
RCW \ 2 44010, CR 2 \
7. Oivorce 0249(2)
T n i l courts approval or stipulation
disposing ot propertv in divorce ca^e will
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not be disturbed unless there is a clear and
manifest abuse of discretion. RCWA 2.44.010; CR 2A.
8. Stipulations C=>2I

Evidence supported finding" that stipulation concerning property had been entered into with understanding of parties

Stern, Gayton, Neubauer & Brucker,
Robert E. Prince, Seattle, for appellant.
K. David Lindner, Seattle, for respondent.
CALLOW, Judge.
In October 1968, the plaintiff wife fiied
suit for divorce and shortly thereafter the
defendant husband filed an answer and
counterclaim. There was a settlement conference in April 1970, which did not culminate in a written agreement, ana the matter came on for trial in August 1970, with
both parties represented by the counsel that
had represented them since the commencement of the action. Counsel informed the
court that attempts had been made at settlement without success, and fhe court inquired of the plaintiff if sne would hke additional t*me to attempt settlement. She
agreed
Following a recess through the morning,
counsel for plaintiff stated that an agreement had been reached, and he called the
plaintiff to the stand She testitied in part
as follows
Q Have the two of \cu, Mrs Baird, arm e d at a diviston ot the property,
both separate and community that is
satisfactory to you'
A I am sorry, I don't—still don't know
what ,t is. I thought it was $80,000
and now I see the figure is $66,000,
and I just don't—
0 Let me ask vou the question- Under
the terms of the settlement that we
have worked out is Mr Baird to receive the apartment house that s referred to as the F r edenck \partment
house ?

A Yes.
Then followed Questions and answers
concerning the agreements regarding the
dwelling house, certain securities and pension rights Then plaintiff was askedO You want to receive from Mr. Baird
$51,672 in cash, is that correct, with
one exception, that from the $51,672
Mr. Baird, in order to have some
cash on hand, vvill give >ou a 6% 18month promissory note for $5,000 so
that in effect rather than to get
$51,672 in cash vou will receive initially $46,672 plus the $54)00 note, is
that correct ?
A Yes. That's right.
After questioning immaterial to this appeal, the counsel further inquired.
0 And the $51,672 and the $18,000 totals
$69,672 and the one-half interest in
the house when t is ^old would bring
your share up virtually above
$80,000 >
\ Yes
Q Now, Mr Baird s *o, is I ^a\, *eceive the Fredenck \partment house
and that vou would then execute to
him a deed, quit claim vou to him
vour interest in the apartment house5
A Yes
O And Mr Baird would receive the
stocks and bonds that ire currenth
held by the two of vou with a market
value as of a da\ or so ago of
$30,316*
\ Uh-huh.
Q So that his share, based on an evaluation of the apartment of $42,000 net
would bring his share also to $69 672
plus one-half interest in the house'
V Yes.
This iS the essence of the recitation It
reflects that the plamtitf understood the
terms of the agreement. She retired from
the stand without comment or objection.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
a Decree ot Divorce were entered on August 28. 1970, with both counsel present

BAIRD v BAIRD
( ito i s Wash Apj>

and with plaintiffs counsel acknowledging
receipt ot copies on the documents
\ motion to \acate the decree as it per
tamed **o the division of properties was
filed by newly renamed counsel beptember
28, 1970 The plamttft claimed the stipulation was a surprise and that she did not
understand the proceedings
Plaintiff claims as error the denial of
the motion to vacate as it pertained to the
property settlement and tailure to do substantial justice bv allowing the stipulation
to stand as it pertains to propertv rights
CR 2A regarding stipulations requires an
agreement between parties to be made and
consented fo in open court before a court
reporter RCW 2 44 010 grants an attorney authont> to bind his client bv his
agreement dulv made but states in part,
that the court shall disregard a stipulation
unless it is made in open court or signed
b> the party against whom the same is alleged or his attorne>
[1 2] A stipulation a r m e d at in this
manner is binding on the parties Cook v
Venmgerhoiz 44 \\ ash 2d 612 269 P 2d
824 1954) QnK it tranri. mistake, misunderstanding or lack of
unsdiction is
snown will a judgment bv consent pe j:eWashington Asphalt
viewed on appeal
i Wash 2d 89
Co "v Harold Kaeser Co
316 P2d 126 (1^57)
[3] The tunction ot the tnai court is to
ascertain that the oarties and counsel understand *"he stipulation Jones v Jones 23
Wash 2d o57, 161 P 2d 8^0 (1945), and to
implement that agreement
[4] \ trial court s decision f hat a stipulation was entered with the understanding
and agreement of the partes will not be
disturbed where it is supported b> the evidence In Deer v Deer 29 Wash 2d 202
186 P2d 610 ^947)
>he court reviewed
the record concerning in order denying
modmcat on ot i propert\ settlement
reached bv stipulation ind retused to interfere with the trial courts decision that the
stipulation wis understood by the parties
Halvorsen v Halvorsen, 3 Wash App 827

Wash
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479 P2d lol (1^70) was concerned with
whether a plaintiff wife w is mcntilly ca
pable of making a knowing decision regarding pioperty rights The trial court
was upheld in its finding that plaintiff had
adequate representation and was cipable ot
making a knowing decision
Substantial
evidence was in the record to support such
a finding, and the party was bound by ner
action
[5] j \ trial court has discretion to re-_
he\e a party from a stipulation when it is
shown that relief s necessary to prevent
injustice and fhe granting of the reliet will
not place the adverse party at i disadvantage bv having acted in reliance iponjhe
stipulation State v Wehinger 182 Wash
JST47"P2d 35 (1935) Stevenson v Hazard, 152 Wash 104, 277 P 450 (1927)
In Schmidt v Schmidt, 40 Wis 2d 649
162 N \ \ 2d 618 (1968), it was apparent
t r om the record that the parties and their
attorneys discussed at length with the trial
ludge the value ot the property involved
The rinding that the parties stipulated ind
agreed on the value ot tne properties and
the property settlement was upheld
The
court stated in part as tollows at o21
Stipulations in divorce actions are in
"he nature ot a contract
rotations
omitted] Knd oral stipulations made in
ooen court during trial taken down by
••he reporter and acted upon bv the parties and the court ire valid and binding
[citations omitted] The discretion ot
the trial court to relieve parties trom
stipulations when improvident or induced
by traud misunderstanding or mistake
or rendered inequitable by fhe dex elop
ment ot a new situation is \ egil dis
cretion to be exercised in the promotion
ot justice ind equitv and here must be
a platn case ot traud misunderstanding
or mistake to ustitv re! et
[citation
omitted]
[6 7] \ stipulation disposing ot proo
ertv m a divorce case is subject to court
ipproval Munroe v Munroe 27 Wish 2d
^ 6 178 P2d 983 (1947) and such ipprov
il ot i propertv division will not >e dis
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turbed unless there is a clear and manifest
abuse of discretion. Mayo v. Mayo, 75
Wash.2d 36, 448 P.2d 926 < 1968); State ex
rel. Gould v. Superior Court, 151 Wash.
413, 276 P. 98 (1929); Lynn v. Lynn, 4
Wash.App. 171, 480 P.2d 789 (1971); Rehak v. Rehak, 1 Wash.App. 963, 465 P.2d
687 (1970).

lation concerning the property was entered
with the understanding of the parties. An
examination of the record also discloses
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by initially and ultimately approving
the disposition of the property.
The judgment is affirmed.

[8] The record reflects sufficient evidence to support the finding that the stipuWILLIAMS and JAMES, J].f concur.
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T..niHIv J. CARTWRIGHT, James F. Murphy, and Stephen A. Little, Co-Administrators of the Estate of Ira L. Lauderdale Deceased, Appellees,

ATLAS CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES, INC.,
a Foreign Corporation, Appellant.
No. 50527.
Court of Appeals of Oklahoma,
Division No. 1.
April 18, 1978.
Rehearing Denied May 23, 1978.
Certiorari Denied March 19. 1979.
Released for Publication by Order of
Court of Appeals March 22, 1979

Coadministrators of estate of worker
who was fatally injured in explosion
brought action against manufacturer of
blasting caps alleging survival cause o( action for benefit of estate seeking damages
for pain and suffering and reimbursement
of medical expenses and wrongful death
action The District Court, Creek County,
Charles S. Woodson, J , entered judgment
in favor of coadministrators on jury verdict,
and manufacturer appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Box, P J , held that (1) evidence
was sufficient to establish prima facie case
of manufacturer's product liability, (2)
manufacturer failed to properly preserve
objections that hypothetical questions asked
by coadministrators contained facts not m
evidence, (3) court did not abuse discretion
in qualification of witnesses as experts in
explosives and packaging; (4) statement of
worker to attending physician concerning
accident was properly admitted under res
gestae exception to hearsay rule, (5) where
pathologist testified concerning autopsy
findings insofar as they bore upon life expectancy of worker, refusal to admit autopsy report was not error; (6) refusal to allow
withdrawal of stipulation by manufacturer
was not abuse of discretion. (7) award of
$50,000 for nam and suffering was ^upported by evidence and was not induced by

bias or prejudice of jury; (8) award of
$200,000 to widow for pecuniary losses and
loss of services was not excessive; (9) evidence was sufficient to establish that worker contributed money, aid and services of
pecuniary value to daughters for purposes
of supporting award to daughters, and (10)
prejudgment interest was properly awarded
on amounts recovered under survivorship
and wrongful death causes of action.
Affirmed.

1. Explosives $=»12
In order to establish onma facie case of
manufacturer's products liability, plaintiffs
must prove: (1) that product was cause of
injury, (2) that defect existed in product at
time it left possession and control of manufacturer, and (3) that defect made product
unreasonably dangerous to user or his property
2. Explosives o=>l2
In action against manufacturer of
blasting caps for death of individual who
allegedly dropped box of caps, evidence was
sufficient to establish prima facie case of
manufacturers products liability in that inferences could be drawn that product as
packaged made it unreasonably dangerous
to user and product was cause of injury.
3. Trial c»178
In determining whether evidence is
sufficient to establish prima facie case of
manufacturer's product liability, evidence
must be viewed in light most favoraDte to
plaintiffs and all evidence tending to derogate plaintiffs' position must be disregarded.
4. Products Liability o=>82
Circumstantial evidence may be relied
upon in manufacturer's product liability
case.
5. Trial o » 139.1(7)
Motion for directed verdict should not
be sustained unless there is entire absence
of proof showing plaintiff's ngnt to recovery-
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6. Explosives c=»12
Where evidence of both sides in products liability action against manufacturer of
blasting caps was conflicting, it was function of jury to determine rights and liabilities of parties
7. Appeal and Error <s» 1001(1)
Where there was competent evidence
which reasonably tended to support jury
verdict against manufacturer of blasting
caps in products liability action, verdict
would not be disturoed on appeal
8. Evidence c=» 553(4)
Hypothetical questions must be based
upon facts as to which there is such evidence that jury might reasonably find that
such facts are established.
9. Evidence o=» 553(2)
Only omission of material facts which
are essential to formation of intelligent
opinion on matter will be fatal to hypothetical question.
10. Appeal and Error o=>231(6)
To preserve eiror on appeal, opposing
counsel must specifically ooject that hypothetical question includes facts not m evidence, or error, if anv, cannot be raised on
appeal; such objection should point out the
facts improperly mcluded or omitted.
11. Appeal and Error c=>206(2)
Objection that hypothetical question
omitted material data cannot be raised for
first time on appeal
12. Appeal and Error c=> 231(6)
Where manufacturer^ objections went
to expertise ot four witnesses or were merely general objections, manufacturer failed
to properly preserve objections that hypothetical questions asked of witnesses contained facts not in evidence in products
liability action against manufacturer of
blasting taps
13. Evidence c=>546
Question ol whether witness is sufficiently qualified to testify as expert is preliminary question fo be determined by trial
court and qualification of witness is c\pert
is matter addressed to sound duscrttion of
the court

14 Evidence G=>542
As expert in field of chemical engineering, witness could properly give his opinion
as to chemical reactions of three explosives
contained Within blasting cap for purposes
of products liability action against manufacturer of blasting cap
15. Evidence s=»542
Ruling that witness was unqualified to
give opinion as to exact amount of impact
necessary to cause detonation of blasting
cap did not mean that witness, who was
chemist familiar with explosives, could not
express opinion that detonation could occur
given sufficient quantity of impact.
16. Evidence c=»536
Where packaging engineers were suffi
ciently qualified to testify regarding custom
packaging, engineers could give opinion as
to packaging of blasting caps, notwithstanding that neither engineer had packaged explosives
17. Evidence o=*128
Where worker was subjected to violent
explosion which tore both his lower legs
from his body as well as causing other
severe injuries, worker was conscious at all
times, was m severe pain and was within
hours of his death, statement by worker to
physician concerning accident vas spontaneous, not deliberative, and was provoked
or influenced by Happening of accident so as
to become a part thereof, thus, doctor s
testimony concerning worker's statement
was admissible under res gestae exception
to nearsay rule
18. E\idence o=> 123(1)
Time span between event and declarant s later expressions is simply element for
consideration, but is not controlling, in determining whether expressions are admissible unuer **es gestae exception to nearsay
rule
19. Evidence o=>US
Admissibilitv of statements under res
gestae exception to hearsay rule is largely
determined bv facts and circumstances of
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each case and should be left to discretion of
trial court.
20. Evidence o » 333(1)
In light of statements in autopsy report
which were outside expertise of pathologist
who performed autopsy, which were not
probative on issue which they were offered
to show, or which were speculative, autopsy
report was not admissible in its entirety in
products liability action against manufacturer of blasting caps where report was
offered by manufacturer to show that
worker who was killed in explosion was
suffering from disease processes which
would have shortened his normal life expectancy.
21. Trial <s»48
If document contains evidence which is
inadmissible, party offering document may
omit the inadmissible part and offer those
portions which are admissible.
22. Evidence c » 333(1)
Where pathologist testified concerning
autopsy findings insofar as such findings
bore upon life expectancy of worker killed
in explosion, refusal to admit autopsy report in evidence to show that worker suffered from conditions which would have
materially shortened his work and life expectancies was not error in products liability action against manufacturer of blasting
caps.
23. Stipulations c=»12
Standards for allowing withdrawal of
stipulation are: (1) ciear showing that fact
stipulated to is untrue; (2) motion to withdraw must be timely made; (3) good cause
must be shown for relief; (4) stipulated
fact must be one of material character
which changes rights of parties; (5) opposing party must not have detrimentally relied and changed his position; (6) failure to
allow stipulation will result in injustice to
one of parties, and (7) whether court abused
discretion.
24. Stipulations c=»l3
There are no grounds for relief from
stipulation if lack of knowledge is due to
failure to exercise due diligence.

-iES
25. Stipulations c=>12
Where motion by manufacturer in
products liability action to withdraw stipulation was not timely, fact of whether manufacturer did or did not manufacture blasting caps could have been ascertained with
due diligence prior to stipulation, and plaintiffs detrimentally relied on stipulation,
court did not abuse discretion in refusing to
allow manufacturer to withdraw stipulation
that manufacturer was engaged in business
of manufacturing, packaging and selling
blasting fuse caps.
26. Appeal and Error <»999(1)
Verdicts will not be interfered with in
appellate court if issues have been fairly
submitted under proper instructions.
27. Appeal and Error o=> 1004.1(1, 4)
Reviewing court has no right to place
limitations on amount of damages returned
by jury unless it is convinced amount of
recovery bears no relation whatever to evidence, or that it was induced by bias or
prejudice on part of the jury.
28. Damages <*=>96
Compensation for pain and suffering
rests in sound discretion of jury as there is
no market where pain and suffering are
bought and sold, nor any standard by which
compensation for it can be definitely ascertained, or the amount actually endured
determined.
29. Death c=>97
Where injuries sustained by worker
due to explosion included multiple blast
wounds to the face, chest and abdomen,
both of his lower legs were biown away, his
right hand was gone with near amputation
of his left hand and both eyes were severely
injured, worker was conscious during ambulance ride, and physician could not give
worker adequate pain medication, award of
$50,000 for pain and suffering was adequately supported by evidence and not induced by bias or prejudice on part of jury.
30. Death c=»99(4)
Award of $200,000 to widow for pecuniary loss and loss of services resulting from
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death of husband was not excessive where
widow was 56 vears of age, had been married to husband 32 and one-half years and
before he retired husband would have
earned approximately $60,000
31. Death e=>95(3)
Adult children can recover in wrongful
death action for death of father, for such
purposes, correct measure of damages is
pecuniary loss suffered by reason of death
of father.
32. Death c=>77
Evidence was sufficient to establish
that father had contributed monev, aid and
services with pecuniary value to adult
daughters for purposes of recovery by
daughters in action for wrongful death of
father
33. Appeal and Error ^=> 1004.1(1)
On appeal, matter is not vnether appellate court would have reached different
conclusion as to amount of damages suffered, only question which is presented on
appeal is whether there is competent evidence to sustain verdict
34. Appeal and Error c=> 1004.1(8)
Where jury was property instructed as
to measure of damages, there was competent evidence reasonaoly tending to support
verdict and it did not appear that jur\ was
swaved with passion or prejudice verdict n
wrongful death action would not oe disturbed on appeal
35. Trial o=>116
Rule that use of blackboards during
closing argument is matter within discretion of trial court applies w hether counsel
places figures on oiackboara prior to or
aurmg argument to jury
36. Trial s=>116
Use of blackboard containing damage
analysis as aid during: closing argument bv
coadministrators of decedents estate was
not abuse of discretion <n products liability
action
37. Interest 0=^9(2)
Since causes of action for personal injuries survives death ot injured paitv, pre-

judgment interest awarded when verdict
for damages by reason of personal injuries
is accepted is properlv allowable in survival
action 12 O S 1971, §§ 727, 1051.
38. Death &=> 104(6)
Interest <3=»39(2)
Prejudgment interest was not required
to be included in jury instructions and
merged in final verdict in survival cause of
action for benefit of estate seeking damages for pain and suffering, statute governing such prejudgment interest specifically required court to add interest onto the
verdict 12 O S 1971, §§ 727, 1051.
39. Interest s=>39(2)
Statute governing prejudgment interest allows interest if verdict is returned for
damages by reason of personal injuries,
thus, language of statute is broad enough to
include recovery of prejudgment interest
for wrongful death by reason of personal
injuries if action is brought by someone
other than person who sustained injuries.
12 O S 1971, §§ 727, 1053

Appeal from the District Court of Creek
Countv, Charles S Woodson, Judge
AFFIRMED
Jack B Sellers Law Associates, Inc by
Jack B Sellers, Sapuipa, tor appellees
Dan \ Rogers, W Michael Hill, Tulsa,
for appellant
BOX Presiding Judge
An appeal bv Atlas Chemical Industries,
Inc (Atlas), deiendant in the trial court,
from a manufacturers product liability
case P'amtiffs-apoeilees are the co-administrators of the estate of Ira L Lauderdale,
deceased, A ho brought a survival cause of
action for the oenefit of the estate seeking
damages for pain and suffering and reimbursement for meaicil expenditures and a
wrongful death action for the pecuniary
loss sufcred bv the beneticianes by reason
of the death of decedent The beneficiaries
consist of >he widow and two adult daughters
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Decedent was a sixty-one \ear old welder
who was employed by Cimarron Pipeline
Company (Cimarron). On September 8,
1971, decedent was in the process of moving
dynamite fuse caps when he allegedly
dropped a partially filled container causing
one or more of the caps to explode which, in
turn, caused detonation of the remaining
caps. Decedent died as a result of injuries
sustained in the explosion. The caps involved in the explosion were allegedly manufactured by Atlas. Plaintiffs brought
both the wrongful death and survivorship
causes of action based upon manufacturers'
product liability. Plaintiffs' main contention was that Atlas caps were high explosives capable of detonation when subjected
to impact force. Given this susceptibility,
the packaging of the caps was defective
inasmuch as the caps were not cushioned
from one another and would strike against
each other if dropped which made the product unreasonably dangerous to the consumer.
Plaintiffs initially sued American C\anamid Company (American C>anamid) and
Deupree Distributing Co , Inc. (Deupree) as
co-defendants
However, plaintiffs dismissed their causes of action against these
defendants without prejudice
Upon submission of the case to the jury, a
verdict was returned in favor of plaintiffs
in the total amount of $272,045 28 On
appeal, Atlas asserts nine propositions of
error which will be discussed under beparate
headings This court commends the parties
for the excellent briefs provided.
I

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Atlas' first contention is that plaintiffs
failed to establish a prima facie case inasmuch as the evidence failed to establish a
defect existed or that the defect caused the
accident and the trial court erred tn refusing to direct a verdict in favor of Atlas
[1] In order to establish a prima facie
case tn manufacturers' products habiltU under Kirkland \ General Motors Corv , Okl .
521 P2d 1353, plaintiffs mikst prme (1)
that the product v\as the cause ot the injury, (2) that the dU'ect existed in the prod-

uct at the time it left the possession and
control of the manufacturer; and (3) that
the defect made the prcxiuct unreasonably
dangerous to the user or his property. Unreasonably dangerous is defined at pages
1362-63 of Kirkland, as follows
"The article sold must be dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics."
Plaintiffs contend that the defect existed in
the packaging of the dynamite caps.
The parties entered into numerous stipulations, all of which are not necessary to
enumerate at this time. Stipulations 8 and
9 read as follows*
8 That it was intended by Atlas in
the manufacture and packaging and sale
and distribution of the caps it made during the time material to this case that the
caps would reach tne ultimate user or
consumer in the same and unchanged
condition was made and packaged by
them.
9 That it is agreed in this case such
Atlas caps as were sold to Cimarron Pipeline by Deupree, or if any, from American Cvanamid, were delivered to Cimarron in the same condition as when manufactured, packaged and sold by Atlas.
These two stipulations were sufficient to
establish element number two of plaintiffs
prima facie case Thus, plaintiffs had only
to prove a defect existed in the product
which caused the injury and the defect
made the product unreasonably dangerous
to the user
The parties further stipulated that it was
foreseeable to Atlas that dynamite caps
might be dropped by the user from heights
of four feet ana that Atlas nad the control
and discretion of choice of packaging materials, suoject to governmental regulations,
if any
In order to rule <>n Uias' first contention,
it becomes necessary to summarize the evidence presented bv the parties The transcript of evidence encompasses 687 pages.
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For this reason, the summary is not meant
to include a detailed account of each witness' testimony. The objections to various
portions of plaintiffs' evidence will be discussed under separate headings.
Plaintiffs' first witness was Lawson Dan
Glenn, a welder for Cimarron, who was
working with decedent on the date of the
explosion, September 8, 1971, between 7:30
and 8:00 A.M. Mr. Glenn and decedent
went to the shed to put protective covers
over the locks of the storage magazine.
They took no welding equipment in the
shed and nothing was present which could
have produced a spark. In order to put the
protective covers over the locks of the magazine, it was necessary to move the dynamite caps that were located therein. There
were two full cartons oi caps plus one partially filled carton with loose caps without a
lid (referred to as a tray). Mr. Glenn removed the first full box and handed it to
decedent. Decedent carried the box and set
it on the floor, 15 or 20 feet from the
magazine. Mr. Glenn reached to remove
the second full box while decedent was in
the process of setting the first upon f he
floor. The same procedure was followed
for the second full box of caps. The third
box was a partial carton with several boxes
removed so the remainder were loose. Mr.
Glenn handed decedent the partially opened
carton who proceeded to carry the bo\ to
set it on the floor. Mr Glenn squatted
down in front of the magazine to measure
the lock and then decedent said "Dan" in a
normal voice. Mr. Glenn raised and turned
toward decedent but all he saw was the
blast.
CIovis Dale Hester, president ol Cimarron, testified he bougnt all his caps from
Deupree and all the caps were stored in the
magazine.
Willis Dyer, Jr. was the office manager
for Cimarron for eighteen years and had
custody and control over the magazine box.
Mr. Dyer testified that the magazine contained two cartons* and one tray The last
6,000 caps purchased by Cimarron came
from Deupree dnd Cimarron nc\ur purchased elsewhere. No other brand besides

Atlab caps was in the magazine. The morning of the accident, Mr. Dyer had put the
tray back in the magazine. The tray was
partially filled with Atlas caps, some caps
had been removed and a rag had been
placed around it.
Willis Cummisky was the magazine keeper and manager for Deupree, an explosive
distributor. After June, 1965, Deupree only
received Atlas fuse caps and the oldest were
soid first.
Joseph E. Deupree testified during plaintiffs' rebuttal. Mr. Deupree was associated
with Deupree and supervised the record
keeping. Since 1965, Deupree delivered
only Atlas Number 6 caps and had never
sold Dupont fuse caps.
Dr. John D. Hesson treated decedent in
the emergency room. Dr. Hesson asked
decedent what happened and "he was moving some dynamite caps and he thought he
may have dropped them, and he said they
exploded."
Plaintiffs called as their first expert witness Robert J. Grubb. chief chemist of the
Warner Plant oi American Cyanamid Company who was familiar with the general
types of explosives manufactured in the
United States. Two chemicals contained
within the Atlas caps are HNM (Hexanitromannite) and Diazo (Diazodinitrophenyl)
and botn -vere considered by Mr. Grubb as
high explosives. He stated that impact or
shock energyr of sufficient quantity can detonate these explosives. There is a level of
impact above which all caps will detonate
and below which none will. There is also a
level of impact where some caps will detonate and others will not. On cross-examination, it was determined Mr. Grubb was
not qualified to testify on the exact amount
of force necessary to detonate a cap inasmuch as he had never performed drop tests
on Atlas caps, [f one cap in an Atlas tray,
containing 100 caps, exploded there is a
very high probability they all would detonate. In the explosion, the metal contained
in the shed would be torn into shrapnel and
thrown at hitrh velocity. The presence of
L,rnt or impurities in the cap increases lis
sensitiuU
Mr Grubb's opinion was that
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caps that were afforded no cushion from
one another with grit present in the caps
and dropped four feet would be unreasonably dangerous to the consumer.
Robert E. Fearon, a chemical engineer
educated in the fields of physics, chemistry
and mathematics who has detonated and
dissected caps to examine and analyze
them, was called as plaintiffs' second expert
witness. Atlas caps contain PETN (Pentaerythitol Tetranitrate), a very powerful
and quite sensitive explosive. Mr. Fearon
considers PETN more sensitive than nitroglycerin as to impact. Impurities which
make PETN more sensitive are grit and
void spaces filled with air. If PETN was
dropped four feet onto the floor with a
bubble of air contained therein and there
was no cushioning, Mr. Fearon felt one of
the caps might get hurt and explode. It
was his opinion that there is a probability of
any high explosive exploding if it suffers an
impact. Mr. Fearon testified HNM was a
high explosive, quite sensitive to shock and
very dangerous to put any impact on.
According to Mr. Fearon, time, temperature and relative humidity are the things
that do harm to explosives, such as being
placed for a long time in a warm place with
high humidity In Oklahoma, there would
be some damage after a long period of
storage. Assuming the Atlas caps had been
stored in the shed at Cimarron for fifteen
months up to two years, Mr. Fearon's opinion was that when tne caps were dropped,
one exceeded its toleration limit. The fact
that the caps were not cushioned from one
another made Mr. Fearon feel they were
unreasonably dangerous to the consumer.
Mr. Fearon also expressed the following
opinion:
It is my opinion that the provision of
metallic contact, that is, the contact of
these metal cases with one another is an
unnecessary invitation to a hard jolt because metal is striking on metal if anything happens, and it's also—that relates
to the manner of packaging. And it's
also my opinion that there could have
been \uthtn the statistics of the manufacturer >ome variation that would result
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and probably did result in some of the
caps being much more sensitive than the
other ones were.
Mr. Fearon has never been employed by a
manufacturer of explosives and had disassembled an electric cap containing lead
azide which is more dangerous than an Atlas fuse cap which does not contain lead
azide.
Robert E. Hebert, a packaging engineer,
was called as an expert for plaintiffs. In
response to a hypothetical question, Mr. Hebert testified that a proper package for
caps sensitive to impact would be to restrict
the movement in the container of the individual blasting caps and then to cushion
them from impact from one another. Barrier bags could prevent exposure to moisture and air. Materials such as molded
s tyro foam or slotted chipboard for partitions could be used as cushioning at a very
minimal cost to the manufacturer. Mr. Hebert felt it was quite feasible from an engineering and economic standpoint to package caps to absorb the shock of a four foot
drop in both the primary and intermediate
container. Mr Hebert stated the package
used by Atlas provided no protection on the
interior; the caps are not protected on impact from one another. If one cap is removed, the remaining caps roll about
knocking against each other. The exterior
box is thin chipboard which will transmit
impact to the caps inside providing very
little cushioning. Because the caps could
move about, they would hit on the more
susceptible part to explosion if dropped (the
heavier end). Military specifications call
for paperboard partitioning the caps with
the box placed in a barrier bag.
Ralph Lash has been a packaging engineer for thirty years. He testified to the
use of rolls of polyethylene (plastic) to cushion caps from one another at a cost of
two-tenths of a cent to separate a hundred
fuse caps. (The packaging would be similar
to that of Contact Cold Capsules.) Mr.
Lash also prepared a package made of corrugated chipboard so the caps could not
strike each other if dropped. Mr Lash's
opinion was the package used by Atlas had
no cushioning value whatsoever.
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Atlas called as its first defense witness
Anna K. Orlosky, who works on the cap line
at Atlas Ms Orloskv's job is to rumble the
caps The caps are placed in the rumbler
bag which cleans the excess powder off the
shells with damp sawdust
Ms Orlosky
does position herself behind builet proof
glass and wears special clothing to rumble
There is only a visual inspection without
any optical aids to determine if there are
any bad caps or if the caps are clean, no
powder or foreign bodies remaining on the
caps.
Arthur Boman, a research chemist for
Atlas, testified that several months exposure to high humidity and temperature desensitizes the caps, they become less likely
to explode
Mr Boman had performed
drop tests from thirty feet on Atlas caps
and had also placed the caps on a steel anvil
and dropped a ten pound weight upon them
No explosion resulted in either case
Paul Miller is the Director of Governmental Affairs for Atlas He testified the reason for the military specifications vUi because the caps were dropped h) paracnute
and there was need for more protection
during clandestine work behind enemy
lines Mr Miller stated the use of plastic in
packaging as testified to by Mr Lash A as
incorrect The plastic generates or stores
static electricity which represents i hazard
to explosives Mr Miller did not oeheve it
was possible to drop Atlas caps iour ieet
and have them detonate On cross-examination, Mr Miller stated that before the
caps leave the plant chev are cushioned
from shock through the use of two inches of
sawdust between the intermediate carton
and outside shipping carton
George Keenum, the area manager for
Atlas, searched the scene ot the accident
the day after the explosion and found several unexploded caps Atiac> caps have a
round bottom Some of the caps f ound nad
indentatons on f he bottom and vere oneeighth tnch shorter than Ulas c ips They
were shown to be Dupont, not All is cap's
upon X-Rav
However in ms k position,
Mr Ketnum stated the cans he lound wei<i
the genual color M/e ind app< n a n a M>la

bv \tlas
It was stipulated Mr Burnett
would have testified he investigated the
accident and he found unexploded caps and
gave them to Mr Keenum, but he did not
and was not asked to mark them
Melvm A Cook, a consultant m the "leld
of explosives, was called as an expert witness for Atlas It was his opinion caps are
not affected by the temperature in Oklahoma High humidity and mo'sture make the
caps less sensitive Caps are most sensitive
when brand new and do not become more
sensitive in normal use
Mr Cook expressed the opinion that caps dropped four
feet in a partiallv filled box would not
detonate
[2-4] Although the evidence presented
oy the parties was conflicting, this court
believes the evidence offered by plaintiffs
was sufficient to establish a prima facie
case in manufacturers product liability In
passing upon this contention, the evidence
must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiffs and all evidence tending to
derogate piaintiffs' position must be disregarded Jackson v Cubbing Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Okl, 445 P2d 797, Wihon v
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific RR
Co,
Okl, 429 P 2d 763 Taken in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs, the evidence tended
to show that caps manufactured by Atlas,
not Dupont, caused the explosion and that
A* las raps A ere a combination of high explosives that could be detonated by mpact
force Atlas voluntarily packaged the caps
in such a wa\ that the caps in the intermediate package would strike against one an)ther ifter one cap had been removed if
dropped from four feet Plaintiffs experts
testified the packaging was defective in
that it did not protect the caps from external trauma when proper packaging was
readilv available and feasible from an engineering and cost standpoint While moving
i partiallv fcilled carton, decedent dropped
the caps which the parties stipulated was
foreseeable
When dropped, tne caps exploded Proper inierences could be drawn
that the product is packaged made it unreasonablv dangerous to the consumer and
the product was he cause of the injury

11 2 Ok!

593 PACIFIC REPORTFR Id SERIES

Circumstantial evidence ma) be relied upon
by plaintiffs in a manufacturers' product
liability case The Supreme Court in Kirkland, supra at 1355, held:
Syllabus by the Court.
5. The plaintiff may prove his cause
of action in Manufacturers' Products Liability by circumstantial evidence and
proper inferences drawn therefrom, since
actual or absolute proof of the defect in a
sophisticated product may be within the
peculiar knowledge or possession of the
defendant.
See also Sadler v T, J. Hughes Lumber Co,
Inc., Oki.App., 53T P2d 454; see generally
Highway Const. Co. v Shue, 173 Okl. 456,
49 P2d 203. This court holds plaintiffs'
proof, along with Stipulations 3 and 9, was
sufficient to establish a prima facie case in
manufacturers' products liability.
[5-7] Atlas also contends the trial court
should have directed a verdict m its behalf
We disagree. A motion for directed verdict
should not be sustained unless there is an
entire absence of proof showing plaintiffs'
right to recover Sadler v T J Hughes
Lumber Co, Inc, supra, citing Austin v
Wdkerson, inc, Okl, 519 P 2d 899 Furthermore, the evidence of both sides to this
controversy was conflicting and it is the
function of the jurv under these circumstances to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties There being competent
evidence which reasonably tends to support
the jury verdict for plaintiffs, the verdict
will not be disturbed on appeal
Sunray
DX Oil Co v Brown. Okl., 477 P 2d 67,
Miller Construction Co v Wenthold, Okl,
458 P 2d 637
II

Hypothetical Questions Based on
Facts Not in Evidence

In proof of their case, plaintiffs utilized
four expert witnesses
\tlas contends reversible error was created bv Ulowing
plaintiffs' experts to answer hvpothetieal
questions based on facts unsupported bv the
evidence

[8-11] H}potheticai questions must be
based upon facts as to which there is such
evidence that a jury might reasonably find
that they are established Goodlett v Wilhamston, 179 Okl 238, 65 P 2d 472. Only
the omission of material facts which are
essential to the formation of an intelligent
opinion on the matter will be fatal to a
hypothetical question
K P Construction
Co v Death of Parrent, Okl., 562 P2d 501;
In the Matter of the Death of Deere, Okl.,
557 P2d 891. However, to preserve the
error on appeal, the opposing counsel must
specifically object that the question includes
facts not in evidence or the error, if any,
cannot be raised on appeal. This rule is
well stated in 31 A m J u r 2 d Expert and
Opinion Evidence, § 64 p. 572-73 (1967), as
follows.
In objecting to a hypothetical question,
counsel must be reasonably specific as to
the grounds of the objection. Thus, if
counsel relies upon the point that the
question invades the province of the jury,
his objection should call the trial court's
attention to such point, a mere general
objection to the question, in which there
is no intimation that counsel regarded the
question as an invasion of the province of
the jury, will not suffice An objection
made on the ground that the question
includes facts not in exidenee
should point out the facts improperly included or omitted
The purpose of requiring counsel to specily
grounds of objection to a hvpothetieal
question is not onl} to assist the court in
ruling on the oojection, but also to enable
opposing counsel to eliminate objectionable parts or characteristics of the question by changing its form or content.
*
*
*
*
*
*
In accordance \nth the general prmci»
pie of appellate re\iew, an objection that
a hypothetical (juestion omitted material
data (annot be raised for the first time
on appeal (Emphasis added Footnotes
omitted )
See also 12 0 S 1971, ^ 424. Da\is \ Town
of Cannon. Okl, 562 P2d 854, Cook i
Sheffield. 181 Okl. 635. 75 P 2d 1101, Wor-
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[12] Rather than give a detail account
of the numerous and lengthy hypothetical
questions and objections thereto, suffice it
to say Atlas' objections went to the expertise of the four witnesses or were merely
general objections. In making his general
objections, counsel for Atlas, Mr. Rogers,
usually used the phrase "Note my (our)
objection" with no grounds for the objection recited.
In regard to the expert witness, Robert
E. Hebert, proceedings were neld at the
bench outside the presence of the jury at
which time Mr. Rogers objected that Mr.
Hebert was not an expert in packaging
explosives and should not be allowed to give
his opinion on the matter. This objection
was overruled. Thereafter, Mr. Rogers objected after a hypothetical question was
asked stating:
Note my objection, Your Honor. .
I won't be required to give my reason as
long as I make my objection; is that
sufficient, Your Honor.
. I want
to be sure I save the record.
It's agreed / don't have to give my reason, counsel knows what they are. (Emphasis added.)
It was agreed to by both parties and the
trial judge. However, from reading the
transcript, it is apparent this was an extension of the objection of the expertise of Mr.
Hebert and was not an objection to the
hypothetical question containing facts not
in evidence. On the next page of the transcript appears the following language:
[H]ave I saved my objection as to the
opinions of this person as an expert in
this field of packaging dynamite caps? It
is agreed I have saved my record?
MR. SELLERS: I have so agreed for this
particular witness and this particular inquiry. (Emphasis added.)
THE COURT: All right.
A proper objection was entered as to one
hypothetical question asked of Mr. Hebert;
however, this particular question u as not
complained of in Atlas' brief as containing
facts not in evidence. Mr. Rogers request-

ed and was allowed a running objection to
the expertise of Mr. Ralph Lash. No other
objection was made other than "Note my
objection."
Atlas failed to properly preserve its objections that the hypothetical questions
asked by plaintiffs contained facts not in
evidence. Thus, Atlas' second proposition
of error is without merit.
III.

Qualifications of Expert Witnesses

[13] Plaintiffs presented four expert
witnesses: Messrs. Grubb, Fearon, Hebert
and Lash. Atlas contends these witnesses
were not qualified to express the opinions
elicited during their examination and as a
result Atlas should be granted a new trial
under Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Norton,
189 Oki. 252, 116 P.2d 893. The question
whether a witness is sufficiently qualified
to testify as an expert is a preliminary
question to be determined by the trial court
and the qualification of a witness as an
expert is a matter addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. Gold Kist Peanut Growers Ass'n v. Waldman, Okl., 377
P.2d 807. The Supreme Court in City of
Hoidenviile v. Griggs, Okl., 411 P.2d 521,
525, stated:
In Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Maggi, Okl., 409 P2d 369, this Court said:
"Qualification of expert witness is addressed to sound discretion of tnal
court whose ruling that a witness is
sufficiently qualified will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that the discretion has been
abused.''' (Emphasis added.)
See also Continental Oil Co. v. Ryan, Okl.,
392 P 2d 492, citing Tuck v. Buller, Okl., 311
P.2d 212. We find no abuse of discretion by
the trial court.
[14] Atlas contends Mr. Fearon was not
qualified to testify in regard to fuse caps
because he had disassembled an electric cap
containing lead azuie which is more dangerous than Atlas caps. There are similarities
between the Lwo forms of explosives and as
an expert in the field of chemical engineering, Mr. Fearon could property give his
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opinion as to the chemical reactions of the
three explosives contained within an Atlas
cap.
[15] Mr. Grubb testified impact could
detonate an Atlas cap. The trial court
ruled that he was not qualified to testify on
the exact amount of force necessary to detonate a cap inasmuch as he had never performed drop tests on Atlas caps. Atlas
contends that the trial court, having ruled
the witness unqualified, clearly abused its
discretion by not granting Atlas' motion to
strike and allowing Mr. Grubb's opinion to
stand. The trial court only ruled the witness was unqualified as to the exact amount
of force necessary to cause detonation.
This does not mean that a chemist familiar
with explosives could not express an opinion
that detonation could occur given sufficient
quantity of impact even though he couid
not testify as to the exact amount of impact
needed.
[16] Messrs. Hebert and Lash were
packaging engineers and Atlas asserts both
were not qualified because neither had
packaged explosives. However, the evidence shows both men were sufficiently
qualified to testify regarding custom packaging. As with all the experts presented
by plaintiffs, the weaknesses, if any, in
their qualifications were adequately tested
by cross-examination and the value of their
opinions determined by the jury. Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Norton, supra; 31 Am.
Jur.2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 30 at
p. 530 (1967).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion
in the qualification of these witnesses as
experts.
IV

Res Gestae Exception

[17] Atlas next asserts error on the part
of the trial court in overruling its objection
to hearsay testimony given by Dr John D.
Hesson, the attending physician when decedent was brought into the emergency room
at Drumnght Memorial Hospital. The testimony complained o( reads as follows:
So I asked him what happened, and he
was moving some dynamite caps and he

thought he may have dropped them, and
he said they exploded. I asked was he
standing close by and he said right irr
front of them when they went off .
(Emphasis added.)
Atlas asserts the admission of this hearsay
evidence is reversible error. Plaintiffs contend the hearsay testimony was admissible
under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule or as a declaration included within
the medical history given by the decedent
to his treating physician as an aid to diagnosis and treatment*
The Supreme Court in Silver Seal Products Co. v. Owens, Okl., 523 P.2d 1091, 1096,
reaffirmed in In re Death of Cleveland,
Okl., 531 P.2d 1396, 1399, defined the res
gestae exception, as follows:
In Piggee [Sand Springs Ry. Co. v.
Piggee, 196 Okl. 136, 163 P.2d 545] we
said statements are admissible as part of
the res gestae: (1) when made at or near
time of the occurrence; (2) when spontaneously made; (3) when provoked or influenced by happening of the accident
itself so as to become a part thereof. The
Taylor [Henry Chevrolet Co. v. Taylor,
188 Okl. 380, 108 P 2d 1024] case declared
admission of res gestae statements was
justified by spontaneous nature of the
statement, which provides sufficient
guarantee of trustworthiness to render
declarations admissible in evidence. Also
see, Wigmore on Evidence 2nd, § 1749,
that spontaneous or instinctive utterance
made under circumstances calculated to
provide a degree of trustworthiness, derive some credit independently of the declaration. We are of the opinion the basis
for decision in these cases correctly define
principles which govern admissibility of
res gestae statements.
See also Smith v. Munger, Ok LA pp., 532
P.2d 1202.
Under the facts of this case, Dr. Hesson's
testimony was admissible under the res gestae exception. Decedent was subjected to a
violent explosion which tore both his lower
legs from his body as well as causing other
severe injuries. He was removed by ambulance to the emergency room where the
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statement was made to Dr Hesson Decedent was conscious at all times but in severe
pain and within hours of his death This
court holds the statement bv decedent was
spontaneous, not deliberative, and was provoked or influenced by the happening of the
accident so as to become a part thereof
The disturbing event in this case would so
pervade the mental processes of the decedent that it would be unlikely the statement was made in a premeditated, calculating or self-serving sense
[18] The statement was not made at the
time of the explosion, but sometime thereafter (The record is not clear as to the
time lapse, however, decedent only survived for three hours after the accident and
during this time he was transported to Tulsa where he died) The time span between
the event and the declarant's later expressions is simply an element for consideration,
but is not controlling Sooner Construction
Co v Brown, Okl, 544 P2d 500, Sinclair
Oil & Gas Co v Cheatwood, Okl, 350 P 2d
944 In Henry Chevrolet Co v Taylor 188
Okl 380, 108 P 2d 1024, 1027, the Supreme
Court stated
It is sufficient to say that admission of
such statements is justified by the spontaneous nature of the statement which s
m itself a sufficient guarantee of the
trustworthiness of such declarations to
render them admissible, if thev are made
under the immediate influence of the occurrence to which they relate, and it is
not necessary that the declarations oe so
strictly contemporaneous with the occurrence to which thev relate as to be admissible under the so-called Verbal act' doctrine the element of time be'ng important only for the purpose of determining
whether the declaration was made when
the speaker *as unaer the stress of nervous excitement as a result of the occurrence to the extent that the
reflettne
faculties were stilled and the utterance
therefore a sincere expression oi h s actual impressions and belief
(Emphasis
added Citations omitted )
See also Sand Springs R\ Co \ P^gte, 19b
Okl 136, 163 P 2d ^45

[19] Decedent's statement falls within
the purview of the Taylor case Furthermore, the admissibility of such statements
is largely determined by the facts and circumstances of each case and should be left
to the discretion of the trial court
Indian
Oil Tool Co v Thompson, Okl, 405 P2d
104, Wray v Garrett, 185 Okl 138, 90 P 2d
1050 We find no abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court m admitting the
statement
Inasmuch as the statement made by decedent to Dr Hesson was properly admissible
under the res gestae exception we need not
determine whether the statement would
fall within the medical history exception
V

Admissibility of Autopsy Report

[20] Dr Leo Lowbeer, the pathologist
who performed the autopsy upon decedent,
was called to the stand by Atlas to testify
decedent was suffering from disease
processes at the time of the accident which
would have shortened his normal life expectancy After Dr Lowbeer testified, Atlas moved to have f he autops} reoort admitted into evidence The trial court ruled
that the autops) report vvas inadmissible
and Atlas contends the trial court committed reversible error m refusing to allow the
report into evidence We disagree
The Supreme Court in its Supplemental
Opinion on Rehearing in Horn v Sturm,
Okl , 408 P 2d 541, 549-50, recognized that
autopsy reports could be made to obtain
information useful m defending a damage
suit and held thev should not be placed in
the categorv of hospital records for evidentiary purposes Further, the court stated
that the report was admissible after proper
identification and after the doctor vvho performed the autopsv vas called to identify
the report and testify in regard thereto
Although Atlas did follow the procedure
outlined in Sturm tnis does not mean that
the contents of 'he autopsy reoort did not
nave ^o be examined bv the trial court to
determine f there were statements contained therein which were not admissible
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The autopsy report contained many statements prejudicial to plaintiffs and which
had little, if any, probative value on the
issue which Atlas sought to establish by
introduction of the report, i. e., that decedent suffered from physical conditions
which would have shortened his life expectancy. Many other statements were beyond
the expertise of a pathologist and, as such,
a pathologist's opinion thereon would be
inadmissible. Other recitals were pure
speculation on the part of Dr. Lowbeer.
This court does not deem it necessary to
summarize ail the statements which would
have been inadmissible, rather only a few
will be reproduced to illustrate the problem.
The report recited:
[T]he velocity in this case may well have
approached 5000 feet per second and
more.
It appears, that any protective clothing of
any thickness or resistance would be a
great help in eliminating flashburns and
minimizing splinter perforations.
Exactly how the explosion occurred is
only a matter of speculation.
For some reason, he must have put down
the two boxes with the loose caps with
too much force; or else they slipped
slightly out of his hands; or else he
slipped on the sandy floor. It appears
fairly certain that the explosion occurred
first in one of the two boxes with the
loose caps, which perhaps raises the question of handling such boxes even more
delicately than necessary even in a tightly packed box. (Emphasis original.)
[H]e may have dropped the box during
such sudden episode of chestpain; this of
course is purely speculative.
The man could have had a sudden episode
of dizziness as is often found in such
anatomic conditions and for that reason
slipped or dropped the box or boxes. This
also is a matter of speculation; but it
does raise the question, whether not everybody engaged in such potentially dangerous work, shouid have periodic thorough physical examination and knowledge of their health status, particularly
over the age of 60

But it also should be known of anyone in
a dangerous occupation whether or not he
indulges in alcohol, constantly or periodica))y. Again this is a matter of sheer
conjecture.
Because many of the statements in the autopsy were outside the expertise of Dr.
Lowbeer, not probative on the issue which
they were offered to show, or speculative,
the autopsy report was not admissible in its
entirety.
[21] Where a document contains evidence which is inadmissible, the party offering the document may omit the inadmissible part and offer those portions which are
admissible. New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Gibbs, 176 Okl. 535, 56 P.2d 1179. However,
nowhere in the record did Atlas move to
have only the admissible portions of the
autopsy report introduced into evidence.
[22] Furthermore, Atlas contends the
autopsy report "would have demonstrated
that decedent suffered from conditions
which would have materially shortened his
work and life expectancies." However, Dr.
Lowbeer testified concerning his autopsy
findings insofar as they bore upon the life
expectancy of decedent.
We find no error in the trial court's refusal to admit the autopsy report into evidence.
VI.

Withdrawal of Pre-Tnal Stipulation

Atlas contends the trial court committed
reversible error by denying Atlas' counsel
the nght to amend or withdraw a stipulation agreed to by the parties before trial.
The stipulation reads as follows:
10. That at ail times material to this
case, Atlas was engaged in the business
of manufacturing, packaging and selling
fuse caps.
Defendant-Atlas is a Rhode Island corporation. On the fourth day of trial, Atlas tried
to withdraw Stipulation Number 10 asserting the Rhode Island corporation had never
manufactured, distributed or sold dynamite
caps. Rather, a Delaware corporation with
the same name was the cap manufacturer.
The attorney for the Delaware corporation,
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Mr Quinhn, was present when the pre-trial
stipulation was entered into Both corporxtions are wholly owned subsidiaries of the
Tyler Corporation
Defendant-Atlas sought to withdraw this
stipulation after three full davs of a jury
trial and the majority of plaintiffs case had
already been presented, plaintiffs nad already presented eight of their fourteen witnesses
Defendant-Atlas stated the\ did
not intend to defend on the basis that the
wrong corporation was sued and plaintiffs
had not attempted to secure evidence on
this point and proceeded to trial without
concern for the required elements ot proof
In denying defendant-Atlas motion to
withdraw, the trial court stated
THE COURT Well, I want to ask some
questions too
First of all, for the record Mr Rogers,
the Court is snocked that you would
come m here on the fourth day after
this case was started, and after we
spent three and a half hours on stipulations, one of which you now ask the
Court to allow \ou to withdraw
If the
Court's memory is right Mr Quinhn
was present with you at all times during this conversation
Is this not correct0
MR ROGERS That is correct
THE COURT And he bat here ind allowed sou to make the stipulations
I
don t know wnat has happened in this
case since I saw you \esterdav morning, I have no idea, but tne Court certainly takes a dim view of a t t o r n e y
who want to piav games like this with
the Court I am not too receptive to
your motion, tranki)
MR ROGERS I appreciate 'hat \ o u r
Honor but I will tell sou I did not lav
behind a log on it intentionalU it did
not come to my attention that this
was—
THE COURT I don t know if \ou did or
not but I f hink this is a matte** tor the
\ p p e l h t e Court to determine He are
m the middle ot trial and I think \ou
have wamd
\ou /live tin id\ mad*,
opening statement and hi\t told th s

jury who you are ind who you represent and not one thing has peeped in
an opening statement to this jury that
you are the wrong corporation I think
it's—
MR ROGERS No, we did not intend to
defend it on that basis
THE COURT Well I don't care if you
did or not, but if vou had a defense to
it that was the time to do it and not
take more of the Court s time with it
MR ROGERS This as I say has come to
light insofar as I m concerned right
now
THE COURT I think that is something
you will have to take care of on down
the line I am going to overrule /"our
request and allow you an exception
(Emphasis added)
[23] The Supreme Court in McFarhng v
Demco Inc, Okl 546 P2d 625 630-31,
discussed standards tor allowing the withdrawal ol a stipulation First there must
be a clear showing that the fact stipulated
to s untrue Second, the motion to vithdriw the stipulation must be timelv made
Second the motion to withdraw the stipulation must be timely made The motion to
withdraw was not timely Defendant-Atlas
attempted to withdraw the stipulation four
da\s into the jury trial In McFarhng, the
motion to withdraw was entered a day belore tne trial date
L24] The third standard is good cause
must be shown lor r^i ef The McFzrhng
court considered lack of negligence as a
factor showing good cause We feel lick of
negligence As not present in this case Mr
Quinhn ihe attorne\ for the Delaware corporation was present when the stipulation
was entered into
We believe with due
diligence the fact Defendant-Atlas did or
did not manufacture caps could have been
ascertained by defendants counsel prior to
agreeing a> the stipulation There are no
grounds lor rehti vnere lack ot Knowledge
s due to the failure to exercise die dih£cnu. 33 C J S Stipulations fc 35b(2) at p
91 (195 *) 73 Am Jur 2d Stipulations & 14 at
p 551 (1974)
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[25] Fourth, the fact must be one of
material character which changes the rights
of the parties. Fifth, the opposing party
must not have detrimentally relied and
changed his position. The McFarling court
considered this to be the crucial question.
Although we find no specific ruling by the
trial court upon this question, the evidence
sufficiently reveals plaintiffs did detrimentally rely on the stipulation. In view of the
stipulation, plaintiffs had not secured evidence on the issue and proceeded to trial
under the assumption that the party sued
was the manufacturer. Plaintiffs had already presented much of their case to the
jury when the motion to withdraw was
made. The sixth factor is that the failure
to allow the stipulation will result in manifest injustice to one of the parties. The last
consideration is whether the trial court
abused its discretion. Under the facts and
circumstances of this case, we can not say
the trial court abused its discretion.
Accordingly, the trial court's refusal to
allow the withdrawal of Stipulation Number 10 is affirmed.

VII.

Excessive Verdict

[26, 27] Atlas contends the verdict was
excessive due to improper instructions and
passion, prejudice and bias on the part of
the jury. Atlas complains of Instructions
17 and 18; however, both adequately describe the various recoverable items and we
find no prejudicial error contained within
either. A verdict will not be interfered
with by an appellate court where the issues
have been fairly submitted under proper
instructions. Hampton v. Danks, Okl., 387
P.2d 609. A reviewing court has no right to
place limitations upon the amount of damages returned by the jury unless it is convinced that the amount of recovery bears
no relation whatever to the evidence, or
that it was induced by bias or prejudice on
the part of the jury. Tulsa City Lines v.
Geiger, Okl., 275 P.2d 325. See also First
Natl Bank of Amarillo v. LaJoit\ Oki.. 537
P.2d 1207; Vickers v. Ittner, Oki., 418 P.2d
700.

The jury returned the following verdict:
Pain and Suffering
Medical
Widow
Iris (Decedent's daughter)
Joyce (Decedent's daughter)
Funeral
Total

$ 50,000.00
504.20
200,000.00
10,000.00
10,000.00
1,541.08
$272,045.28

There is no dispute as to the amounts
awarded for the funeral expenses and medical bills.
[28] In regard to^ the $50,000.00 pain
and suffering award, Atlas contends the
jury awarding this sum shows passion and
prejudice because the pain and suffering
"admittedly lasted no more than two or
three hours." There is no fixed rule whereby damages for pain and suffering alone
can be measured. Compensation for pain
and suffering rests in the sound discretion
of the jury, because "there is no 'market
where pain and suffering are bought and
sold, nor any standard by which compensation for it can be definitely ascertained, or
the amount actually endured determined.' "
Denco Bus Lines v. Hargis, 204 Okl. 339,
229 P.2d 560, 563, quoting St. Louis S. W. R.
Co. v. Kendall 114 Ark. 224, 169 S.W. 822,
824. See also Chicago, Rock Island <& Pacific R. R. Co. v. Hawes, Okl., 424 P.2d 6;
Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpa trick, Oki.,
418 P.2d 900.
[29] The injuries decedent received due
to the explosion included multiple blast
wounds to the face, chest and abdomen,
both of his lower legs had been blown away,
his right hand was gone with near amputation of his left hand and both eyes were
severely injured. According to the ambulance driver, decedent was conscious during
the ride to the emergency room and during
the trip to Tulsa. The driver believed decedent was suffering quite a lot of pain. The
treating physician at the emergency room,
Dr. Hesson, testified decedent was conscious and in pain. Dr. Hesson couid not
give him adequate pain medication. Because decedent's arms had been blown
apart, Dr. Hesson was not abie to ascertain
a blood pressure. Although morphine or
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demerol would normally have been used,
Dr Hesson only administered Talwin which
only "takes the edge off" without lowering
blood pressure
We find that the award for pain and
suffering was adequately supported by the
evidence and not induced by bias or prejudice on the part of the jury
[30] Vivian Lauderdale, the widow of
decedent, received an award of $200,000 00
for pecuniary loss and loss of services Mrs
Lauderdale is 56 years of age and was married to decedent 32 and a half years Before he retired, decedent would have earned
approximately $60,000
Mrs Lauderdale
was also entitled to be compensated for loss
of consortium, including loss of advice, comfort, companionship and services The jury
was in a better position to determine the
dollar amount of Mrs. Lauderdale's pecuniary loss We feel the evidence was adequate to support their verdict
Although
Dr Lowbeer testified decedent would have
had a shorter than normal life expectancy,
Dr Hesson stated the findings of Dr Lowbeer were not unusual ana decedent could
have survived an average life span with
reasonable medical care The jury s duty is
to determine facts from conflicting evidence This court finds that the award to
Mrs Lauderdale was not excessive
[31] The two married adult daughters
of decedent were awarded $10,000 eacn
Adult children can recover in wrongful
death actions
The correct measure of
damages is the pecuniary LOSS suffered by
reason of the death of their father
Beiford
v Allen, 183 Oki 256, 80 P 2d 671 Gyps\
Oil Co v Green, S2 Okl 147, 198 P 851,
Pressley v Incorporated Town of Sdllisaw,
54 Okl. 747, 154 P 660 Pecuniary ioss was
discussed in Rogers \ Worthan, Okl., 465
P2d 431, 438-39, as follows
Recovery in a wrongful death action is
not contingent upon a showing that the
claimant had been dependent, to some
extent, upon the leceased
Even great
wealth vvould not of itself, preclude the
recovcrv of dam uccs for ui\ pecuruarv
benefits which a claimant might reasonably have expected to rective il the deceased had lived

The basic factor controlling recovery in
such an action is not whether the claimant had been dependent upon the deceased for support, but is whether, m the
circumstances disclosed by the ev idence in
the particular case, it can reasonably be
said that there was a probability, or a
reasonable expectancy on the part of the
claimant, that the decedent, except for
his death, would ha\e contributed money,
aid, services, or anything else that would
have a pecuniary value to the claimant.
(Emphasis added.)
[32,33] Both daughters testified as to
services, aid and money provided by decedent, such as wedding, birthday and Christmas gifts, assistance in moving, arranging
for burial of a grandchild, paying for groceries, providing family barbeques and the
boat for family recreation, giving business
guidance, welding services, helping with
household repairs, babysitting, co-signing
notes and loaning money which was never
asked to be repaid We feel sufficient evidence existed that decedent contributed
money, aid and services with pecuniary value to the daughters On appeal, it matters
not that the appellate court might or might
not nave reached a different conclusion as
to the amount of damages suffered and the
only Question which is presented is whether
there is any competent evidence to sustain
the verdict
Battles * Janzen, Okl, 325
P 2d 444
[34] The jurv was properlv instructed as
to the measure of damages, there was competent evidence reasonably tending to support the verdict, and it does not appear
from the record that the jury was swaved
by passion or prejudice Hence, the verdict
will not be disturbed on appeal Belford v.
Allen, supra

VIII

Lse ol Prepared Board During
Closing Argument

During closing argument, plaintiffs' attorney, Mr Sellers produced \ board on
which tigures had been placed before trial
The board contained a damage analvsis
used as an aid to closing argument Ac-

120

Okl.

593 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

cording to plaintiffs' brief, the items on the
board were covered from view by masking
tape until actually referred to by Mr. Sellers during his argument. Atlas asserts the
use of this board was improper and resulted
in an excessive verdict.
[35,36] In regard to the use of blackboards during closing argument, the Supreme Court in Shuck v. Cook, Okl., 494
P.2d 306, 312, stated:
[W]e adhere to the rule that to grant or
refuse the request is within the sound
discretion of the trial court who is in the
best position to know how error may
creep in.
The rule is the same whether counsel places
figures on the blackboard prior to or during
his argument to the jury. Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., Okl., 555 P.2d 48,
62. We find, under this record, no abuse of
discretion.
Furthermore, in
Missouri-Kansas-Texas
Railroad Co. v. Jones, Okl., 354 P.2d 415,
420, the Supreme Court stated another test
to determine whether the use of a blackboard was prejudicial to the defendant was
whether it resulted in an excessive verdict.
See also Kansas City Southern Railway Co.
v. Black, Okl., 395 P.2d 416, 419. We have
already determined, in part VII of this
opinion, that the verdict was not excessive.
Atlas asserts the trial court should have
given a cautionary instruction or admonished the jury that the board was not evidence. However, neither were requested
by Atlas.
We find no error in the trial court's permitting plaintiffs to utilize a prepared
board during closing argument.
IX.

Prejudgment Interest

Atlas contends in its last proposition of
error that the trial court should not have
awarded prejudgment interest. Prejudgment interest is allowable under 12 O.S.
1971. § 727, which provides in part:
2. When a verdict for damages by
reason o( personal injuries is accepted by
the trial court, the court in rendering
judgment shall add interest on said ver-

dict at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date the suit was commenced to date of verdict.
The trial court awarded prejudgment interest in the amount of $53,987.97. The issue
is whether prejudgment interest should be
awarded under a survival or wrongful
death cause of action.
In Allen v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 190 Okl. 313, 123 P.2d 252, 253, the
Supreme Court stated: "A plaintiff in an
action for damages for negligence, 3uch as
one for wrongful death, may not recover
interest prior to the entry of judgment"
Allen is not controlling inasmuch as it was
decided prior to the adoption of Section 727
allowing prejudgment interest.
[37,38] Plaintiffs' first cause of action
was a survivorship action under 12 O.S.
1971, § 1051, which provides, in part:
In addition to the causes of action which
survive at common law, causes of action
for an injury to the person
shall also survive: and the action may be
brought, notwithstanding the death of
the person entitled or liable to the same.
Because causes of action for personal injuries survive under Section 1051, prejudgment interest awarded under Section 727
"when a verdict for damages by reason of
personal injuries is accepted" is properly
allowable. Indeed, Atlas does not contend
prejudgment interest can not be awarded
under a survivorship action. Rather, Atlas
contends under Bossert v. Douglas, Okl.
App., 557 P.2d 1164, the prejudgment interest must be included in the instructions to
the jury and merged in the final verdict. It
can not be computed and added to the
jury's verdict. We find this to be an erroneous interpretation of Bossert
Furthermore, the statute specifically requires the
court to add the interest onto the verdict.
[39] The remaining issue is whether prejudgment interest should be allowed in a
wrongful death action. Oklahoma's wrongful death statute is codified at 12 O.S.1971,
§ 1053, which provides:
When the death of one is caused by the
wrongful act or omission of another, the
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personal representative of the former
may maintain an action therefor against
the latter, or his personal representative
if he is also deceased, if the former might
have maintained an action had he lived,
against the latter, or his representative,
for an injury for the same act or omission
The action must be commenced
within two years
The damages must
mure to the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and children, if any, or next
of kin; to be distributed m the same
manner as personal property of the deceased. (Emphasis added )
If decedent had lived, he could maintained
an action for his personal injuries and recovered prejudgment interest.
In addition, the prejudgment interest
statute allows the interest when a verdict is
returned for "damages by reason of personal injuries " The language of the statute is
broad enough to include a recovery for
wrongful death by reason of personal injuries when the action is, of necessity,
brought by someone other than the person
wno sustained the injuries Colorado allows
prejudgment interest in wrongful death actions. Although the Colorado prejudgment
interest statute contains the language
"whether such injury shall have resulted
fatally or otherwise," the Colorado Supreme
Court m American Ins Co v Nay lor, 103
Colo 461, 87 P2d 260, 264-65 (1939) construed the phrase "in all actions brought to
recover damages for personal injuries" as
follows
There is, of course, no difference in character between fatal and nonfatal injuries
The difference is onl> in degree, from
which it follows that the tale of the act
of which the foregoing section is a part,
"An Act providing for interest on damages for personal injuries," Laws 1911, p
296, is sufficient to cover actions for damages resulting from both fatal and nonfatal injuries If the injuries result fatally
the person bringing the action will of
necessity be some one other than the deceased, which is the situation presented
by the cases before us
We think ,t
might well be said that a person, as the
plaintiff here, who has lost the souet\,

companionship and services of his wife
and Has expended money in an attempt to
minimize or prevent such loss, has himself
sustained a personal injury We think it
is not necessary however so to hold in
order to bring the instant cases within
the statute
In Muhey v Boston, 197
Mass 178. 83 N E. 402. 14 Ann.Cas. 349,
the court, referring to a statute of limitations, said "The language of tne statute
is not restricted to actions for injuries to
the person of the piamtiff, and we think
it is broad enough to include all actions of
tort founded on injuries to .the person of
any one m such relations to the plaintiff
that the injury causes him damage."
Webster's International Dictionary gives
as one definition of the word "for," and
the one we think applicable to the construction of the statute before us, the
following 'Indicating the cause, motive
or occasion of an act, state or condition,
hence, because of, on account of, in consequence of, as the effect of, for the
sake of " We think the actions brought
to recover damages for each of these
torts were because of, on account of, and
in consequence of personal injuries sustained bv the plaintiffs wife of such extent that they finally resulted fatally
The cross assignments of error therefore
must be sustained The reasoning of the
courts in opinions rendered in the following cases, tnough not involving statutes
and situations identical with those under
consideration in the cases at bar, is in
point and supports the conclusion we
have reacned and expressed herein Mul\ey \ Boston, supra, Brahan v Meridian
Light £ Ry Co, 121 Miss 269. 83 So 467,
8i\by v Sioux City, 184 Iowa 89, 164
N W 641, Crapo v Syracuse, 183 N Y
395, 76 N E. 465, Titman v Mayor, etc.,
of City of New York, 57 Hun 469, 10
N Y S 689, Price \ National Surety Co,
221 App Div 56, 222 N Y S 437, Crapo \
Syracuse, 98 App Div 376, 30 N Y S 553,
International & G N Ry Co v Edmundson, Tex Civ App , 185 S W 402.
See also Hmdel v State Farm Wut Auto
Ins Co, 97 F 2d 777 (7th G r 1938) (Statute
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which provided "for the benefit of all per- interest.); 43A C.J.S. Injury at p. 770 (1978)
sons who may suffer personal injuries" con- (The word injuries includes all injuries,
strued to cover an injury which results in whether fatal or not.).
death.); Hams v. Elliott, 277 Ala. 421, 171
We therefore hold that the trial court
So.2d 237 (1965), citing Alabama Great properly awarded prejudgment interest on
Southern R. Co. v. Ambrose, 163 Ala. 220, the amounts recovered under both the sur50 So. 1030 (1909) (An action for wrongful vivorship and wrongful death causes of acdeath is an action for personal injuries.); tion. In view of the findings of this court
Wetz v. Thorpe, 215 N.W.2d 350 (Iowa 1974) on Atlas' nine propositions of error, the
(Allowance of prejudgment interest in judgment of the trial court is accordingly
wrongful death is essential to accomplish affirmed in all respects.
full justice.); Brahan v. Meridian Light &
AFFIRMED.
Ry. Co., 121 Miss. 269, 83 So. 467 (1919) (The
term personal injuries construed to mean all
actions of tort founded on injuries to the
ROMANG and REYNOLDS, JJ., concur.
person and does not refer to only those
actions brought by the person receiving the
physical impact.); Weiman v. Ippolito, 129
O I K6YNUM8ERSYSTEM
NJ.Super. 578, 324 A.2d 582 (1974) (Prejudgment interest allowable in wrongful
death action when statute stated the court
shall "in tort actions" include prejudgment
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J. Hyrum CALL, Elizabeth H. Calf, as cotrustees, W. W. DIHard and Essie Dillard,
Husband and Wffe, Pfaintiffs and Counter
Defendants-Respondents,
v.
Virgil A. MARLER and Alice Marler, Husband and Wife, Defendants and Counter Claimants-Appellants.
No. 9531.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
June 2o, 196.*

Partition action wherein defendant
sought accounting* for wheat crop. The
District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial
District, Caribou County, Francis J. Rasmussen, J., entered judgment, and defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, Knudson, J , held, in part, that the stipulation
entered into by the parties during the trial
abrogated the contradictory pretrial conference order provision to the effect that
the plaintiffs' collection of rent tor certain
\ears was barred by limitation
Judgment modified and attirmed and
cause remanded.

1. Partition 0=89
Evidence in partition action wherein
dctendants sought accounting for wheat
ciop established that detcnaants were entitled to share of crop based on $2.12 rather
than a $1 65 per bushel figur: used by trial
court.
2. Trial 0=>388(l)
Purpose of requiring findings of fact
and conclusions of law is to aid appellate
court bv affording* it clear understanding of
basis ot decision of trial court
3. Appeal and Error C=>I07I(6)
Absence of findings would be disregarded by reviewing court where record
was so clear that court did not need their
aid for complete understanding of issues.
4. Partition 0=89
Burden ot est ibliblung th it a n t lis v\crc
pi\able to them for >eais 1047 through 1951

was on defendants, in partition action
wherein defendants sought accounting for
wheat crop for certain years.
5. Partition 0=89
Evidence involving testimony of witness who was unable to staie kind, amount
or value of crop or crops raised or produced
during any oi years was insufficient to
support judgment for defendants, in partition action wherein defendants sought accounting for wheat crop for certain years
6. Limitation of Actions 0=85(5)
Since statute of limitations may ha\c
been suspended during time plaintiff tenants in common were absent from state,
collection of rents by defendant tenants in
common for certain years was not barred
by statute of limitations. I.C. § 5-229.
7. Stipulations C»«8(4)
Stipulation entered into by parties during trial abrogated contradictory pretrial
conterence order provision to effect that
parties had agreed that collection of rents
tor certain years was barred by limitation.
I.C. § 5-229, Rules of Civil Procedure,
rule 16
8. Stipulations 0=16
Stipulations are ordinarily entered into
for purpose of saving time, trouble or
expense, and as general rule parties are
bound therebv.
9. Stipulations 0=13
Court mav in its sound discretion rehe\ e against stipulation entered into through
mistake or misunderstanding of fact or
entered into inadvertently, inadvisedK, or
mipro\ idently where under all circumstances its enforcement would work injustice
10. Partition 0=114(1)
Each party was properly oraered to
bear oun trial court costs m partition action
therein defendants sought accounting for
wheat crop, both parties prevailed, and
defendant appellants' costs were not shown
to have been in excess of costs incurred by
Maintutb 1 C §§ 12-102, 12-104.
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R. M W h i t t i e r and L. Kim McDonald,
rocatcllo, for appellants.
Jones, Pomcroy & Jones and Raci IC,
Huntley & Olson, PocateJlo, for respondents
K X U D S O N , Justice.
Plaintiffs-Respondents, J. Hvrttm C ill,
Elizabeth H Call, as co-trustees, \\" W
Dillard and Essie Di'lard. husband and
wife, commenced this action seeking a partition or sale of 160 acres of land which they
held as tenants in common with defendantsappellants, Virgil H . M a i l e r and -Mice
Marler, husband and wife.
Defendants
filed their answer contending the property
could not be paititioned, and also by way
of counterclaim «ought an accounting: of
rents and profits allegedly received by plaintirfs and their predecessors in interest while
they occupied or had the use of the land
involved.
The partition ot the land has been accomplished and it has been stipulated that any
matters relatmg to the division oi the land
are no longer to ue considered as an ls^ue
on this appeal.
The issues created by the pleadmgs involve rents and profits which allegedly accrued during 1947 and subsequent vears.
Defendants acquired their undivided onehalf interest m the land under iked c x c u i t e d
bv Ila/elle McDon ild and Eugene P McDonald, VVIIL and husband, dated April 1°,
1%0 ( D e r E \ n I)
Prior to said transfer
the McDonalds and respondents \V \ \
Dillard and o.1 f e were owners ot die land
as tenant'- m common
P r i o r to the commcicinKiit j t this action ^March 20, \%l)
the McDonalds had filed an action against
the Dillards in Los \ngeles Countv, C i h fonna, seeking to recover tor pibt due
rentals relative ^o the propertv here concerned
Under date oi Tune °, 1960, McDonalds assigned rheir right, title and interest in and to said cause of action to
defendants, Marie rs
In l°61 plaintiffs C ills entered into i
purchase contract where'n thev agreed to
purchase all interest which the Dillards h i d

in the 1 ui'I and also agreed to pay anv
m o m } s due to the defendants by reason ot
their succession to the lights of McDonalds
Trial was had Ix fore th^ com t sitting
without a jurv and ]ii igment Wets entcied
June 1°), 1964 m r\r or of defendants in the
amount of $1880 03, together with inteicst
and without costs. This appeal is trom
said judgment.
[1] U n d e r appellants assignments of
e r r o r Xos I V , V and VI it is contended that
the trial court did not allow appellants compensation to which *-hc> were entitled for
their proper share ot the wheat crop raised
on 40 acres of the land which had been
farmed by Calls during 1961. These assignments are not discussed by respondents in
their brief
T h e evidence established that 1384 83
bushels of v*neat had been raised on said
40 acres during 1061 and the court tound
that 346 3 bushels constituted appellants'
share of such crop. The findings do not
disclose the steps considered or method
employed by the court in at riving at that
figure, however it amounts to one-fourth of
the total crop v Inch is w keeping with the
percentage allowed each ot the owners as
concerns the other crops p r x l u c e d during
that vear on the land involved and constituted a t ur ana reasonable ipportionmcnt
V e arc unable to hnd m the T ecord support
t<>r the cnu-t s cmeiusi. n that >uch wheat
w is wottn onlv ^1 65 ner ou>he! Plaintiffs'
E\hit>it D discloses f h it me-halt ot that
croo or vheat was MIKI toi $2 12 per bushel
irul since there is no other competent CM*
dence it -he value, ippell mts should be
aw t rde I S~"4 15 instead ot > ; 71 40 as their
siiaie ot said crop
Xpoeilants contend that the court erred
in fading to make h n d " gs ot tact and
cone UMons ~>t law r c ' i t i v * f o appellants'
claim *oi rents and profits tor the \ e i r s
1047 through 1051 T h e court did find that
plaintiffs' predecessors m m t e r c n the Dillar Is, r< smod outside of this state during
s i ' d p u i o d , ind that *he r u i t s pavablc to
u u \ n d mts fr their pted*. cessoi s in interest
the McDona'ds, toi said ve u s were one and
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pavable in this state as rents on Idaho real
property.

which stated that the parties had stipulated
the following quoted paragraph 6:

[2,3] The purpose of requiring findings
of fact and conclusions of law is to aid the
appellate court by affording it a clear understanding of the basis of the decision of the
trial court. The absence of findings may be
disregarded by the appellate court if the
record is so clear that the court does not
need their aid for a complete understanding
of the issues. Merrill v. Merrill, S3 Idaho
306, 362 P2d 887, \ngletou v Vnglcton,
84 Idaho 184, 370 P2d 7S8 In view of the
condition of the record betore us, we consider this rule to be applicable herein.

"6 That $1,000 00 per year w as paid
b\ the Calls to the Dullards for rent for
the vears 1952, 1053, 1954, 1955, and
1956. That the collection of these rents
b> the defendants, Marlers. is barred
by the Statute of Limitations "
The order further directed that a copy
thereof be mailed forthwith to each of the
counsel for the parties It also ordered that
the case be set tor tnal to commence April
30 1962.

[4,5] The burden of establishing that
rentals were payable to them for the vears
1947 through 1951 was on appellants The
only evidence submitted relative to said
period was the testimony of one witness who
was unable to state the kind, amount or
^alue of the crop or crops raised or produced during any of said \ears The proof
submitted was incompetent and insufficient
to support a judgment of anv amount in
fa\or of appellants under said claim.
Appellants contend that the court erred
in finding that the defendants, as tenants m
common with plaintiffs, were nrecluded
from recovering their share of pabt rentals
and profits because oi the running ot the
statute ot limitations and in tailing: to set
aside pretrial conterenee order that had
been erroneously ordered b> the court
The rents and profits nuohed under
these assignments or error were originally
those allegedly owed from respondents Dillards to the McDonalds as the latter s cotenant s share for the \ears 19^2 through
1956 Appellants claim sucn rentals under
an assignment from McDonalds and seek
to recover them under their counterclaim.
The record discloses that a pretrial conference was had before the court on February 7, 1962, at which time ill of the parties
unoiveci were repicsented by their respective attornc\s. On April 13, 1%2, a pretrial
conference oracr was entered and filed

On October -, 1962 the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law wherein,
at paragraph 7 thereof, it is stated that the
court finds •
"7. That the paities agree the collection ot rents for the \cars 1952, 1953,
1°54, 1955 and 1956 is barred bv the
Statute of Limitations.'
These findings were filed October 3, 1962.
On October 17, 1°62, defendants filed
their objections to the findings and conclusions " herein it is stated that the defendants
"object to finding: number 7 for the
reason that the Defendants and Counter-Claimants do not agree that the
collection of the rents tor the years
1°^2 through 1056 is barred by the
Statute of Limitations '
On "he same day defendants filed their
motion to strike from paragraph 6 of the
pretrial conference order the following
quoted language
"That the collection ot the^e r cnts ay
the Defendants Marlers, is barred b>
Statute ot Limitations '
As i part of «aid motion defendants aiso
stated that in tne alternatne they moved
to ha\ e the c i*e reopened and to permit
counsel to ha\e the pretrial statements
amended and a hearing had relating to the
running of the statute ot limitations. This
motion was supnotted b\ the afnda\it of
R M Whittler attorne\ tor defendants,
wheiein the affiant states posituelv and
uiie'[ui\oca!l\ that the defendants did not
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enter into a stipulation as stated in said
paragraph 6 of the pretrial conference
order. By order dated February 29, 1964
and filed March 4, 1964, defendants' said
motions were denied on the ground that the
motion was not timely.
The supporting affidavit contains the following explanation or defendants' delay in
presenting such motion to s t r i k e :
"Your Affiant further states that
Item 6 of the pre-trial conference order
was permitted to stand without any
mention for the reason that the Defendants and Counter-Claimants, Mariers,
and their attorney over-looked and did
not become advised of the contents of
Item 6 of the pre-trial order until this
date and that it was assumed by the
Defendants
and
Counter-Claimants
that the facts were that this was an
issue which was in accordance with the
Defendants' pre-trial statements to the
Court furnished at the time of the pretrial hearing and that this is a matter
of oversight or excusable neglect and
that great and irreparable harm would
result if this order was permitted to
stand undisturbed."
In support oi appellants' contention that
it is evident from the record that neither
court nor counsel considered that such a
•stipulation had been entered into at the
pretrial conference, our attention is called
to the following quoted stipulation which
was entered into in open court during the
trial and as a part of defendants' case,
to-wit:
"'MR. W H I T T I E R : Before proceeding
further, T wonder if counsel would stipulate the fact that—in one of these
issues is whether the statute of limitations has run. I wonder if it could be
stipulated that Mr. Dillard has been out
of the State of Idaho for the years 1947
through 1962.
• T H E C O U R T : Mr. Racine.
"MR. R A C I N E : Weil, —
"MR. W H I T T I E R : O r do you want
me to produce evidence on this?

" M R . R A C I N E : No. I think n o t W e
understand generally that he has been
a resident of California although occasionally in the State of Idaho, Y o u r
H o n o r , and we—
" T H E C O U R T : N o t as a resident in
the State of Idaho, but as—
"MR. R A C I N E :
Idaho.

Not as a resident in

"THE COURT:

—only as a visitor.

" M R . R A C I N E : As a visitor.
" T H E C O U R T : T h e record will show
that you gentlemen have stipulated that
W . W. Dillard and Essie Dillard have
been residents of California during the
terms—times in question in the cross
complaint." .
T h e provisions of I.C. § 5-229 are pertinent to the foregoing stipulated facts.
Said section provides:
"If, when the cause of action accrues
against a person, he is out of the state,
the action may be commenced within
the term herein limited, after his return
to the state, and if, after the cause of
action accrues, he departs from the
state, the time of his absence is not
part of the time limited for the commencement of the action."
[6] Since, the statute of limitations may
have been suspended during the time Dillards were absent from this state, it is evident from the foregoing stipulated facts that
tiie collection of rents for the years 1952
through 1956 was not in fact barred by the
statute of limitations.
Consequently the
above quoted stipulation is exactly contrary
to the stipulation stated in the pretrial conference order. Obviously only one of them
can be given effect. Appellants contend that
the stipulation made during the trial should
control since it is a stipulation of fact while
the other was a stipulation of law and not
binding on the court (John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Niell. 79 Idaho 5SD,
319 P.2d 195), or on the parties. Cox v.
City of Pocatello, 77 Idaho 225, 291 P.2d
282.
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The pretrial conference order is governed
by I.R.C.P. Rule 16, which states in part:
"The court shall make an order which
recites the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the
pleadings, and the agreements made by
the parties as to any of the matters
considered, and which limits the issues
for trial to those not disposed of by
admissions or agreements of counsel;
and such order when entered controls
the subsequent course of the action,
unless modified at the trial to prevent
manifest injustice."
[7-9] Stipulations are ordinarily entered
into for the purpose of saving time, trouble
or expense and as a general rule the parties
are bound thereby. However fl, roil r t mn - y
in its sound discretion relieve against _a
stipulation entered into through mistake or
misunderstanding of fact or entered into
inadvertently, inadvisedly, or improvidentlv
where under all the circumstances its enforcement would work an injustice. Bradford v. Schmucker, 10 Cir., 135 F.2d 991,
and cases cited therein. Concerning this
subject this court, in Koepl v. Ruppert, 29
Idaho 223, 15S P. 319, stated:
"Furthermore, it is within the sound
judicial discretion of a trial court, for
good cause shown and in furtherance
of justice, to relieve parties from stipulations which they have entered into
in the course of judicial proceedings,
and it is its duty to do so when enforcement thereof would be inequitable and
when, as in this case, all parties to the
action will, by vacating the stipulation, be placed in exactly the same condition they were in before it was
made."
In the instant case appellants contend
that since the court heard evidence on the
matter and respondents stipulated that the
Diilards did not reside in Idaho during the
stated years and the rental involved during those years was recognized as an issue
in the case, they were entirely misled by
the court's recognition of the challenged
portion of the order.

I.R.C.P. 16 expressly authorizes modification of the pretrial conference order during the trial. Since paragraph 6 of said
order is contrary to the stipulation entered
into during the trial, the latter must be
regarded as a modification of the order to
the extent that it nullified said paragraph
6 of the order. We therefore conclude that
the court erred in finding "that the parties
agreed the collection of rents for the years
1952, 1953, 1954, 1955 and 1956 is barred by
the Statute of Limitations."
[10] The trial court held that each party bear their own costs. 4 Although error is
assigned to this order, it is not discussed in
respondents' brief. Appellants contend that
since they were awarded a judgment for
a net sum of $1,SS9.03 and interest they
were entitled to recover their costs pursuant to the provisions of I.C. § 12—104.
This action was originally concerned
with a partition or sale of real property
which in its nature involves title or possession of real estate. By their counterclaim
appellants introduced the issue involving
the recovery of money. The issues presented by both parties were tried together
and at the same time. Respondents were
successful in their action seeking partition
and under I.C. § 12-102 they likewise were
entitled to recover costs incident to their
action.
In the absence of a showing on the part
of appellants that the costs which they incurred in the prosecution of their counterclaim exceeded the costs allowable to respondents under the judgment decreeing
partition, appellants were not entitled to
the relief requested. There being no such
showing the claimed error is without merit.
The judgment of the trial court is modified and the cause remanded with directions
to the trial court as follows:
(1) To strike paragraph 7 from its findings of fact.
12) To consider such evidence as has
been introduced ami to hear and consider
such additional evidence as the parties or
any oi them may oiler m support of or

FIRST OF DENVER MORTG. I! VESTORS v. C. N. ZUNDEL Utah
Cltt at 6(

FIRST OF DENVER MORTGAGE
INVESTORS and Citibank, N.A.f
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v,
C. N. ZUNDEL AND ASSOCIATES, a
limited partnership, et aL, Defendants
and Respondents.
FIRST OF DENVER MORTGAGE
INVESTORS, et aL, Plaintiffs
and Respondents,
v.
C. N. ZUNDEL AND ASSOCIATES, a Unv
ited partnership, Bland Brothers, Inc., et
aL, Defendants and Appellant.
Nos. 15696, 16051.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 24, 1979.

Appeal was taken in separate but related proceedings in the Second District Court,
Davis County, J Duff} Palmer, J , involving allocation of priorities between mortgagees foreclosing against real property and
competing hen claimants who provided
services and matenals for improvements to
the property The Supreme Court, Stewart, J, held, inter aha, that the trial court
properly determined that the mechanics
and materialman's hens had priority over
the trust deed
Affirmed and remanded

1. Mechanics' Liens *»43
It is not necessary to attachment of
mechanics hen that material or labor be
furnished solely on building structure or
that work be performed solely on lot on
which building is being erected, and contractor should not be barred from enjoying
benefits of mechanics hen statute where
his work not only enhances /alue of developer s land but is also necessary to make
residences to be built on such property habitable U C A 1953, 38-1-3
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2. Mechanics' Liens «=»35
Contractor was entitled to mechanics'
hen in connection with construction project
on 44-acre subdivision for its services in
locating existing lines and putting in pipeline, water and sewer systems and storm
drains U C A 1953, 38-1-3
3. Mechanics' Liens <s=>173
Where mortgage loan involved blanket
mortgage covering entire 44-acre subdivision comprising single dwelling lots and
condominiums, and initial work of contractor in locating existing lands and putting in
pipelines, water and sewer systems and
storm drains related to and benefited entire
subdivision, such work could not be characterized as being "off-site" improvements
that would not impart notice to lenders;
therefore, mechanics' hens arising from furnishing of materials and labor both on overall development site and on individual condominium units within development related
back to initial work done on project U C.
A 1953, § 38-1-3
4. Mechanics' Liens <3=»208
To be valid and binding, waiver or release or mechanics hen by contractor
agreement must be supported by legal consideration, when contractor received cash
and propert} in exchange for release of
hen, its release of hen rights was therefore
binding as to those rights accrued up to
time of release U C A 1953, 38-1-3
5. Mechanics' Liens <s=»166
Where work of all other lien claimants
on construction project was completed prior
to date on which one claimant released its
hen in exchange for cash and property, and
other claimants' rights had already attached, such other claimants who were not
parties to relief and did not consent to its
terms, were not affected bv rehef and such
other hen claimants were entitled to same
priority date as that originally accorded to
releasing claimant
U C A 1953 38-1-3,
38-1-10
6. Stipulations ®=>3
Courts are ordinarily bound by stipulations between parties, but sucn is not case
when points of law requiring judicial determination are involved
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7. Stipulations <s=>13, 16
Parties are bound by their stipulations
unless relieved therefrom by court, which
has power to set aside stipulation entered
into inadvertently or for justifiable cause.
8. Appeal and Error <$=>846(5)
Where, in proceedings involving priority of mechanics' lien claims versus claims of
mortgagee, record contained no findings as
to validity or effect of one claimant's stipulation waiving its lien, Supreme Court
would not consider such matter for first
time on appeal.
9. Stipulations $=>17(2)
Whatever effect of stipulation by mechanics' lienholder concerning lien's priority
status with reference to trust deed, other
lien claimants who sought priority over
trust deed were in no way bound by stipulation to which they were not parties.
10. Appeal and Error <*» 790(2)
Appeal involving priority of mechanics'
lien claimants with references to trust deed
on construction project was not moot
where, although sheriffs deed in foreclosure had been issued to mortgagees, they
had not paid amount bid into court as ordered and thus should not have received
deed and lien claimants who had been adjudged to have first priority had not been
paid. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
69(e)(4).
11. Appeal and Error $=> 337(1)
Appeal involving issue of priority of
mechanics' lien claims with reference to lien
of deed of trust on construction project was
not premature, despite fact that various
cross claims and counterclaims had not been
resolved by trial court, where such cross
claims and counterclaims were unrelated to
issue of lien priority and no further judicial
action remained to be taken with respect to
issues of priority and sale of property.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 54(b), 72(a).
12. Mortgages <s=»575
In proceedings involving foreclosure
under deed of trust, trial court retained
jurisdiction over enforcement of its decree
even after appeal was taken from its deter-

mination regarding lien priorities where no
supersedeas bond was posted prior to sheriff's sale or before motion was made to
have sale vacated.

Richard H. Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs and appellants in 15696 and for
plaintiffs and respondents in 16051.
J. Anthony Eyre, George H. Speciale,
Milo S. Marsden, Jr., Albert J. Colton, Robert 3. Howell, David H. Schowbe, Richard
C. Davidson, Carvel R. Shaffer, Salt LakeCity, George K. Fadel, Albert E. Mann,
Bountiful, John H. Kelly, pro se., LeRoy S.
Axland, Randy S. Ludlow, Salt Lake City,
for defendants and respondents in 15696.
Robert C. Cummings, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and appellant in 16051 and for
defendants and respondents in 15696.
Gordon A. Madsen, Robert F. Orton, Salt
Lake City, for defendants and appellants in
16051.
STEWART, Justice:
This appeal from the district court consolidates two separate but related proceedings.
These proceedings involve the allocation of
priorities between mortgagees foreclosing
against real property in Davis County,
Utah, and competing lien claimants who
provided services and materials for improvements to the property.
Plaintiffs, First of Denver Mortgage Investors ("FDMI") and Citibank, N.A., were
granted a judgment against defendant
Mountain Springs by the trial court on December 20, 1977, in the amount of $2,358,396.08. The amount represented $1,558,005.51 in outstanding principal and $800,390.57 in interest. The judgment was secured by a lien on the Lakeview Terrace
subdivision. The court's conclusions of law
include the following:
4. Plaintiffs have stipulated in open
court that they shall bid only the sum of
one million nine hundred thousand for
said property [at the sheriff's sale] and
take no deficiency judgment against the
defendant. Mountain Springs Construe-
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tion Company, nor against any of the
individual guarantors
The Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure
states
The priority of the mechanic's and materialmen's hens is reserved for future determination and shall be set forth in a
supplemental Judgment and Decree of
Foreclosure to be entered prior to Sheriffs Sale.
The Decree further provides
that the proceeds of sale be
applied in payment of the Sheriffs cost
of sale and thereafter to the parties in
accordance with the priority to be determined by the court
The court subsequently entered its order
awarding priority to mechanics liens
ciaimed by eight defendants. The appeal
from that order by plaintiffs is Case No.
15696 in tms Court.
In a consolidated case, No. 16051, defendant Bland Brothers, Inc. ("Bland Bros.")
appeals from the lower court's denial of its
motion to set aside the sheriffs sale held
pursuant to the foreclosure action and raises procedural issues in connection therewith. We shall examine first the common
facts underlying these cases and then deal
separately with the issues raised on appeal.
This litigation concerns a subdivision
which originally comprised 44 acres in
Bountiful, Utah, known as Lakeview Terrace subdivision A trust deed was recorded as to this property on August 1, 1973,
when plaintiff FDMI made a loan of $450,000 to C N Zundel and Associates, a limited
partnership In November 1973 defendant
Child Brothers, Inc. ("Child Bros") commenced the first work on the property for
C.N Zundel The work consisted of locating existing lines and putting in pipeline,
water and sewer systems, and storm drams
Subsequently, the original FDMI loan was
refinanced, and the 1973 trust deed released, with FDMI advancing $1,500,000 to
Zundel and several limited partners This
amount was secured by a new trust deed

recorded on February 19, 1974. The construction loan was for the financing of improvements on the 44-acre property, which
was to comprise 54 single-family building
sites and 69 condominium units The loan
was due and payable on January 15, 1976.

1. On June 13 1979 orders of dismissal based
on settlements between the parties were en
tered in this Court dismissing the following

parties Child Bros Duncan Electric. Countertop Shop and Holt Witmer

On August 8, 1975, Zundel conveyed the
property to Mountain Springs Construction
Company, whose stockholders were the
same individuals who had been Zundel's
limited partners Because Zundel had become delinquent on the FDMI loan, FDMI
on September 8, 1975, filed its first complaint for foreclosure In-November FDMI
concluded a supplemental loan agreement
with Mountain Springs, the successor to
C N. Zundel and Associates, which modified
the construction loan so as to require repayment in installments in July 1976, October
1976, July 1977, and December 1977
The following lien claimants first performed work on the Lakeview property for
Mountain Springs on the dates indicated
Child Bros, November 15, 1973, Duncan
Electric, January 22, 1975, Robert J Wardrop, December 1, 1975, Countertop Shop,
Inc., March 9, 1976, Max D Scheel, April
19, 1976, Ronald Graham Tile Co, March
23, 1976, and Bland Bros , March 8 1976
Additionally, Holt-Witmer provided wallpaper and linoleum under contract with Zundel commencing January 1, 1975 Except
for Child Bros, the hen claimants all performed labor or furnished materials on various condominium units situated on the
property l
In June 1976 Child Bros, as credit in the
approximate amount of $22,000 toward the
sum owed by Zundel and Mountain Springs,
accepted a check for $13,210 and a warranty deed to two lots in the subdivision
FDMI's trust deed provided that the title to
the property deeded to Child Bros would
revert to FDMI if the required payment
was not made by July 1, 1976 In exchange
for the payment in cash and property, Child
Bros executed a release of all hens and
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claims. The release was recorded on June
22, 1976.
Mountain Springs failed to pay the July
1976 installment on its note to FDMI. A
partial assignment of the promissory note
and trust deed from FDMI to Citibank,
N.A., was recorded on July 30, 1976, and
FDMI and Citibank on August 2, 1976, filed
an amended complaint seeking foreclosure
of the property Mountain Springs answered, counter-claimed for damages, and filed
a lis pendens against the property. One
year later Child Bros, cross-claimed for
money due and failure of warranty on the
lots conveyed to it. Subsequently, the
plaintiffs and the lien claimant defendants
moved for summary judgment.
Following the December 20, 1977, hearing, plaintiffs were awarded a judgment
against Mountain Springs; the question of
lien priority was reserved for later determination. The sheriff's sale took place on
January 19, 1978. Plaintiff FDMI bid
$1,900,000 for the property; no higher bids
were received. On January 24, the court
entered a Memorandum Decision awarding
the lien claimants first priority over the
plaintiffs. That ruling involved total liens
in the undisputed amount of $37,397.42. In
making its ruling, the court in effect rejected a stipulation signed by attorneys for
Child Bros, and FDMI on January 11, 1978,
that Child Bros.' lien was junior to the trust
deed. The provisions of the Memorandum
Decision were embodied in the court's Order
Granting Summary Judgment and Order
Amending Certificate of Sale on February
1, 1978. Pursuant to this order, the sheriffs certificate of sale was amended to
change plaintiffs bid to $1,937,397.42. On
February 16, 1978, following the entry of a
summary judgment in favor of lien claimant Holt-Witmer, the court entered another
order requiring "that the sheriffs certificate of sale shall be amended to show that
plaintiffs bid for the property is the sum of
$1,944,732.86."
Child Bros.' cross-claim and counterclaims
against Zundel, Mountain Springs, and
plaintiffs were dismissed following a tnai

on February 1, 1978. Child Bros.' counsel
was not present at the trial for reasons set
out in an affidavit filed with Child Bros.'
appellate brief.
On these facts, the plaintiffs FDMI and
Citibank in Case No 15696 seek reversal of
the summary judgment dated February 1,
1978, awarding the named lien claimants
priority over plaintiffs' trust deed.
Plaintiffs contend that liens for materials
furnished for construction in Lakeview Terrace could not relate back to the date of the
first work commenced on Novemoer 15,
1973, by Child Bros, for two basic reasons.
First, plaintiffs characterize Child Bros.'
work as "off-site improvements" and argue
that liens arising subsequent to such improvements and after the recording of
plaintiffs' trust deed which relate to specific structures cannot relate back to the date
of the commencement of Child Bros.' work.
Second, plaintiffs rely on Child Bros.' release of its claims to a lien for wcrk performed prwr to June 17, 1976. Plaintiffs
further argue that the work done in October 1976 by Child Bros, was not under the
same contract as work done previously by
Child Bros, on Lakeview Terrace and was
therefore, as stipulated by Child Bros., junior and subordinate to plaintiffs' trust deed.
Whether the lower court decided the
question of hen priority properly depends
on a consideration of several propositions of
law underlying plaintiffs' contentions.
The first issue is whether the improvements by Child Bros, met the general statutory requirements under Utah law for the
attachment of mechanics' liens. The Utah
lien statute, § 38-1-3,2 lists the following
persons among those entitled to a mechanics' hen: "Contractors, subcontractors and
all persons performing any services or furnishing any materials used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any
building or structure or improvement to
any premises in any manner
u

The purpose of the lien statutes is to
protect those who have added directly to
the value of property by performng labor

2. All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended.
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or furnishing materials upon it," Stanton
Transportation Co v Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184,
187, 341 P2d 207, 209 (1959) The broad
language, "improvement to any premises in
any manner," encompasses the instant case
where sewer and water systems were installed on the subject property
[1,2] It is not necessary to the attachment of a mechanics' hen that the material
or labor be furnished solely on a building
structure or that the work be performed
solely on the lot on which a building is
being erected. We agree with the New
Jersey Supreme Court, which stated in J R.
Christ Construction Co v Willete Assocs.,
47 NJ. 473, 221 A 2d 538 (1966), that a
contractor should not be barred from enjoying the benefits of the mechanics' hen statute where his work not only enhances the
value of the developer's land, but is also
necessary to make residences to be built on
such property habitable. The court held
that where a developer engages the contractor to install a sewer system for a subdivision project, the contractor, if he complies with required statutory procedures, is
entitled to a mechanics' lien against the
developer's property for the cost of labor
and materials furnished The New Jersey
Court cited Ladue Contracting Co v Land
Development Co, 337 S W 2d 578 (Mo App
1960), in emphasizing the fact that water
and sewer systems are essential to the comfortable and convenient use of dwellings
and that it would be "turning] the clock
back to another century' to hold that 3uch
improvements are outside the terms of the
lien statute. (Id at 585)
The second issue is whether the priority
of materialmen's hens is different with respect to a blanket construction loan for a
subdivision comprising single dwelling lots
and condominiums as compared with a construction loan for a single dwelling in a
subdivision where there may have been
'off-site" improvements that would not impart notice to lenders of the latter type of
loan Plaintiffs rely on this Court's decision in Western Mortgage Loan Corp v
Cottonwood Construction Co, 18 Utah 2d
409, 424 P2d 437 (1967), to support their

argument that our mechanics' hen statute
provides that hens are to date back only to
the time each individual structure was commenced
Western Mortgage involved the relative
priorities of mechanics' liens and a construction mortgage on a single lot in a subdivision. The question was whether hen claimants who had furnished labor or materials
that went into the construction of the house
on that single lot were entitled to tack for
priority purposes to work comprising "offsite improvements," i e., the laying out the
subdivision and the installation of water
lines, sewer, curb and gutter, and street
paving done earlier in connection with the
subdivision as a whole. The lien claimants
cited § 38-1-5, which reads in part as follows*
Priority—Over otner encumbrances —
The hens herein provided for shall relate
back to, and take effect as of, the time of
the commencement to do work or furnish
materials on the ground for the structure
or improvement, and shall have priority
over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time when the building,
improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first material
furnished on the ground
This Court held that the recorded construction mortgage took pnont over the mechanics' hens because in that case the liens
could not relate back to the date of commencement of off-site imorovements. The
decision rested on the issue of notice The
Court stated, 18 Utah 2d at 412, 424 P2d at
439
The presence of materials on the building 3ite or evidence on the ground that
work has commenced on a structure or
preparatory thereto is notice to all the
world that hens may have attached.
However, the off-site construction in developing the subdivision for ouilding sites
would not necessarily bring to the attention of a lender that someone is claiming
a hen on a particular lot in the subdivision This is especially true as in this
case, where the lender advanced money
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to build a home long after the subdivision
had been laid out and developed.
[3] The instant case, however, is distinguishable from Western Mortgage. Here
we are not dealing with a lender who made
a loan on a single lot within a subdivision
and who had no reason to be on notice as to
the existence of prior work. In this case,
the initial work performed by Child Bros,
related to and benefited the entire subdivision. The mortgage loan in question was a
blanket mortgage covering the entire subdivision. Because the initial work was performed over substantial portions of the
property involved, it could not properly be
characterized as being "off-site" as were
the improvements in Western Mortgage in
relation to the property that was the subject of the construction loan. Furthermore,
the claimant of the mechanics' lien in Western Mortgage performed the labor on a lot
entirely separate from the initial work. In
the present case the claimants performed
their work on the same site, i. e., the 44
acres covered by FDMI's construction loan.
Plaintiffs also cite Aladdin Heating Corp.
v. Trustees of Cent. States, Nevada, 563
P.2d 82 (1977), in which the court refused to
relate mechanics' liens back to pre-construction architectural, soil testing, and survey
work. The court in Aladdin required "visible signs of construction to inform prospective lenders [who inspected] the premises
that liens had attached," and the work performed in that case and others cited therein
resulted in nothing that would put a lender
on notice because of the visibility of the
work. In the instant case Child Bros, laid
water line and sewer pipe for the subdivision, commencing its first work on November 15, 1973. The trial court made no specific findings as to the visibility of Child
Bros.' work at the time the loan agreement
was entered into, and this issue was not
raised or argued by plaintiffs. The work
done by Child Bros., however was concededly more suDstantiai than that done in A/addin. Accordingly, Aladdin is distinguishable from the present case.
Based on our statute and the issues submitted by the parties, the materialmen with

valid liens stand, in this case, on equal
footing in dating their liens from the time
work commenced. We therefore hold that
the mechanics' liens arising from the fur- •
nishing of materials and labor both on the
overall development site and on individual
condominium units within the development
relate back to the initial work done on the
project by Child Bros.
A third issue involves the effect of Child
Bros.' execution in June 1976 of a document
titled "Release of All Liens and Claims"
pertaining to the Lakeview property. The
notarized release document recited that for
a valuable consideration Child Brothers,
Inc., by its president, Eugene Child, who
signed the document, "release[d] and discharge^]" Mountain Springs, FDMI, Zundel, and the Lakeview subdivision property,
from any and all liens, claims, demands,
damages, actions at law or in equity
arising out of any contractual or other
relationship
and/or claims of
liens, arising or accruing on or before
[date omitted], or existing on that
date
and all matters involved
in any and all claims of liens for all labor
performed upon, and ail materials furnished to [the Lakeview subdivision property] arising on or before, or existing on,
the date specified above, by the undersigned, and by all agents, employees, suppliers, [etc.]
all of whom the
undersigned hereby warrants have beer
fuily paid, and none of whom has an\
further claim or hen against such reai
estate as of the date specified above. .
That the parties hereto intend herebj
that this Release of All Liens and Claims
shall be a final and complete release and
discharge of [Mountain Springs, FDMI,
Zundel, and the Lakeview subdivision] by
the undersigned, [his heirs, assigns,
agents, employees, etc.], and all other persons performing labor upon or furnishing
materials
as of the date specified above, at the instance of the undersigned.
The document was dated June 17, 1976; it
was recorded on June 22, 1976.
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As this Court stated in upholding the
waiver of lien rights in Dwyer v Salt Lake
City Copper Mfg Co., 14 Utah 339, 344, 47
P 311, 312 (1896), "A mechanic's hen is a
privilege conferred by statute, and ordinarily may be waived by express agreement of
the party in whose favor it exists.'* The
legitimacy of a release of lien rights was
also recognized in G Chicoine Contractors,
Inc. v John Marshal Bldg Corp., 77 111.
App.2d 437, 222 NE2d 712, 714 (1966),
where the court stated, "One right the lien
claimant has is to execute his full and general waiver releasing his rights to a mechanic's lien against the property" The
court then quoted the following language
from Decatur Lumber and Mfg. Co. v Crail,
350 111. 319, 324, 183 N E. 228, 230 (1932):
While a waiver of hen for a clearly expressed special purpose will be confined
by the courts to the purpose intended,
yet, where a general waiver is executed,
and there is nothing in the context to
show a contrary intention, there is nothing left for the court to do but enforce
the contract as the parties have made it.
[4] To be valid and binding a waiver or
release of a mechanics' hen by contract or
agreement must be supported by a legal
consideration Kelly v Johnson, 251 111.
135, 95 N E. 1068 (1911); Skidmore v Eby,
57 NM. 669, 262 P2d 370 (1953) Child
Bros., received cash and property in exchange for the release Its release of hen
rights is therefore binding as to those rights
accrued up to the time of the release, at
least as to it.
[5] As to the hen claimants left in the
case, all their work on the project was completed prior to the date of Child Bros'
release Their hen rights had already attached. These henholders were not parties
to the release, did not consent to its terms,
and are not in the category of subcontractors or materialmen performing labor or
furnishing materials at the instance of
Child Bros, and therefore the release does
not affect their status as henholders. They
are entitled to the same priority date as
that originally accorded Child Bros , whose
work was the first done on the project, in

accordance with U C A. § 38-1-10, which
provides:
The hens for work and labor done or
material furnished as provided m this
chapter shall be upon an equal footing,
regardless of date of filing the notice and
claim of lien and regardless of the time of
performing such work and labor or furnishing such matenat
A final issue relating to hen priority in
this case is whether the stipulation that
Child's hen was junior to plaintiffs' had any
binding legal effect The stipulation was
signed by attorneys for f DMI and Child
Bros, on the 11th of January, 1978. It
states that Child Bros released its hen
against the Lakeview property and that
Child Bros was the grantee in a warranty
deed recorded June 22, 1976, covering Lots
59 and 60, Lakeview Terrace. The second
paragraph states
Said parties hereby stipulate that the
warranty deed is junior and subordinate
to the lien or [sic] plaintiffs Trust Deed
and tiiat defendant Child Bros Inc has a
lien m the sum of $13,450 52 which hen is
junior and subordinate to plaintiffs Trust
Deed [Emphasis added ]
[6,7] Ordinarily, courts are bound by
stipulations between parties, Koron v
Myers, 87 Idaho 567, 394 P2d 634 (1964),
Rwrdan v Commercial Travelers Mut Ins
Co, 11 Wash App 707, 525 P 2d 804 (1974)
Such is not the case, however, when points
of law requiring judicial determination are
involved, Mobile Acres, Inc v Kurata, 211
Kan. 833, 508 P 2d 889 (1973), In Re Estate
of Maguire, 204 Kan 686, 466 P 2d 358,
modified 206 Kan 1, 476 P2d 618 (1970),
Cox v City of Pocatello, 11 Idaho 225, 291
P 2d 282 (1955) Parties are bound bv their
stipulations unless relievpci therefrom bv
the court, which has the power to ^et aside
a stipulation entered li^to inadvertently or
tor justifiable cause, Klein i &7ein, Ltah,
544 P 2d 472 (1975), Johnson v Peoples
Finance & Thrift Co, 2 Utah 2d 246, 272
P2d 171 (1954), Guard v County of Mancopa, 14 AnzAop 187, 481 P 2d 873 (1971),
Higby v Higby, Colo App, 538 P2d 493
(1975), Thompson v Turner, 98 Idaho 110,
558 P 2d 1071 (1977)
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[8, 9] In the present case, the trial court
apparently disregarded the stipulation of
FDMI and Child Bros as to lien priority
The record contains no findings as to the
validity or effect of the stipulation, and this
Court will not consider this matter for the
first time on appeal Whatever the effect
of the stipulation upon Child Bros priority
status, the other hen claimants who sought
priority over FDMFs trust deed are in no
way bound by a stipulation to which they
were not parties, Thomas v State, 57 Haw
639, 562 P 2d 425 (1977)
[10] Bland Bros, also a defendant in
Case No 15696, raises the further issues
that this appeal is both moot and premature Mootness is claimed because plaintiff
FDMI has bid $1,944,732 86 3 for the property at the sheriff's sale and is thus required
to pay that amount to the sheriff pursuant
to Rule 69(e)(4), which states that every bid
shall be deemed an irrevocable offer and
that the purchaser is liable on such bid
Because the amount bid would batisfy fully
the claims of the lienors, as wetl as plaintiffs, defendants claim that the plaintiffs
have no grounds for bringing an appeal
Plaintiffs conceded that should someone
pav the amount of $1,944,732 86 during the
redemption period, the hen claimants would
receive $44 732 86 and the appeal would
become moot Otherwise plaintiffs argue
that this Court should determine the lien
claimants to be junior and subordinate to
their trust deed Bland Brob claims that
the redemption period cannot expire where
no payment has been made pursuant to the
order of sale
The record shows that plaintiffs themselves stipulated to the amount to be bid
and moved the trial court on the 11th day
of February, 1978, fo amend fhe Sheriffs
Certificate of Sale to provide that the r otal
amount to be paid was $1 944 732 $6, m the
event that hen claimant Holt-Witmer Arab
granted first priority An order was signed
by the court so amending fhe certificate of
sale Plaintiffs objections at this point are
3. Since this case is to be remanded to the trial
court vve leave to that court the determination
of what effect the settlements made during the

more a change of mind than a justifiable
claim of error on the part of the trial court
Although a sheriffs deed was issued to the
plaintiffs, they have not paid the amount
bid into the cour r as ordered and thus
should not have received a deed The hen
claimants who had been adjudged to have
first priority have not been paid The issues raised herein are not moot
[11] Defendant Bland Bros also argues
that this appeal is premature because various cross-claims and counterclaims have not
been resolved Unless an appeal may be
taken pursuant to Rule 54(b), U R.C P , or
our interlocutory appeal procedure, only 'final orders ' are appealable to this Court, see
Rule 72(a), U R C P
Bland Bros claims
that there was no final order until hen
claimant Holt-Witmer s priority status was
adjudicated on February 22, 1978
The order of February 22, 1918, was an
amendment to the order dated February 1
1978 4ithough the notice of appeal states
that it is the February 1 order that is
appealed, we deem that order to incorporate
by amendment the order of February 22
since it was entered prior to the filing of
the notice of appeal
Nonetheless, it is
clear that certain cross-claims and counterclaims unrelated to the issue of 1 en priority
remain to be adjudicated
Whether an order is deemed i 'final order" is not necessarily dependent in all instances upon whether all issues in a ^awsuit
have been adjudicated The test to be applied is a pragmatic test See Brown Shoe
Co v United States 370 U S 294, 82 S Ct
1502, 8 L Ed 2d 510 (1962), Wright Federal
Courts 505 (3rd ed ) In the msi ant case no
further judicial action remains to be taken
with respect to ^he issues of pnontv and
the sale of the property and, but for the
appeal sale of the property and disbursement of the proceeds would oc:ur To require the appeal to abide <-he determination
of pending unrelated claims wojld make an
appeal on the is^ue ot priorities moot Unless an appeal mav be taken at this point
pendencv of the appeal (see Footnote 1) shouid
make with respect to plaintiffs t id
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substantial property interests may be destroyed since the sheriffs sale would proceed and the money would be disbursed on
the basis of the priorities determined by the
trial court With the issuance of a sheriffs
deed and the disbursement of monies, the
legal rights and obligations of the parties
are finally established \ccordmgly, under
a pragmatic view of the test of finality, the
order appealed in this case is final

law with respect to the execution of process, and if for anv reason such process is
improperly executed, then and in such
case to vacate the improper proceeding
had pursuant to the process, and order
the issuance of another in lieu thereof
The court below was in error in holding
that it was without jurisdiction to hear
and determine the motion to vacate the
order of sale

Consolidated with the appeal of FDMI
and Citibank in Case No 15696 is an appeal
by Bland Bros, Case No 16051, which challenges the refusal of the trial court to set
aside the sheriffs sale held pursuant to the
foreclosure order The facts pertaining to
this appeal may be set out briefly
The
Lakeview Terrace property was offered at
a sheriffs sale on January 19, 1978 FDML
pursuant to its agreement, bid the sum (as
amended) of $1 944 732 86 and subsequently
received the sheriffs deed to the property
Before the deed was issued, and wnen the
normal six-month redemption period was
about to expire Bland Bros moved the
lower court to vacate the sale because plaintiff FDMI had failed to pay the amount of
its bid into the court as had been ordered
The trial court in an order dated August 15,
1978 denied the motion stating that its
jurisdiction was lost wnen the appeal regarding hen priorities was taken to the
Supreme Court The court on its own motion ordered FDMI to post a supersedeas
bond in the amount of the claims of the
mechanics lienholders who had been adjudged lo have tirst prioritv

Bland Bros also points out a detect m the
publication of notice of the sheriffs sale,
namely that there was no publication m a
Davis Count> newspaper ;n the week immediately preceding the sale as required by
Rule 69(e)(1), (3), U R C P Since this issue
should be considered b> the trial court in
connection with the determination as to the
validity of the sheriffs sale, we decline to
deal with it here

[12] Bland Bros argues that the lower
court retained jurisdiction over the enforcement of its decree inasmuch is no supersedeas bond was posted prior to the sheriffs
sale or betore Bland Bros motion to have
the sale vacated This position s correct
and is sustained bv this Courts opinion in
Skeen v Pratt *7 Utah 121 at 125 48 P 2d
457 at 458 (1935) which stated
As an incident to the authority remaining
in the trial court to enforce a decree of
toreclosure where an *\ppe d is had without a supersedeas bond or stay is the
authority to compel compliance with the
600 P2d—t2

Our decision regarding the pnontv issue
makes it unnecessary to rule on additional
matters argued by the parties herein It is
the opinion of this Court that the lower
court was correct in granting priority to the
mechanics hen claimants inasmuch as the
initial work bv Child Bros established the
priority date for all who provided labor and
services on the Lakeview Terrace subdivision The action of *he trial court as to the
setting ot priorities is therefore atfirmed as
it pertains to the lien claimants who remain
as parties to this appeal
We affirm the trial court s determination
that the mechanics and materialmen s hens
of the defendants whose appeal has not
been dismissed have priority over FDMIs
trust deed We remand for anv necessary
consideration of the issues raised with respect to the sheriffs sale
Costs to defendants
CROCKETT C I
and MAUGHAN,
WILKINS and HALL, J J concur
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22 Ariz.App. 591
HARSH BUILDING COMPANY, an Oregon
Corporation, Harsh Investment Corporation, an Oregon Corporation; and Harold
J. Schnitzer, Appellants,
v,
Sam BIALAG, Jerry Bialac, James 1", Bialac,
Lee Bialac, Alice Sue Altman and
Robert Altman, Appellees.
No. I CA-C1V 2752.

2. Stipulations C=l
"Stipulation" is an agreement, admission or concession made in a judicial proceeding by the parties thereto or their attorneys, in respect to some matter incident
thereto, for the purpose, ordinarily, of
avoiding delay, trouble and expense.
See publication Words and Plirases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1,
Department A.
Jan. 7, 1975.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 18, 1975.

3. Stipulations 3=>!4(l)
In construing stipulations, primary
rule is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the parties and the stipulation
must be construed in the light of the circumstances surrounding the parties and in
view of the result which they were attempting to accomplish.

After case, which had originally been
removed to federal court, had been remanded to state court for lack of federal
jurisdiction, the Superior Court, Maricopa
County, Cause Xo. Cl%753, Howard F.
Thompson, J , set aside certain stipulations
entered into between the parties in federal
district court and dismissed defendants'
counterclaims based thereon and defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals, Stevens, J., held that where the stipulations
specifically stated that they were entered
into in view of directed verdicts granted in
federal district court against plaintiffs and
were entered into without prejudice to
plaintiffs' right to challenge federal jurisdiction, state trial court properly refused to
enforce the stipulations once the case was
remanded to state court and properly dismissed the counterclaims based thereon;
and that, in view of duress w«hich was occasioned by the directed verdicts, no contract between the parties was entered into
iO that piamtiffs were entitled to return
amounts received pursuant to the terms of
the stipulations and to seek to avoid the
stipulations.
Affirmed.

1. Stipulations C»I3, 17(1)
Generally, parties are bound by their
stipulations unless relieved therefrom by
the court.

4. Stipulations 0=^13, 19
Where stipulation for judgment was
entered into in federal district court after
court had directed verdicts against plaintiffs on all but one claim and where plaintiffs reserved the right to contest jurisdiction of the federal court, state court, after
federal court had been found to be without
jurisdiction and case had been remanded to
state court, properly refused to enforce the
stipulations and properly dismissed them in
the form of defendants' counterclaims.
5. Stipulations C»I3
Court, in exercise of its own discretion, may set aside a stipulation entered
into through inadvertence, excusable neglect, fraud, or mistake of fact or law, or
where the facts stipulated have changed or
there has been a change in underlying conditions that could not have been anticipated, or where special circumstances exist
rendering it unjust to enforce the stipulation.
6. Contracts C=»I5
To find the existence of a contract,
court must find that the two parties freely
consented to make a contract.
7. Stipulations C=M3
Where stipulations provided that they
were entered into on part of plaintiffs because oi federal district court's action in
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directing verdicts against plaintiffs, the
stipulations were obtained under the duress
of the directed verdicts and no contract
was entered into between the parties so
that plaintiffs, after tederai court was
found not to have jurisdiction and case
was remanded to state court, could return
amounts received under the terms of the
stipulations and have the stipulations set
aside.

Evans, Kitchel & fenckes, P C, by Newman R. Porter and F Pendleton Gaines,
III, Phoenix, for appellants
Lewis & Roca b\ John P Frank, Gerald
K. Smith and Richard N Goldsmith, and
Flynn, Kimerer, Thmnes & Galbraith by
John J. Flynn, Phoenix, for appellees
OPINION
STEVENS, Judge
This appeal is to review the decision of
the trial court not to accept two stipulations entered into between the parties
while litigating their case in federal court
Harsh Building Companv and the other appellants (Harsh Bunding) were the defendants in an action commenced in the
State court on 31 January 1967 On 3
February 1967, the case was removed to
the United States District Court tor the
District ot \nzona on the basis of diversity of citizenship Following MX years ot
federal court proceedings which included a
trial and two appeals, the case was remanded to the State court tor lack of tederai jurisdiction, see Bialac v Harsh
Building Co, 463 F i d 1185 Qfh O r
1972) On 31 May 1973, Harsh Building
tiled an answer and counterclaim* in the
Superior Court ot \rizona ror Maricopa
Count)
Sam Bialac and the other appellees (Bialacs) made a motion to dismiss
several counterclaims ot Harsh Bunding
In a judgment entered S \oni 1(>74 the
trial court dismissed counterclaims V md
I. The record ot proceedings in the tederai i
Court upon remand

B The trial court made an express finding that there is no just reason for delay
and expressly directed the entry of judgment, thereby making this judgment a final, appealable judgment.
Rule 54(b),
Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S
The detailed recitation of the facts of
this dispute is not necessary to our decision
and, especially due to the incompleteness of
the record be tore us, 1 we quote appellants'
brief for a short statement ot facts
"The parties' disputes center around a
large apartment complex and adjacent
shopping center located in Phoenix \t
one time, the property was owned b> a
corporation controlled by plaintiffs (referred to hereinafter simply as the Bialacs'). This complex litigation arises
from the Bialacs' desire and etforts to
convert the rental apartments into FHA
234' condominium units during the period from 1965 through 1967 \\ lthout
unnecessary detail, it is sufficient to note
that the complicated, intricate series of
contractual arrangements between die
parties arose trom the Bialacs' wish to
avoid being taxed on the proceeds of the
condominium conversion at ordinary-income rates.
The Bialacs sought to
achieve ravorable capital gains treatment
of the sales and proceeds and it the
same time preserve the benefits of FHA
financing "
The case was pending in* the tederai court
for several vears while both parties filed
numerous pleadings, motions and engaged
in extensive discovery In May and June,
1971, «-he litigants participated in a fiveweek jury trial Towards the end ot their
case, che Bialacs made an oral motion to
remand the case to the State court based
on an incomplete diversity of citizenship
alleging that Harsh Building, an Oregon
corporation had its principal place ot business in \ n z o n a . The motion to remand
was denied The Court, a tew dav<= later,
directed verdicts in tavor ot Harsh Buildng on seven ot eight counts ot the Biairt has not been transmitted to the Superior
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lacs' complaint. The case was in this posture when the parties entered into and
filed a second stipulation entitled "Stipulation for Judgment, Dismissal and Other
Disposition of Certain Claims." This stipulation settled the major portion of the
case and it settled and disposed of the remaining count of the Bialacs' complaint as
well as Harsh Building's counterclaims.
This stipulation incorporated by reference
a 13 March 1970 stipulation entitled "Stipulation and Order Re Disposition of Certain Claims."
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that the federal court
lacked jurisdiction and remanded with
directions to send the case back to the
State court. Once in the Maricopa County
Superior Court, Harsh Building sought the
enforcement of the two stipulations by incorporating them as counterclaims A and
B in their answer. Upon the motion of
the Bialacs, the trial court dismissed counterclaims A and B. Harsh Building appealed this decision. The question for review is: As a matter of law, is an agreement to settle claims in litigation rendered
invalid because the agreement is evidenced
by a stipulation filed m a court later determined to lack jurisdiction?
[1] The general rule is that the parties
are bound by their stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the court. Higgins v.
Guenn, 74 Ariz. 187, 245 P 2d 956 (1952) ;
Guard v. County Of Maricopa, 14 Ariz.
App. 187, 481 P.2d 873 (1971). The parties could not direct us to any, case directly
on point nor did our research reveal any.
We must find the general rules and apply
them to the present dispute to find a solution.
[2,3] UA stipulation is an agreement,
idmission or concession made in a judicial
proceeding by the parties thereto or their
attorneys, in respect to some matter incident thereto, for the purpose, ordinarily, of
avoiding delay, trouble and expense." Bekins Van & Storage Company v. The Industrial Commission Of Arizona, 4 Ariz.
App. 569, 570, 422 P.2d 4oO, 401 (1967).

In some cases, it is also a wise trial strategy to enter into a stipulation to save what
may be saved when one party seems to be
prevailing in the dispute. In construing
stipulations, the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
parties and the stipulation must be construed in light of the circumstances surrounding the parties and in view of the result which they were attempting to accomplish. Gear v. City Of Phoentx, 93 Ariz.
260, 379 P.2d 972 (1963).
[4] As we have stated, the second stipulation, dated 15 June 1971, incorporated the
first stipulation of 13 March 1970. We
now quote paragraph seven of the second
stipulation which states the reason for, as
well as provides an insight of the intent of
the parties in entering the stipulation.
"7. This stipulation is prepared and entered into in light of the fact that the
Court has directed verdicts against the
plaintiffs on all but one of the claims
contained in the Fourth Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs reserve, without prejudice of any kind, the right to appeal
from the judgment as to each of these
claims (except as to the stipulated dismissal of Count Five) and to contest by
appropriate means, whether appeal or
otherwise, the jurisdiction of this Court."
The above quote, we believe, clearly reflects the Bialacs' reason for agreeing to
the stipulation. The District Court directed verdicts against them on all but one of
their claims. This is a persuasive and
compelling reason for entering a stipulation to make the best of a seemingly hopeless situation. Their reason for wanting to
nullify the stipulation is also evident. The
Bialacs are back in the State court and are
presented with an opportunity to pursue
their claims anew. A stipulation is an
agreement between the parties and ordinarily, we would not hesitate to enforce a
stipulation regardless of whether it was
made while the parties were litigating in
the federal or state court. The stipulations
in question were clearly entered into in
view or the posture of the case as it then
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existed and it would be inappropriate to
hold the parties to these stipulation* now,
when the partieb are back in the position
from wnence they started.
[5] The Bialacs also reserved the right
to contest the jurisdiction of the tederai
court. If this stipulation was to have effect in any other court, it would have been
an idle gesture to reserve the right to contest the jurisdiction of the court It would
have made little, if any, difference as to
which court would enter a consent judgment based on a set of stipulations that set
out in detail the amount ot the judgment
For these two reasons, we tind that the
trial court had adequate cause tor refusing
to en tore? the stipulations and dismissing
them in the torm ot counterclaims A. and
B
TTIhe court, in the exercise of its
sound discretion, may bet abide a btipulation entered into through inadvertence,
excusable neglect, traud, mistake ot tact
or law, where the facts stipulated have
changed or there has been a change m
the underlying conditions, tnat could not
have been anticipated, or where special
circumstances exist rendering it imjust
to entorce the stipulation " Los \ngeleb
City s^h Dist v Landier Management
Co, 177 CalApp2d 744, 2 Cal Rptr 662,
665-666 (1960)
The effect ot the motions to dismiss counterclaims A and B was a request by the
Bialacs to be relieved of their stipulations
in view ot the drastic change ot the circumstances
By the granting ot trie motions the Superior Court Judge ruled that
under the circumstances the Bialacs should
be so relieved. We find no abuse ot discretion in this ruling.
Harsh Building asserts that these stipulation* are in the nature ot i contract and
bhould be enforced as such The> point to
the tact that Harsh Building made a ^a^h
payment ot SIUXK) to the Bialacs as consideration under the terms of the stipulation The Bialacs atter the dttermination
ot the appeal, attempted to return the

$13,000 paid to them but Harsh Buildn^
refused to accept it.
[6,7] To tind the exisience of a contract, we must tind that the two parties
freely consented to make a contract. It
would be hard to argue that the Bialacs.
faced with the directed verdicts againfj
them in all but one claim, freely consented
to the contract. We believe that the Bialacs' consent to the stipulation was obtained under the duress of the directed
verdicts This is evidenced by paragraph
seven of the stipulation where the Bialacs
reserved the right to appeal trom the judgments and to contest the jurisdiction of the
court We cannot, in good conscience, entorce the stipulation as a contract
The decision ot the trial court to dismiss
counterclaimb A and B is based upon good
cause. It is affirmed.
OGG, P J , Department A, and DOXOFRIO, J , concur

22 AnzApp. ,)94
Jesus F1GUEROA, Petitioner,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION oi
Arizona, Respondent,
New Pueblo Construction Co., Respondent Employer,
Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Respondent Carrier.
Nos. I CA-IC 1019, I CA-1C 1020.

Couit of Appeals of Arizona,
DiMsion 1,

Department O
Dec 24, 197-1
Rehearing Denied Jan. 13, 1975.
Review Granted Feb 2o, 1975.
Workman, whose bem fits tor lett inguinal herniab buttered in lanuarv 1971
and <n lanuary 1972 had jeen terminated,
Lhim \o> 1 0-07-^7 and 2/0-27-37 petitioned ror certiorari to review the In-
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Gerald E. HI0LE1 and Ruth J Higley,
husband and wife, Plaintiffs
md Appellants,
A. Cardon McDONALD and Doilie
McDonald, husband and wife,
Defendants ind Respondents.
No. 18755.
Supreme Court of Utah
April 27, 1984
Plaintiffs brought action n ejectment
to secure removal of defendants' mobile
home from real property allegedly owned
by plaintiffs The Seventh District Court,
Carbon County, Boyd Bunnell, J , entered
judgment of no cause of action against
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs appealed The Supreme Court, Hall, C J , held that parties'
stipulation that deed survey depicted approximate location of the mobile home did
not bind trial court to apply measurements
and calculations on the deed survey m determining location of disputed boundary
Affirmed.
1. Stipulations e»17(l)
Stipulations are conclusive and binding
on parties unless, upon timely notice and
for good cause shown, relief is granted
therefrom
2. Stipulations «»17(3)
In action in ejectment to secure removal of detendants mobile home from real
property allegedly owned by plaintiff parties stipulation that deed survey depicted
approximate location of the mobile nome
did not bind trial court to apply measurements and calculations on the deed survey
m determining location of disputed boundary
James W Guthrie, Hansen, Thompson &
Dewsnup, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and
appellants

<i SERIES

Duane A Frandsen, Michael R Jensen,
Frandsen, Keller & Jensen, Salt Lake City,
for defendants and respondents
HALL, Chief Justice
Plaintiffs brought this action in ejectment to secure the removal of defendants'
mobile home and other personal propertv
from real property allegedly owned by
plaintiffs The district court sitting without a jury, entered judgment of no cause of
action against plaintiffs We affirm
In 1951, Arthur Bolotas (hereinafter 'Bolotas ') purchased a tract of mountain land
located along the eastern shoreline of Scofield Reservoir m Carbon County, Utah In
terms of its legal description, the property
is situated within the southeast quarter of
Section 4, Township 12 South, Range 7
East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian
In 1960, Bolotas hired John Bene (hereinafter 'Bene'), a licensed surveyor, to survey and plat out a portion of the shoreline
property for development as a mountain
home subdivision Bene surveved the land
into lots and blocks and set survey markers
(drill steel) at the corners of the lots He
tied his survey to a point established by
him as the northeast corner of the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of
Section 4 This point was determined by
locating the survey markers representing
the northeast corner and the east quarter
corner of Section 4 and then, through the
use of survev equipment, by extending an
imaginary line through those two points
and to the south thereof a distance of 1,320
feet (standard 40-acre distance) A steel
pin was placed at this point by Bene as a
survey marker
Bene testified in respect to the northeast
corner and east quarter corner reference
points that he found the former point
marked, as most sectional corners typically
are by an authentic brass cap placed bv
government surveyors, while the latter
point was marked by a 3/4-inch bent steel
rod, which was shown to him by an adjoining landowner Justice Seelev This latter
point has been denominated the 'Seeley
Corner "
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After completing his survey of the Bolotas property, Bene prepared a subdivision
plat (hereinafter "Bolotas Plat") from the
data obtained in the survey. Bolotas postponed recording the plat until the remaining portion of his property could be surveyed and included in the plat. However,
the remainder of the property was never
surveyed and subdivided, and thus the plat
was never recorded.
In 1969, plaintiffs Gerald and Ruth Higley and defendants Cardon and Dollie McDonald (hereinafter referred to in the singular as plaintiff and defendant) purchased
two adjoining lots in the Bolotas Subdivision. The lot-purchased by plaintiff was
designated on the Bolotas Plat as Lot 26
Block 1 and was situated to the south of
defendant's lot, which was designated as
Lot 27 Block 1.
At the time the parties negotiated the
purchase of their respective lots, the only
descriptions they had of the lots were the
"lot and block" descriptions indicated on
the Bolotas Plat. Aside from that, the
parties could see the physical monuments
at the corners of the lots (set previously by
Bene) and could determine therefrom the
sizes and locations of the lots. There appears to be no inconsistency between the
lot dimensions and locations as depicted on
the Bolotas Plat and as represented by the
physical monuments.
The deeds to Lots 26 and 27 were prepared by attorney Luke Pappas (hereinafter
"Pappas"). Inasmuch as the Bolotas Plat
was not of record at the time the deeds
were prepared, Pappas described the subject lots by metes and bounds descriptions.
However, in anticipation that the plat
would be recorded in the future and to
facilitate future references to specific lots
in the subdivision, Pappas included with the
metes and bounds descriptions the lot and
block numbers as set forth on the plat.
Pappas testified that the metes and
bounds descriptions contained in plaintiffs
and defendant's deeds were calculated
from the dimensions on the Bolotas Plat.
Notwithstanding, he also testified that the
metes and bounds descriptions were at var-

lance with the lot and block dimensions on
the Bolotas Plat in that the former represented the location of the lots to be 40 feet
farther to the north than the latter. This
discrepancy, according to Pappas, resulted
from the circumstances described hereafter: Following a conveyance from Bolotas
to one Jouflas of four lots located in the
same block (Block 1) as, and just south of,
Lots 26 and 27, Bolotas informed Pappas
that he (Bolotas) had measured (apparently
onsite) a section of Block 1 and had found
that approximately 40 feet more land existed in that block than was included in the
plat dimensions. Based on this measurement, Pappas drew up a description extending the northern boundary of Block 1 an
additional 40 feet. He subsequently used
that description as a reference in preparing
the metes and bounds descriptions on plaintiffs and defendant's deeds. Sometime
thereafter, Pappas made an on-site measurement himself and discovered that the
additional 40 feet did not exist and that the
actual dimensions of Block 1 and the lots
included therein were precisely as they are
recorded on the Bolotas Plat. He therefore
concluded that the metes and bounds descriptions in plaintiffs and defendant's
deeds, containing the additional 40 feet of
land, were in error. Unfortunately, this
error was never corrected, or even revealed, prior to the institution of this lawsuit.
In 1970, plaintiff Gerald Higley, with the
assistance of defendant Cardon McDonald,
surveyed the north-south boundary line between their respective properties and set
stakes along that line in preparation of
moving their mobile homes onto their lots.
Shortly thereafter, the parties moved their
mobile homes onto their lots, positioning
them within the staked areas.
In 1971, plaintiff informed defendant
that defendant's mobile home was encroaching onto plaintiffs lot due to an error they had made in their 1970 survey.
Defendant responded by contacting Bene
and requesting his services in settling the
dispute. In 1972, Bene surveyed the
boundary between the two lots, using as
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reference points the drill steel survey
markers he had set at the corners of the
lots in his ongmal 1960 survey, and determined that defendant's mobile home was
overlapping the boundary line and encroaching 10 to 12 feet onto plaintiffs lot.
Thereafter (during that same year), defendant moved his mobile home a distance of 10
to 15 feet to the north. Plaintiff witnessed
the moving of the trailer and expressly
conceded to the adequacy thereof.
After defendant's mobile home had been
relocated, Bene again made an on-site inspection and survey of defendant's lot and
determined therefrom that defendant's mobile home was no longer encroaching on
plaintiffs lot and that said mobile home
was positioned entirely within the bounds
of defendant's lot. as that lot was established by Bene in his original (1960) survey
and as it appears on the Bolotas Plat.
Since the 1972 reestablishment of the
boundary line between Lots 26 and 27, the
parties have planted trees along that line,
and the power company has placed a utility
pole on the same
In 1977, plaintiff once again informed
defendant that his (defendant's) mobile
home was encroaching on plaintiffs property Plaintiffs claim was purportedly
based upon a survey performed by a Mr
Spensko in 1974 or 1975 Defendant rejected this claim and refused to move his mobile home again. This action ensued.
The trial court observed that the metes
and bounds descriptions included in the
deeds to Lots 26 and 27 were inconsistent
with the lot and block descriptions also
included therein. The court ruled that the
inclusion of inconsistent legal descriptions
within the subject deeds rendered those
deeds ambiguous. As a result, parol evidence was allowed to clarify the intent of
the parties and their common grantor (BoIotas) as to the dimensions of the two lots
in question, as well as the location thereof.
At the conclusion of the presentation of
evidence, the trial court ruled that the parties intended to purchase Lots 26 and 27,
and Bolotas intended to convey the same,
in accordance with the lot and block dimen-

sions on the Bolotas Plat. In addition, the
court found that the lots occupied and possessed by the parties at that time had the
same dimensions (square footage) and were
in the approximate location as the lots d e.,
Lots 26 and 27) depicted on the Bolotas
Plat. It was therefore concluded that defendant's mobile home was not encroaching
on plaintiffs lot, but was situated within
the boundaries of defendant's own lot
Plaintiffs sole contention on appeal is
that the measurements and calculations indicated on the Bolotas Plat relative to Lots
26 and 27 'do not support the foregoing
conclusion. He maintains that he proved at
trial by stipulated evidence that defendant's mobile home encroaches approximately 30 feet onto his (plaintiffs) land as calculated and measured from the Bolotas Plat.
The stipulated evidence referred to by
plaintiff is a diagram of Lots 26 and 27
produced by Bene in 1981, during the pendency of this lawsuit. Said diagram (hereinafter referred to as the "deed survey")
illustrates the location of defendant's mobile home in relation to Lots 26 and 27,
using the metes and bounds descriptions
contained in plaintiffs and defendant's
deeds According to the deed survey, defendant's mobile home encroaches across
the full 40- to 45-foot north-south width of
plaintiffs lot (i.e , Lot 26).
Plaintiff does not, however claim that
the encroachment extends the full 40 co 45
feet indicated on the deed survey He observes that the metes and bounds descriptions in the deeds erroneously represent
the location of the disputed boundary line
as being 15 feet farther to the north than it
actually measures on the Bolotas Plat.
From this observation, he concludes that
the southern boundary of defendant's lot is
actually located 15 feet farther to the south
than is shown on the deed survey, and thus
the encroachment measures only 30 feet
rather than the full 45 feet (i.e., 45 less 15).
The premise for plaintiffs argument that
the measurements on the Bolotas Plat establish a 30-foot encroachment is the belief
that the metes and bounds descriptions on
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the deeds, from which the deed survey was
taken, are consistent with the lot and block
measurements on the Bolotas Plat. This
premise, however, is false. The inconsistency between the metes and bounds descriptions and the Bolotas Plat measurements has heretofore been shown through
the testimony of the attorney who prepared
the metes and bounds descriptions, namely
Luke Pappas. Pappas testified that he included in the metes and bounds descriptions an extra 40 feet of ground that did
not appear on the Bolotas Plat and that he
later determined to be in error. It was his
opinion that the 40-foot overage had been
incorporated into the deed survey and was
therefore responsible for the encroachment
shown on that survey.
The testimony of Luke Pappas with respect to the 40-foot overage was corroborated by a draftsman named Martin Smart,
who was commissioned during the pendency of this action to sketch the various lots
in Block 1, including Lots 26 and and 27,
according to the metes and bounds descriptions m the respective deeds His survey
confirms the conclusion drawn by Pappas
that an approximate 40-foot discrepancy exists between the representations on the Bolotas Plat of the location of the Block 1 lots
and the representations in the metes and
bounds descriptions of the same.
The evidence in this case, particularly
that discussed above, supports the trial
court's determination that the measurements and dimensions on the Bolotas Plat
relative to Lots 26 and 27 establish the
location of defendant's mobile home as being entirely within the boundaries of defendant's lot and therefore not encroaching
on plaintiffs lot.
Furthermore, as to plaintiffs observation that only a 15-foot variance exists between the metes and bounds dimensions
and the Bolotas Plat dimensions, the evidence stated above supports the conclusion
that the variance was more than just 15
feet and that it was approximately 40 feet.
1. First of Denver Mortgage ln\estors \ CN Zundel&Assocs, Utah. 600 P 2d 521 (1979), State v

[1] Having considered the evidence (i.e ,
deed survey) alleged to nave been entered
upon stipulation by the parties, we now
turn our attention to the merits of the
stipulation itself In his appellate brief,
plaintiffs version of this stipulation is as
follows*
The parties
stipulated that the survey [deed survey] accurately represented
the location of the appellants and respondents' property as described in the
respective deeds, and that respondents'
60-foot mobile home is accurately depicted on the survey in relation to the deed
descriptions, and that it is actually located on the face of the earth »n the place
depicted in Exhibit 3 [deed survey].
He points out that the well-settled rule
with respect to stipulations such as this is
that they are conclusive and binding on the
parties unless, upon timely notice and for
good cause shown, relief <s granted therefrom. He further indicates that the ruie
precludes the adoption of findings in conflict with stipulated facts l
[2] While plaintiff accurately cites the
rules in this regard, we do not adopt his
characterization of the stipulation. According to the record, the extent to which the
parties stipulated respecting the deed survey was that it could be admitted into
evidence and that it depicts the "approximate ' location of defendant's mobile home.
We cannot agree that the effect of this
stipulation was to bind or obligate the trial
court to apply the measurements and calculations on the deed survey in determining
the location of the disputed boundary
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate error.
Affirmed. Costs to defendant.
OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ , and J.
DENNIS FREDERICK, District Judge,
concur.
STEWART, J , does not participate herein; FREDERICK, District Judge, sat.
Bailey 3 Utah 2d 254 282 P 2d 339 (1955).
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conclusion that the minimal terms of a
contract, under the lazv, were present here.
There is nothing here indicating the
amount of material agreed upon, the time
within or during which performance is required. It was as compatible with perpetuity, as with a definitive hour-glass measurement. The provision here as to performance "if and when the option is exercised," is vulnerable to a similar contractual deficiency. the provision that 'This
option is for the purpose oi establishing
the price," seems meaningless without a
recitation of the amount of material agreed
upon,—absent here, or, again, a recitation
of the time for payment. The "special
conditions affecting the availability" of the
materials,—unresolved but seemingly determinable in futuro, almost reaches the assumption that it is an agreement to agree,
failing which, none exists. The statement
that the agreement shall not be construed
as a sole or prior right to the materials
leads one to conclude that Ogden could
have sold not only the "materials" but the
fee at any time before a firm contract was
born,—which certainly was no fait accompli here, the provisions about arrangements to be made for occupancy or removal and stipulations for work areas and
'any other pertinent agreements" ^hall be
made before entry to remove material is
accomplished in futuro, surely does not
lend itself to the basic concept under obligation of contract's principles that the
terms must be certain.
As to the facts recited, those mentioned
in plaintiffs brief are accurate enough, but
by and large, are most favorable to plaintiff's contention Other believable facts either discount some that are stated in favor
of plaintitf or lead to a reasonable refutation, or at least to an entirely different
scenario They would appear to be of the
type looking to the supplvmg of terms
found missing m the instrument,—not m
explaining confused terms contained therein. Such procedure would seem to be unacceptable in evidentiary areas.

We believe that on top of the correctness of the trial court's analysis of the
terms of the 'option," there is ample, believable, competent and admissible evidence
that if believed by the court, as seems to
be the case here, make inescapable the requirement that we do anything else but affirm under the accepted rules.
Since we conclude that the trial judge
was correct in his deliberation both as to
the law and the facts, to the effect there
was no binding contract, we believe and
conclude that tjie other points on appeal—
II, as to estoppel, III, IV and V re
breach and VI, relating to damages—are
moot and that VII, to the effect that the
Court failed to make certain findings and
those made were insufficient to support the
judgment, is without merit, and that VIII,
with respect to the matter of filing for
costs, may be determined by the lower
court.
ELLETT, CROCKETT,
and MAUGHAN, JJM concur.
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Robert 0. KLEIN, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Mary Avalon KLEIN, Defendant and
Respondent.
No. 13994.

Sup romp Court of Utah.
TVe 16 197."

From supplemental decree of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, G.
Hal Tavlor, [, adjusting financial and
property interest of parties to divorce proceeding, husband appealed. The Supreme
Court, Crockett, J , held that entry of Mich
a supplemental decree after original decree
in divorce proceeding had been affirmed
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was proper, that issue whether husband
had agreed to and should be bound by stipulation with regard to division oi property
was for District Court and that even if
husband did not understand and/or was
subject to duress m agreeing to stipulation
or if his agreement to stipulation was timely and properly withdrawn, an award in
accordance with stipulation was not an
abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
Maughan, J., dissented and tiled opinion.
1. Oivorce <S»I72

Under usual circumstances, same matters cannot be litigated anew subsequent to
a definite and final judgment and decree
in a divorce action.
2. Divorce C=*254

Entry of supplemental decree adjusting financial and property interest of parties after original decree in divorce proceeding had been affirmed was oroper
where original decree contained the reservation that 'The court further retains limited jurisdiction if within one year either
party proves to he suffering serious financial distress because of this decree based
on decisions and ensuing development arising therefrom not capable of e\ahiation
and etfect at this time, the court will review its ruling" and where case involved
substantial propert) interests and complex
financial situation.
3, Stipulations <£=>I3
Same rules apply to binding parties to
stipulation as applv to an> other igreement; if there is any justification in law
or equity for avoiding or repudiating stipulation, and party timely does so, he is entitled to be relieved from it, otherwise not.
4, Divorce <§»286(l)
In divorce proceeding in which supplemental decree adjusted financial and property interests of parties, in accordance
with stipulation, issue whether husband
had agreed to and should be bound b> stipulation was for trial court.
544 P 2d—30Va

5. Divorce 0249(2), 297
Though a stipulation pertaining to
matters of divorce, custodv and property
rights therein is adv isorv on court and will
usually be followed, such a stipulation is
not necessarily binding on court, it is only
a recommendation to be adhered to if court
believes it to be fair and reasonable.
6. Divorce C=»249(2)
Even if divorced husband did not understand and/or was subjected to duress in
agreeing to stipulation with regard to division of spouses' financial and property
interests or if his agreement to stipulation was timely and properly withdrawn,
trial court could have considered that which
was proposed as a stipulation and that
which was said b> spouses and their counsel about the stipulation, as part of total
facts and circumstances on which to fashion a just and equitable decree.
7. Divorce C=>252
Even if divorced husband did not understand and/or was subjected to duress in
agreeing to stipulation with regard to division of spouses' financial and propert} interests or if his agreement to stipulation
was timely and properly withdrawn, an
award in accordance with stipulation was
not an abuse of discretion where, under
such award, husnand received about
$200,000 more than he would have received
under trial court's rndgment under which
property with net value or $931,602.03 and
$743,387.35 would have been awarded to
husband and wne respectively

Orrin G. Hatch, of Hatch & Plumb,
Salt Lake City, tor plaintiff-appellant.
Robert S. CampbeU, J r , and James P.
Cowle>, of Watkiss & Campbell, Salt Lake
City, for detendant-respondent
CROCKETT, Justice.
This appeal is sequel to Klein v. Klein,
30 L':ah 2d 1, 511 P 2d 1284. It attacks a
supplemental decree of the district court
which adjusted the financial and property
interests of the parties.
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[1,2] The plaintiff's tirst line ot attack
is that the district court having rendered
its judgment m May 1972 and that judgment having been affirmed b> this court in
July 1973, it became final and absolute
and that the trial court could not properly
change or modity that decree except for
subsequent change in circumstances The
correctness ot that proposition under usual
circumstances and as applied to a detinue
and tinal judgment and decree in a duorce
action, to the end that the same matters
cannot be litigated anew, is acknowledged l
However, from what is said below, it will
be seen that that is not the type ot decree
we are concerned with here
Other basic facts are set forth in the
prior decision It is material here to recite
only that these parties were married in
1953 that they became the parents of
three children, that the plaintiff has a net
income of about $24 000 per year that the
defendant has an earning capacity ot about
$3 600 per >ear but is presentlv unemployed and that the court awarded $30o
per month alimony and $100 support money
tor each child

proves to be suffering serious financial
distress because ot this decree based on
decisions and ensuing de\elopments arising therefrom not capable of ezaluation
and effect at this tune the court mil rezieii its filling and determine whether
modification should be made
On review of the case on appeai, this
court also had apprehensions about the valuation ot the propertv and the allocation
thereof but decided not to wrestle with
that controversy because ot the reservation
in the decree just recited, which would
give the trial court a further opportunity
to deal with that situation This is shown
by the following language from the decision
The fudge who tned this case has retired and another Judge will hear any
future matters
If the Decree causes financial distress,
the ruling made can be reviewed it within one year alter una) judgment either
party requests it
\nother possible reason ror having the
matter looked at within a year is the distribution ot the assets

None of the foregoing facts is in controversy here. The dispute is over division ot
\er> substantial assets and property which
had been built up during: the marriage
In the original divorce case the trial
judge found their total ne*" worth to be
$225,000 and attempted to award defendant about one half bv giving her the family
home, \alumg it at $103,000 plus a Chevrolet, and the proceeds from the sale of
four lots, valued at about $6,000 But it is
apparent from the findings and decree that
the court was not entirelv satisfied with
the arrangement arrived at So instead of
making a definite and final disposition
thereof he included this somewhat unusual
provision as the (mal paragraph ot the dc
crce
The court further retains limited jurisdiction it within one year either party
I

0*//i//s i Ovtiut, 114 I nli 2U> l()s r j d
3*3. Gate i Qalc 123 t tali 277. J3^ P Jd
986.

The decision ot the Court ZLUS based
upon an assumption that the net value of
the assets ot the plaintiff was $225 00000
Having confidence in the integrity ot
our trial courts and the ability ot the
nidge to review the matter it oresented
to them Ttr affnm the judgment rendered and Late it to the lozicr court to
aetetmine if a modification should be
made
\tter the remand the defendant, on October 25 1°73 tiled a ' Petition tor Review
ot Economic Matters and Modification ot
the Decree' supported by affidavits and
protter ot proof
Tn connection with an
order to show cause issued thereon the
trial court 3 indicated his view that under
the prior decree and the decision ot this
2

This )u\or w is Mifprnl b\ Hon
M \ \ 1\ l

Tnnifs

M1(I tlu» s u b s t q U t l U I»NW»P4»<hiii;s

»ml

the imended decree ippealed from were handled bv Hon. G. Hal Tutor
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court it was his conclusion that "serious financial distress is a relative matter" and
that whether the defendant was so distressed could not be determined without review- '
ing the whole economic situation of these
parties.
If we look at the total situation, including the substantial property interests and
the complex financial situation of these
parties, together with the facts that the
original decree did not purport to make the
usual final disposition thereof, but contained the reservation recited above, we
see nothing unreasonable or improper in
the just stated conclusion of the trial court.
The circumstances here distinguish this
case from those relied on by plaintiff
which hold that a final decree cannot be
modified except for a change of circumstances. Moreover, in this situation we see
no reason why the court in its effort to do
equity between these parties could not
make whatever corrections or adjustments
in the decree it deemed necessary to carry
out that purpose.
Consistent with that objective, there followed extensive discovery procedures, and
a hearing of several days' duration, at
which both parties presented extensive evidence and the testimony of experts on valuations; and thereafter submitted their respective memorandums and proposals as to
the disposition to be made of their financial affairs. Consequent thereto, the trial
court on November 11, 1974, made findings that the value of the assets was
52,037,535.63, less liabilities of $288,725.65,
with a resulting net worth of $1,748,809.98.
Of this it awarded to the plaintiff properties valued at $1,121,471.63, required him to
discharge obligations of $189,869, thus giving him properties of net value $931,602.63.
To the defendant he awarded properties
valued at $842,144, required her to discharge obligations of $98,856.65, a net
award to her of $743,387.35.
Four days after the November 11, 1974,
supplemental decree, plaintiff filed his
objections thereto and motions for other
relief and/or a new trial. A hearing on
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these motions began on Friday, December
6, 1974, and continued on Monday, December 9. During the noon recess respective
counsel engaged in discussions and apparently arrived at terms of settlement based
on an offer of the defendant. When court
convened at 2:00 p. m. defendant's counsel
orally stated into the record the terms
thereof, which involved reference to certain paragraphs of the November 11, 1974,
judgment.
Inasmuch as it is the position oi the
plaintiff that he repudiates the stipulation,
the following is noteworthy. A part of the
record, relied upon by him in support of
his position, is;
T H E COURT: All right. Mr. Klein,
you have heard your counsel read into
the record, part of it by reference to
paragraphs. I don't know whether you
have been able to follow it or not.
MR. K L E I N :
Your Honor.
THE

COL'RT:

I haven't followed it,
Do you understand

it?

MR. K L E I N : 1 am relying on my
counsel. At this point, I haven't been
able to read it.
As opposed to the foregoing, a part oi the
record upon which the defendant places reliance is the following response of the
plaintiff which occurred later:
By way of the record, I accept the
stipulation and I so understand. Spoken
by Robert D. Klein.
Speaking in generality, the offer made
on the defendant's behalf which was then
agreed to by the plaintiff and his counsel
reduced the properties being awarded to
the defendant in the amount of about
$200,000 and increased the value of properties being awarded to the plaintiff in that
amount. Subsequent thereto, on December
18, 1974, the trial court made further findings and entered a decree in conformity
with the stipulation, and from which this
appeal is taken.
Plaintiff's arguments that he should not
be bound by the stipulation are: that he
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did not understand the goings-on at the
tune it was presented to the court that it
was his impression that he was obliged to
indicate agreement so that negotiations
could continue and that the stipulation
would be reduced to writing tor his examination before it was confirmed and relied
on but that the next day, when he realized what had been done, he immediately
notified his counsel, who in turn notified
opposing counsel *nd the trial court that
he would not so agree and that this was
done betore the amended order was entered.
[3] Plaintiff advances the proposition
that it would be neither fair nor proper to
enter a "consent decree purporting to be
based on the agreement ot a partv who
does not agree thereto at the time ot final
submission to the court This appears to
be a sound proposition when applied to appropriate circumstances •* But it is also
true that tht same rules apply to binding
parties to such an agreement as ippl> to
an> other agreement. If there is am justification in law or equity tor avoiding or.
repudiating a stipulation, and he timely
goes so, ne is entitled to be relieved irom
it, otherwise not
[4] Proceeding beyond what has mst
been said, we make several observations
about this stipulation the tirst is tnat the
issue as to whether plamtitf agreed to and
should be bound by the stipulation was one
of tact for the trial court to determine
and it was not convinced that the plaintirt
did not understand and voluntarily agree to
the stipulation

duress m agreeing to the stipulation, or
that his agreement was timely and properly
withdrawn, these further observations are
applicable It is the established rule that a
stipulation pertaining to matters of divorce custody and property rights therein,
though advisory upon the court and would
usually be followed unless the court
thought it untair or unreasonable, is not
necessarily binding on the court an>way
It is onl> a recommendation to be adhered
to if the court believes it to be fair and
reasonable 4 fn addition to all of the foregoing, there is* no reason that the trial
court cannot consider what was proposed
by the parties as a stipulation, and what
was said by them or their counsel about it,
as part of the total facts and circumstances
upon which to fashion what in his judgment is a just and equitable decree
[7] Under the circumstances shown,
particularlv the fact that upon his anahsis
ot the total circumstances the court indicated in his udgment ot November 11,
1074 that the detendant should have
^200 000 more in assets than the present
decree gives her and the plaintiff $200 000
less it is obvious that the trial court did
not regard this latter allocation of assets
as m an> degree unjust or inequitable to
the plamtitf
Consistent with the latitude
of discretion necessarily allowed to the
trial judges in dealing with problems ot
the character here involved, we are not
persuaded that we should disturb the
decree 5 ( Ml emphasis herein added )
\ttirmed
dent)

Costs to defendant (respon-

[5 6] This would seem to sutficientl>
settle the issue But even if it be assumed,
as the plaintift contends, that he either did
not understand and/or was subjected to

HENRIOD
C
I,
T L C K E T T If concur

3

see fiurnaman \ Htaimx 1~>0 Tex °>33 210
X\V2d 2SS Van Don acinar t * an Donse
laar 249 Ioua 504. S7 X W 2d 311 {l'>"iM

5

4

Open*haw » Opcmhair 102 I t ill 22 120
P2d 1008 CalliHter i CalhsUr 1 L rah 2d
34, 2G1 P 2d 944

CLLETT,

and

MAUGH \X, Justice (dissenting).
s<t> P mon i Pinion (>2 I tali 255 07 P2d
20T>
MarDnnald i UacDonald 120 t tah
">73 230 P 2d K*>0 Wieie i W tese, 24 t tah
2d 230 4<>9 P 2d 504.
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4. Divorce <£»30l

Blanche Zollinger MADSEN, Appellant,

v.
Oelbert Murray MADSEN, Respondent.
No. 8151.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 30, 1954.

Divorce decree permitting visitation
by defendant father and permitting him to
take young children from custody of mother periodically should be supported by clear,
affirmative and guaranteeing evidence that
welfare of children will not be jeopardized
by execution of order.

Wife's action for divorce, wherein
parties stipulated for $30 per month support
money for each child and $1,000 cash in lieu
of alimony. From a decree of the First
Judicial District Court, Cache County, Lewis Jones, J., awarding $25 per month for
each child and one-half interest in about
fifty acres of land instead of the agreed
$1,000 cash, the wife appealed. The Supreme Court, Henriod, J., held that the
trial court's departure from the provisions
of the stipulation was not, under circumstances of the case, such an abuse of discretion as to warrant reversal.

Where divorce decree permitting defendant father to take children of tender
years from custody of mother once each
month for two days was not supported by
evidence as to how children would be
clothed, housed, fed and otherwise taken
care of or treated at such times, case would
be remanded for further proceedings consistent with view that such decree should
be supported by clear, affirmative and guaranteeing evidence that welfare of children
would not be jeopardized.

Remanded for proceedings consistent
with opinion.

Perry & Perry, Logan, for appellant.

Worthen, J., dissented in part.

5. Divorce <§=>3I2.7

C. Preston Allen, Woodrow D. White,
Salt Lake City, for respondent.

1. Stipulations C=3l7(3)

Trial court in divorce matters, wherein
HENRIOD, Justice.
state is interested party, need not necessaAppeal from those portions of a divorce
rily abide with terms of litigants' stipula- decree which award property in lieu of
tions but such stipulations should be re- alimony and the right of visitation with
spected and great weight given thereto. 1
the children. Affirmed in part, reversed in
part and remanded, with instructions. No
2. Divorce <§»286, 312.6(4)
costs awarded.
Alimony and support money provisions
[1-3] The parties married on July 22,
of trial court's divorce decree could not
be disturbed on review in absence of clear 1949, and had 2 children during the 2i/2
years they lived together. On January 5,
abuse of discretion. 2
1952, plaintiff filed for divorce. A third
3. Divorce <§=>236, 297
child was born to the parties shortly thereUnder circumstances shown in divorce after. The case dragged on through a
case, trial court's award of $25 per month number of hearings until December 1953,
support money for each of three children nearly 2 years later, when a decree was
and of one-half interest in about fifty entered awarding plaintiff a divorce. $25
acres of land as alimony, in lieu of $30 per month support money for each child,
per month for each child and $1,000 cash custody of the children, subject to a right
as alimony as provided by stipulation of of visitation 3 times each month for 12
parties, was not such abuse of discretion hours, and once a month for 2 days, with
as to warrant reversal.
those children who had attained the age of
I. Barrnclousrh v. Barraclou^h, 100 Utah
196. I l l P.2d 702; Cailister v. Callister,
1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 044.

2. Allen v. Allen, 100 Utah 99, 165 P.2d
872; Treinajne v. Tremayae, 116 Utah
4.S3. 211 P.2d 452.
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36 months, defendant being allowed to
take them from plaintiffs presence duung
such periods, and a one-half interest in a
parcel of property owned by defendant
During the protracted litigation, the parties and their counsel had stipulated that it
would be agreeabte if the court awarded
$1,000 cash in lieu of alimony, payable in 6
months, and $30 per month as support money for each child. Such stipulation apparently lulled plaintiff into a false sense
of security, sufficient to impel her to not
proffer any evidence as to her ability to
and need for support of the children. In
so assuming she erred, since the trial court,
in divorce matters, where the state is an
interested party, need not abide, necessarily, with the terms of the litigants' stipulations, 1 although such stipulations should
be respected and great weight given thereto. Plaintiff's only complaint in this respect, would be, not tftat the court was
dutv bound and erroneously refused to carry out the terms agreed upon, but that it
abused its discretion by entering an inequitable decree, 2 a matter we must determine on revitw Unless there is a clear
abuse of discretion, we cannot disturb the
trial court on such matters, and we believe
that the $25 per month awarded instead of
the stipulated $30, and the one-half interest in about 50 acres of land instead of
the agreed $1 000 cash, under the facts of
this case, whose voluminous record cmnot
be detailed here, but where, howe\er, there
is evidence to *ho\v considerable self-sutficiency on the part oi plaintiff, and a
ph>sical ailment on the part ot defendant
which was at least a Hireat to his earning
capacity, was not sucn an abuse ot discretion contemplated by the authorities as to
warrant reversal.

of affection by either spouse and none to
show that the defendant would harm, or
that the children's welfare would be impaired, by the carrying out of the quite
unusual order for visitation entered her*
On the other hand there is no evidence
to show how these children would be
housed when their father came and tock
them away, by whom they would be clothed,
fed and otherwise taken care of, or otherwise how they might be treated. In cases
where little children's welfare hangs in the
balance, we cannot gamole it on an absence
of evidence or on an> presumption that
tender care will be giv'en by the natural
parent. There should be clear, affirmative
and guaranteeing evidence that the welfare
of children such as these would not be
jeopardized by execution of the order. Nosuch evidence appears m this record, and
we are compelled to remand the case with
instructions to proceed n accordance with
the views herein expressed as to ngnts
of visitation.

!. Birrtcloush v Biriiclou^h 100 Utih
1% 111 P2d 792 Ciihster v Cdlnster,
1 I tab 2d 34, 261 P 2d 944

2. Allen v Ulen 100 Utih 99 16*5 P 2d
b~2 md cisc^ eitpd therein Tremav le
v Tremayne, 116 Ltah 463, 211 P 2d 4o2

MCDONOUGH, C J, and CROCKETT
and WADE, J J , concur

WORTHEN, Justice (concurring in part
and dissenting in part)
I agree with Mr Justice Hennod that
this case must be remanded. I believe,
however, that the court was in error in
failing to award ?30 per month support
monev tor each child
In the case of Calhster v Calhster, 261
P2d 944, this Court at page 946, alter
quoting Sec 30-3-5, U C A 1 9 5 3 , said
"This court has neld that, b> reason
of the statute, an agreement or stipulation between parties to a divorce si it
as to alimony or payments for support
[4 5] As to the award of visitirg rights
of children is not binding upon the
to the detendant, we are raced vvith a
court in entering a divorce decree,
decidedly different problem—a smiting
but serves only as a recommendation,
around which might affect the ph>sical,
and t the court adopts the suggesfon
moral and social wellare ot 3 tots :>f render
of the parties it does not thereby lose
years, even more than a detendant's tailure
the nght to make such modification or
to pay support money There is no evichange thereafter as may be requested
dence in the record that shows any lack
by cither party, based upon change of
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circumstances warranting such modification." (Emphasis ours )
The statement is salutory and intended
to permit the trial court to look behind
the stipulation and prevent fraud or coercion by one party upon the other, and to
safeguard the interest and welfare of the
children.
The father of three minor children had
agreed that the court award to each child
$30 per month support money For reasons
not readily apparent the tnal court cut the
azia)d for each child to $25 per month.
The court m finding of fact No. 6 found
,as follows.
V

"That the defendant is receiving
from the U S Government as payment
for partial disability incurred in the
military service of the United States
the sum of $102 00 per month, and he
is also employed in Las Vegas, Nevada, and is earning $70 00 per week."

It was suggested that the court may have
been influenced in its action by the defendant's disaoiut), but if that disability
makes it impossible tor him to continue
to earn the $70 per week he is earning,
then the court could reduce the amount
if the changed condition warrants a re-

duction But if the award of $25 per child
(per month) is permitted to stand, then
no additional award may be made without
showing either increased earnings by detendant or greater need on the part of
plaintiff
However, while defendant has an income
of approximately $400 per month, I am
unwilling to approve an award of $75 for
the support of his three children leaving
him $325 with which to make four trips
per month from Las Vegas to Cache
Countv to visit his children More money
even at the expense of fewer visits will
in my opinion promote the best interest of
the children.
The rule announced in the case of Calhster v Callister, supra, that stipulations
are recommendations only, should not be
permitted to make a father s duty to his
minor children less than he admits it should
be Such an unconscionable award onl>
tends to add to the public expense for the
care ot dependent children
The trial court should be directed to
increase the l u a r d for the children from
$25 to $30 per month per child unkss
changed conditions are shown after turther
hearing justifying the award of only $25
per child.

RUNYON v. CITY < F NEOSHO RAPIDS

Kan.

1069

Cite as, Kan.Af >.. 385 P2d 1069

Pearl B. RUNYON and George
Rosenquist et al., Appellees,
v.
CITY OF NEOSHO RAPIDS, Kansas,
et al., Appellants.
No. 49129.
Court of Appeals of Kansas.
Nov. 3, 1978.
Electors of city brought mandamus action against city and its governing body to
require city to comply with statute requiring city to conduct audit upon petition by
20% or more of city's voters. The Lyon
District Court, R. E. Miller, J., entered
amended order requiring audit and awarding attorney fees to plaintiffs, and defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals, Foth,
C. J., held that: (1) since city's concept of
what was required of it by stipulation entered into by the parties and approved by
court was entirely different from concept
entertained by plaintiffs and trial court,
court was authorized to vacate its original
order based upon stipulation and to replace
it with one which clearly expressed parties'
true obligations, and (2) evidence concerning city's delay in conducting audit and
absence of excuse for city's nonaction supported award of attorney fees.
As modified, affirmed.
1. Stipulations <s=»13
Parties may be relieved of their stipulations for mistake, accident, surprise, inadvertence or improvidence.
2. Stipulations ®=*IZ
Where defendants' concept of what
was required of them by stipulation entered
into by parties and approved by court was
totally different from that of plaintiffs and
court which approved stipulation, court was
authorized to vacate its original order based
upon stipulation and to replace it with one
which clearly expressed parties' true obligations. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(b),
K.S.A. 60-260(b).

3. Mandamus c=»177
Attorney fees are allowable as damages
in mandamus where there has been unreasonable refusal to perform duty imposed by
law.
4. Mandamus @=»177
In mandamus action brought by
electors of city of the third class to compel
city to order audit of its books pursuant to
statute requiring such audit upon written
petition of 20% or more of city's voters,
evidence concerning city's delay in face of
request for audit and absence of excuse for
city's nonaction was sufficient to support
award of attorney fees to plaintiffs on
ground of unreasonable refusal to perform
duty imposed by law. K.S.A 75-1125.
Syllabus by the Court
1. Under K.S.A. 75-1125, when a
proper petition is presented to the governing body of any municipality not required
by law to have an annual audit, it is the
duty of the governing body to order the
audit requested in the petition. The statute
is mandatory, and compliance may be compelled by mandamus.
2. Parties may be relieved of their
stipulations for mistake, accident, surprise
or inadvertence. The same kinds of factors
are grounds for vacating a judgment under
K.S.A. 60-260(6 )(1).
3. Where the construction put on
court-approved stipulation by one party is
totally different from that of the other
party and the court which approved it, the
court is authorized to relieve the other party of the stipulation and to modify its order
based thereon so as to clearly express the
parties' true obligations.
4. Attorney fees are allowable as
damages in mandamus where there has
been an unreasonable refusal to perform a
duty imposed by law
5. In a mandamus action to compel a
city of the third class to order an audit of
its books it is held the trial court did not err
in amending its original order or in allowing attorney fees.
Appendix
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Duane D. Guy, Emporia, for appellants.
Mark L. Yates and Gerald D. Lasswell, of
Stinson, Wisdom & Lasswell, of Wichita, for
appellees.
Before FOTH, C. J., and SPENCER and
MEYER, JJ.
FOTH, Chief Judge:
This is an appeal by the defendants, the
City of Neosho Rapids and its governing
body, from an order in mandamus requiring
an audit of the city's books and an order
allowing attorney fees to the plaintiffs.
On January 12, 1976, plaintiffs, electors
of the city, filed a petition with the governing body requesting an audit of the city's
finances for the preceding six year period.
Neosho Rapids being a city of the third
class a regular annual audit is not required
by statute, but the city is governed by
K.S.A. 75-1125 (Weeks 1969), and particularly the relevant proviso:
"Provided, That upon a written petition
filed with the governing body of any such
municipality not provided for by section
12 [75-1122] of this act by 20% or more of
the voters of said municipality who voted
at the last election for officers of such
municipality it shall be the duty of said
governing body to employ a licensed municipal public accountant or accountants
or certified public accountant or accountants to examine and audit the accounts of
such municipality for such period of time
as may be set out in the petition of the
voters.'* (Emphasis added.)
The petition filed contained sufficient
signatures, and under the statute it thereupon became "the duty of [the] governing
body" to order the audit requested. When
this governing body failed to act for three
months, plaintiffs commenced this action on
April 6, 1976, to compel compliance with the
statute.
The litigation dragged on until December, when the parties entered into a stipulation designed to settle the controversy.
Under the stipulation the city was to order
an audit by designated auditors, to cover
the years 1970 through 1973, and to include

a verification of all expenditures. The stipulation contained the following conditions;
"D. No damages shall be awarded or
paid to Plaintiffs other than reasonable
attorney's fees as may hereinafteir be
stipulated to between the parties op ordered by the Court.
"E. This agreement, the performance
hereunder by the Defendants and performance of Defendants by reason of any
order of mandamus issued by the District
Court of Lyon County, Kansas, pursuant
to this agreement, shall be subject to
authority granted by the Board of Tax
Appeals of the State of Kansas to the
Defendants to issue no-fund warrants in
the amount sufficient to cover the costs
and expenses of litigation between the
parties and the costs of the audit"
The stipulation was submitted to and approved by the trial court, which entered an
order on December 16, 1976, incorporating
the substance of the stipulation in its decree, including the conditional language of
paragraph U E" above.
The city proceeded with its pending application to the Board of Tax Appeals for
authority to issue no-fund warrants,. That
body, after a hearing, denied the application, whereupon the city took the position
that its entire obligation in the matter was
ended. Plaintiffs, however, returned to the
trial court with motions for attorney fees,
to vacate the December order, and for a
contempt citation. The trial court awarded
attorney fees and in May, 1977, conducted a
hearing on the other matters raised.
The primary issue before the trial court
was whether the action of the Board of Tax
Appeals relieved the city of its statutory
duty because of the wording of the original
stipulation and order of December 16, 1976.
The court found that the provisions of
K.S.A. 75-1125 are mandatory and that the
Board of Tax Appeals has no authority to
relieve the governing body of its statutory
duty. Most importantly, the trial court
found that its order of December 16 had not
been intended to make compliance totally
dependent on the action of the Board, but
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only that the time of compliance would
depend on the Board's order.
[1,2] Based on this finding, and relying
on its authority to vacate judgments under
K.S.A. 60-260(6), the court modified the
crucial decretal paragraph of its original
mandamus order tVom:
"IT IS FURTHER BY THE COURT
ORDERED that performance by Defendants of this order of mandamus shall be
subject to authority granted by the Board
of Tax Appeals of the State of Kansas to
the City of Neosho Rapids, Kansas, to
issue no-fund warrants in an amount sufficient to pay the expenses of litigation
and the expenses of preparation of the
audit."
to read:
"IT IS FURTHER BY THE COURT
ORDERED that performance by defendant of the order of mandamus shall be
subject to the further order of the court
as to the time of performance and defendant's (sic) shall have a reasonable
time in which to secure funds for such
purpose and in the necessary sum to pay
costs of audit and litigation. The Court
will thereupon set the date for commencement of the audit, the same to be
within a reasonable time. Defendants
are ordered to advise the Court of the
costs forthwith."
It is from this amended order that defendants appeal. The city argues first that the
court had no authority to modify its order
because it was based on a stipulation of the
parties. However, partes may he relieved
of their stipulations for mistaKe. accident,
surprise, inadvertence or imorovidence.
Morrison v. Hurst Drilling Co., 212 Kan.
706, 512 P.2d 438 (1973); Bodle v. Balch, 185
Kan. 711, 347 P.2d 378 (1959). Those factors closely parallel the grounds for vacating a judgment under K.S.A. 6O-260(b )(1).
The trial court found that the stipulation
and its order both contemplated that the
Board of Tax Appeals would grant no-fund
warrant authority as a matter of routine,
based on the city's good faith application.
In fact, the court found, the city's agents
made it clear to the Board that they did not

really want the authority they nominally
sought, and the Board's denial was the natural result of the presentation made to the
Board. The court's finding that the defendants did not act in good faith in
presenting the application is amply supported by the record. It is apparent that
the city's concept of what was required of it
by the stipulation and order was entirely
different from the concept entertained by
the plaintiffs and the trial ccurt. (It is
clear that if the court had thought it meant
what the city claimed it would never have
approved the stipulation.) That difference
was sufficient ground for the court to vacate its original order and replace it with
one which clearly expressed the parties true
obligations. The motion to vacate was addressed to the trial court's discretion. Baker v. Baker, 217 Kan. 319, 320, 537 P.2d 171
(1975), and cases cited therein. We are
unable to find an abuse of discretion here.
As to attorney fees, the original stipulation called for them to be determined by
later agreement or by the court. There was
apparently an agreement at one time, but it
seems to have foundered in the Board of
Tax Appeals hearing. Under the stipulation it thereupon fell to the court to fix
them, and defendants are not in a position
to complain.
[3,4] In addition, fees are allowable as
damages in mandamus where there has
been an unreasonable refusal to perform a
duty imposed by law. Barten v. Turkey
Creek Watershed Joint District No. 32, 200
Kan. 489, 438 P.2d 732 (1968). Although no
evidence on this issue was presented at the
special hearing devoted to attorney fees,
the court had before it the three month
delay between the request for an audit and
the commencement of the action, and the
absence of any excuse for the city's non-action. Those facts were enough to make a
prima facie case of unreasonableness. The
city even now offers no reason for its failure to act beyond a suggestion that the
statute may be unconstitutional because it
contains no limit on the time to be covered
by the audit. We conclude that the award
of attorney fees is supported by the record.
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The other issue raised—the impoundment
of certain books—was conceded by the city
at oral argument not to be properly before
us and we need not consider it.
Plaintiffs have requested additional attorney fees for services on appeal. Considering the nature of the case and the fact
that these fees are to be paid from public
funds, it is this court's opinion that the
$3,300 allowed below should be sufficient to
cover services in this court as well. We do
allow expenses as itemized in the amount of
$259 82, and the judgment below is modified to that extent.
As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

(o

I KEYNUM8£RSYSTEM>

In the Interest of Kathleen PENN,
a minor.
No. 49431.
Court of Appeals of Kansas.
Nov 3, 1978.
Biological parents appealed from an order of the Wyandotte District Court, Dean
J Smith, J., permanently severing their parental rights. The Court of Appeals, Parks,
J , held that evidence was sufficient to &upport trial court's finding of uniitness and
its order of parental severance.
Affirmed.

1. Infants <*» 16.15
In reviewing sufficiency of evidence to
support a finding of parental unfitness, evidence is viewed from the aspect most lavorabie to findings made by trial court.
2. Infants §=>16.8
Parent will not be permanently deprived of parental rights with respect to a
dependent and neglected child unless there
is clear and convincing evidence

3. Infants c==>16.3
As applied to the relation of rational
parents to their child, the word "unfit"
usually, although not necessarily, Imports
something of moral delinquency; incapacity
to appreciate and perform the obligations
resting upon parents might render them
unfit, apart from any other defects. K.S.A.
38-824(c)
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4. Infants c=»16.3
Inherent mental and emotional incapacity to perform parental obligations can
constitute such breach of parental duty as
to make the parents unfit to be entrusted
with custody of their child. K.S.A. 38824(c).
5. Infants o=>16.8
Evidence in proceeding for term nation
of parental rights was sufficient to support
trial court's finding of unfitness and its
order of parental severance.
K.S.A. 38824(c).
Syllalws by the Court
1. Inherent mental and emotional incapacity to perform parental obligations
can constitute such breach of parental duty
as to make the parents unfit to be entrusted with custody of their child under K.S.A.
1977 Supp 38-824(c)
2. In a proceeding for permanent deprivation ol parental rights in a dependent
and neglected child, the record is examined
and it is held that the trial court's finding
of parental unfitness and the severance order are supported by clear and convincing
evidence.

George W Thomas and Steven D Alexander, Kansas City, for appellants.
Muriel Andreopoulos, Asst. Dist. Atty,
Curt T. Schneider, Atty Gen., and Nick A.
Tomasic, Dist. Atty, for appellee.
Before PARKS, P J., and SWINEHART
and MEYER, JJ

THOMPSON v. TURNER
Cite as 558 P.2d

the road "as now constructed and in use."
The Reynolds argue that this language limits the right-of-way to the types of uses
extant in 1962, and that the Keenes had not
previously used the road to haul timber.
Thus, Mrs. Reynolds argued, she had a right
to prevent attempts to haul timber over the
road.
In its memorandum opinion, designated
to constitute findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and final judgment, the court refused
to hold Mrs. Reynolds in contempt. After
discussing various other issues not relevant
to this appeal, the court addressed the defense raised by Mrs. Reynolds that the
Keenes had no right to haul timber over the
road. The opinion declares: " * * * it is
the conclusion of the Court that the decreed
right-of-way in 1963 was a right-of way for
a road for all purposes." Plaintiffs-appellants appeal from that part of the opinion
concluding that the 1963 right-of-way was
for all purposes, claiming that it substantially and improperly alters the 1963 decree
to their detriment.
The contumacious conduct complained of
consisted of alleged violations of the 1963
order that the Reynolds not interfere with
the use of the right-of-way by the Keenes.
In determining whether Mrs. Reynolds violated that order, it was necessary for the
court to determine the extent of the
Keenes' right to use the road, with the
ultimate purpose of determining whether
they were using the road in a manner which
was protected from interference by the
1963 decree.
[2] It cannot be said that the meaning
attributed to the 1963 order by the district
court was incorrect. That part of that decree declaring a right-of-way "as now constructed and in use * * *," does seem
somehow to limit the Keenes' right; however, the meaning of that language is far
from clear. Language in that decree also
prohibits interference by the Reynolds of
any use of the road for "either business or
pleasure purposes," which seems to imply
that a less limited right was found. Further support for the limitation urged by
appellants is not found in the record, as the
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parties waived findings of fact and conclusions of law in 1963. Thus, it cannot be
said that the district court erred here m
concluding that the existing right-of-way
was declared in 1963 to be for all purposes.
The order of the district court is affirmed. Costs to respondents.
DONALDSON, SHEPARD and BAKES,
JJ., and SCOGGIN, D. J., concur.

(O I KEYMUMBH£STEM>

98 Idaho 110

Wesley B. THOMPSON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Paul TURNER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 12066.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Jan. 20, 1977.
Vendor brought action against purchaser in which vendor sought, on theory that
conveyance of real property was void due to
fraud and lack of consideration, to have
conveyance set aside, to quiet title and to
obtain money judgment for portions of
loans converted by purchaser to his own
use. The District Court, Seventh Judicial
District, Bonneville County, Boyd R. Thomas, J., granted vendor's motions for a
change of venue and for consolidation, and
denied motion to dismiss, and purchaser appealed. The Supreme Court, Donaldson, J.,
held that appeal could not be taken from
orders granting motion for consolidation
and denying motion to dismiss; that denial
of prior motion by vendor for change of
venue was not res judicata in regard to his
subsequent motion for change of venue;
that trial court did not abuse its discretion
in granting the subsequent motion for
change of venue back to county in which
action was originally filed and in thus relieving vendor of a stipulation to the initial
change of venue; that statute, which provides that specified actions relating to real
Appendix
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property "must be tried in the county in
which the subject of the action or some part
thereof is situated, subject to the power of
the court to change the place of trial," does
not limit subject matter jurisdiction of lower courts.
Order granting motion for change of
venue affirmed.

Reginald R. Reeves, of Denman, Reeves
& Ohman, Idaho Falls, for defendant-appellant.
W. Joe Anderson, of Sharp, Anderson &
Bush, Idaho Falls, Sherman F. Furey, Jr.,
Salmon, for plaintiff-respondent.
DONALDSON, Justice.

1. Appeal and Error <&=>85, 105
Appeal could not be taken from orders
granting motion for consolidation of actions
and denying motion to dismiss. I.C. § 13201.
2. Venue <s=>78
Denial of plaintiffs motion for change
of venue was not res judicata in regard to
plaintiffs subsequent motion for change of
venue.
3. Stipulations ®=*\Z
It is within sound discretion of a trial
court, for good cause shown and in furtherance of justice, to relieve a party from a
stipulation.
4. Venue e=>82
In vendor's action against purchaser to
have conveyance of real property set aside,
to quiet title and to obtain money judgment
for portions of loans converted by purchaser
to his own use, trial court did not abuse its
discretion, in granting vendor's motion for
change of venue back to county in which
action was originally filed and in thus relieving vendor of a stipulation to the initial
change of venue, where the motion was
granted for purpose of permitting the action to be consolidated with two other cases
which involved same property and in which
vendor and purchaser were defendants.
I.C. § 5-401.
5. Venue c=>5.3(l)
Statute, which provides that specified
actions relating to real property u must be
tried in the county in which the subject of
the action or some part thereof is situated,
subject to the power of the court to change
the place of trial," does not limit subject
matter jurisdiction of lower courts; overruling Banbury v. Bradford, 158 P 2d 826.
I.C. §§ 5-401, 5-406, 5-409.

The central issue presented by this appeal
is whether it is an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to grant a motion changing
venue back to the county from which the
case had been transferred by stipulation of
the parties. Under the facts of this case,
we hold that it was not.
On April 6, 1972, plaintiff-respondent
Wesley B. Thompson conveyed certain real
property located in Lemhi County to defendant-appellant Paul Turner. Shortly after the conveyance, appellant Turner
obtained a $200,000 loan from Mutual Life
Insurance Company (hereinafter Mutual)
which was secured by a mortgage on the
property. He later obtained another $200,000 loan from Valley Bank, Inc., (hereinafter Valley) which was also secured by a
mortgage on the real property.
On April 15, 1974, respondent Thompson
instituted this action against appellant
alleging the conveyance was void due to
fraud and lack of consideration. He sought
to set the conveyance aside, to quiet his
title in the real property, and to obtain a
money judgment for the portions of the
loans which were converted by appellant
Turner to his own use. The action was
originally filod in Lemhi County but was
transferred to Bonneville County pursuant
to stipulation of the parties. Subsequent to
the initiation of this action, both Mutual
and Valley began proceedings in Lemhi
County to foreclose their mortgages. In
each action respondent Thompson asserted
a cross-claim against appellant seeking the
same relief requested in this action. On
July 30, 1975, upon motion by respondent,
the court ordered that the venue of this
action be changed from Bonneville back to
Lemhi County, and that this action be con-
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solidated with the foreclosure proceedings
begun by Mutual and Valley.

al and Valley. All three cases involve the
same real estate, and both appellant and
[1] Appellant assigns as error the orders respondent are defendants in the other two
of the trial court granting respondent's mo- cases. The trial court determined that contions for a change of venue and for consoli- solidating the cases would reduce costs and
dation, and denying his motion to dismiss. delay, that it would be more convenient for
We will consider only the order granting the parties and witnesses, and that it would
the change of venue since appeal from the be in the best interests of justice. Under
latter two orders is not authorized. I.C. the circumstances, we cannot say that it
§ 13-201; Wilson v. DeBoard, 94 Idaho 562, abused its discretion in relieving respondent
of the stipulation and in granting the mo494 P.2d 566 (1972).
Appellant contends that the trial court tion to change venue back to Lemhi County.
should have denied the motion for two rea[5] Although we uphold the action of
sons: (1) its denial of a previous motion by the trial court, we do not do so for the
respondent for a change of venue was res reason urged by respondent. The Court in
judicata and (2) the parties stipulated to the Banbury v. Brailsford, supra, stated that in
original change from Lemhi to Bonneville enacting I.C. § 5-401,l the legislature inCounty. Respondent counters that under tended to limit the jurisdiction of the lower
Banbury v. Brailsford, 66 Idaho 262, 158 courts. Only a court in the county in which
P.2d 826 (1945), the Court was required to real property is located has subject-matter
grant the motion because it lacked subject- jurisdiction to try an action affecting the
matter jurisdiction to try the case.
title to or possession of that reai property.
[2] Appellant's argument based upon After reviewing the decision, however, we
the doctrine of res judicata must fail. An find the dissent of Justice Givens to be
order denying a motion for a change of persuasive. For the following reasons we
venue is not a judgment subject to that hold that the Banbury Court was incorrect
doctrine. As to the stipulation, the trial insofar as it stated that I.C. § 5-401 limits
court decided that the proper venue for this the subject-matter jurisdiction of the lower
action was Lemhi County since it is an courts.
action for the determination of an interest
Idaho Code § 5-401 was originally enactin real property. I.C. § 5-401. Therefore, ed in 1881 as § 205 of the Code of Civil
the question is whether it erred in relieving Procedure. On its face it states that its
respondent of the stipulation and transfer- provisions as to proper venue are "subject
ring the case back to Lemhi County.
to the power of the court to change the
[3, 4] It iajxnthi^ rhft annnH }\\(\iri'A\ displace of trial." Section 210 of the Code of
cretion of a trial court, for g-oorj oflii^p
Civil Procedure permitted a change of venshown and m furtherance of justice, to re- ue in certain instances. It made no distinc1 leve a party from a stipulation. Loughrey tion between actions affecting real property
v. Weitzel, 94 Idaho 833, 498 P.2d 1306 and other types of actions. Section 213 of
(1972); Call v. Marler, 89 Idaho 120, 403 the Code of Civil Procedure expressly recP.2d 588 (1965). The trial court granted the ognized that an action affecting the title to
change of venue so that this case could be or possession of reai estate could be brought
consolidated with those instituted by Mutu- in or transferred to a court of a county
l.

"5-401 Actions relating to real property —
Actions ror the following causes must be tried
in the county in which the subject ot the action
or some part thereof is situated, subject to the
power of the court to change the place or trial.
as provided in this code
1 For the recovery ot real property, or of
an estate or interest therein, or ror the determi558 P 2d—68

nation in any form of such right or interest and
for injuries to reai property
2. For the partition ot real property
3 For the foreclosure of a mortgage ot real
property Where the real property is situated
partly in one county and partly in another, the
plaintiff may select either of the counties, and
the countv i»o selected is the proper county for
the trial of such action."
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other than the county in which the real
estate or some portion thereof was situated.
The section provided that in such cases a
copy of the final judgment would be transmitted to the clerk of the court of the
county in which the real estate was situated.2 It is obvious that had the legislature
intended I.C. § 5-401 to limit the subjectmatter jurisdiction of the lower courts,
§ 213 of the Code of Civil Procedure would
have been a meaningless enactment.
2.

Section 210 of the Code of Civil Procedure
was last compiled in I C § 5-406, and $ 213 is
compiled in I C § 5-409 Idaho Code $ 5-406
was repealed as a procedural statute in conflict

The order of the district court granting
the motion for a change of venue is affirmed. Costs to respondents.
McFADDEN, C. J., and SHEPARD,
BAKES and BISTLINE, JJ., concur.
rw
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with or covered by the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure Ch 242, § i [1975] Idaho Sess.
Laws 651

B. L. DART (818)
Attorney for Defendant
310 South Main
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
CAROL ANN BARKER BROWN,
Plaintiff,

:
:

FINDINiS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v,

:

BRYANT JEROME BROWN,

:

Civil No. D79-3802

Defendant.

:

Judge Sawaya

oooOooo
Defendant's Motion for an Order enforcing the
provisions of an agreement entered

into between the parties

on the 5th of June, 1984, rame on reeularly for hearing on
Monday, the 15th jay of April, 1985, at the hour of 2:00 o'e
P.T. .

Defendant ac Dear in z

r

in person and by his attorney B.

.

Dart, c\r\d plaintiff appealing in Derson anj by her attorney
David A. McPhie, m d

the Court bavins h e a M

th

irguments

mi

proffers of r<spi-vtive attorneys and having reviewed the f i U*
and be i tig fully acHised, hereby makes the following:

1
Appendix "F"

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Following the filing of plaintiff's Petition for

Modification and defendant's Counter Petition, there was
extensive discovery carried out between the parties following
which the parties engaged in extensive negotiation through their
respective attorneys.
2.

On the 5th day of June, 1984, the parties appeared

at a proceeding before a court reporter for the purpose of
setting forth the terms of a settlement agreement which had been
reached between the parties, and with both parties in attendance
with their attorneys the terms of the agreement were read into
the record with input provided by attorneys for both of the
parties.

At that time all issues were considered and an

agreement was struck and entered on the record and all the
parties and counsels consented to the terms either affirmatively
or impliedly by not objecting to any of the terms of the
Stipulation.
3.

For a period from the 5th of June, 1984, until the

30th of November, 1984, plaintiff made no objection to the
Stipulation which had been reached on the record and had been
reduced to a written Stipulation and presented to her for her
signature.

During this period of time she received the

additional financial benefits under the terms of the Stipulation
which included an increase in the amounts paid by defendant to

2

£00

plaintiff of $200 per month.
4.

Plaintiff by her conduct is estopped from denying

this agreement and defendant has relied to his detriment on
plaintiff's acceptance of the benefits and equity dictates that
the sanctity of that agreement should be preserved and should
prevail.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now
makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant's Motion for an Order appproving and

enforcing the settlement agreement is hereby granted.
2.

The Stipulation of the parties is accepted by the

Court and the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered in this action
may be modified in accordance with that Stipulation as more fully
hereinafter set forth.
3.

The Decree of Divorce is modified to provide that

plaintiff's award of alimony shall be reduced from the amount of
$900 a month to the amount of $500 a month commencing with the
month of July, 1984, and continuing thereafter for a period of
two years or until plaintiff remarries whichever occurs first.
Upon the happening of either event, alimony will terminate.
Defendant's payment of alimony shall be due on or before the 5th
day of each month.

3

So long as defendant has an obligation for alimony,
he is ordered to maintain plaintiff as a named insured on a
currently existing life insurance policy in the face amount of
$50,000.

Defendant is ordered to provide plaintiff with evidence

that this life insurance is currently in force.
4.

The Decree of Divorce is modified to provide that

defendant's obligation to plaintiff for support shall be
increased from a sum of $300 per month to a sum of $500 per month
per child for each of the three minor children of the parties
commencing with the month of July, 1984.

Payments of support are

due on or before the 5th day of each month and defendant's
obligation for support shall continue to age 21 for any child who
shall elect to serve a mission for the LDS Church, or shall
elect to attend a college or university.

For any such child over

the age of 18 not living at home, the payment of support shall be
paid by defendant directly to said child.

If payment of support

is not paid to said child by defendant, plaintiff shall retain
the right for enforcement of collection.
As an additional obligation of support, defendant
is ordered to pay for orthodontia treatment which has been
provided to this time by Dr. Gary Stephens and to pay for any
orthodontia and dentist expenses for any child so long as there
is an obligation for the payment of support for said child.
Defendant is further ordered to continue to maintain the children

on his health and accident insurance which has a $100 per child
deductible*

Plaintiff is ordered to provide to defendant all

medical, dental and orthodontia bills within a reasonable amount
of time not to exceed 30 days of when they are received.

Any

medical expenses not described or covered by insurance will be
the responsibility of plaintiff.
As a further obligation for support, defendant is
ordered to maintain in force his currently existing: life
insurance with the children named thereon as beneficiaries so
long as defendant has an obligation for support.
insurance policy has a $50,000 death benefit.

This life

So long as the

life insurance policy is in force, if defendant's obligation to
pay support for any child terminates, plaintiff will have the
right to notify defendant of her desire to elect that the policy
have the name or names of the non-supported child or children
removed from the policy so that it retains only the supported
children as named beneficiaries.

Unless such an election is made

by plaintiff, defendant shall retain all children as named
beneficiaries on the

life insurance policy until his obligation

to support the last child is terminated.
5.

Plaintiff is ordered to provide to defendant the

account numbers of the Jordan Credit Union, Valley Bank/Olympus
Branch, and Draper Bank accounts that are the accounts for the
children awarded in the Decree of Divorce to be transferred to

5

plaintiff.

Upon receipt of these account numbers, defendant is

ordered to take whatever steps are necessary to have his name
removed from the accounts so that plaintiff's name can be placed
upon the accounts.
6.

The Decree of Divorce should be modified to

provide, in addition to what other rights of visitation the
parties may in the future mutually agree upon, the folLowing:
a*

Defendant shall have the right to have the

children with him on alternate weekends from Friday evening at
6:00 p.m. to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m.
b.

Plaintiff is ordered not to schedule any

activities for the children which will in any way conflict with
defendant's visitation time without first consulting with
defendant and in the event the parties are not able to agree on
such an activity being scheduled for defendant's visitation time,
then either party will have the right to bring the matter before
the Court for determination.

In the event activities are

scheduled as agreed upon or determined by the Court during
defendant's visitation time, defendant is ordered to do whatever
is necessary to see the children participate in that activity.
c.

Plaintiff is ordered to provide defendant with

a reasonable advance notice of any of the activities in which the
children are involved and that there will be as much notice as
possible of any of the activities of the children in which they

are performing in a competitive activity or in which they are
participating or performing in front of an audience that includes
other adults or parents.
d.

Except for Christmas, defendant shall have

the right to have the children on alternate holidays, and when
those holidays are Monday holidays which come on the weekend
defendant has visitation, he shall have the full weekend for
three days including Monday, and on those weekends visitation
shall be from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Monday at 6:00 p.m.
e.

Each Christmas holiday, defendant shall have

the right to have the children commencing on Christmas Day at
1:00 p.m. for the remainder of the Christmas vacation until the
commencement of school, unless there are less than five days of
Christmas vacation before Christmas, in which event the parties
agree time will be worked out so that plaintiff has the children
with her at least five days during the Christmas break.
f.

Defendant will have the right to have the

children with him each summer for a month.

During summer visitation

while the children are in town, plaintiff will have the right to
contact the children by telephone and they will have the right to
contact her by telephone, and plaintiff shall be entitled to
have one visit with them during that time.
The visitation each summer will be agreed upon
between the parties.

Commencing in 1986 defendant shall notify
7

ooC

plaintiff at least 60 days in advance of when he would like to have
the month of visitation, and at the same time, the parties will reac
an agreement as to the one day during the month of summer visitatioi
that plaintiff will have the right to visit.
The parties are ordered to consult with each
other at least 90 days before the beginning of the summer of
their anticipated schedules to be sure there are no conflicts and
to try and resolve potential conflicts that might exist.

If

there is a conflict as to when defendant's summer visitation
should occur, either party will have the right to ask the Court
to resolve the conflict if they are not able to do so.
If the children are offered an opportunity to
register for a summer activity that requires an early
registration, plaintiff is ordered to notify defendant so that he
can let plaintiff know whether this might conflict with his plans
in the hope of avoiding a conflict.
g.

Defendant will have the right to visit with

the children frequently at times other than those outlined
provided the visitation does not conflict with important
activities in which the children are involved.
h.

Either defendant or his present wife shall

have the right to pick up and return the children.

In the event

defendant's current wife is picking up the children, she will
honk for the children in the driveway.

If the children do not

gPo

come or she is not notified when the children will be there, then
after waiting five minutes, she will have the right to go to the
door to get that information.
i.

At any time defendant is exercising

visitation and will be taking the children out of town, defendant
is ordered to provide plaintiff an itinerary so that she will
know where the children are. Plaintiff is ordered whenever she
takes the children out of town, to provide defendant with an
itinerary so that he will know where the children are.
7.

Defendant is ordered to pay the sum of $1,500

toward plaintiff's attorney's fees which shall be paid by
defendant within 30 days of billing by plaintiff's attorney.

DATED this /

day of /P^t^Y,

1,985,

BY T

ATTEST
H. DIXON HiNDLEY
Clerk

DlsftTridt

Judge

By<

flWPL?WS CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of April, 1985,
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law to:
David A. McPhie
Attorney for Plaintiff
147 North 200 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
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B. L. DART ( 8 1 8 )
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendant
310 S o u t h Main
S u i t e 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
CAROL ANN BARKER BROWN,

:

Plaintiff,

:

ORDER

v.

:

BRYANT JEROME BROWN,

:

Civil No. D79-3SC2

Defendant.

:

Judge Sawaya

oooOooo
Defendant's Motion for an Order enforcing the
provisions of an agreement entered

into between the parties

on the 5th of June, 1984, came on regularlv for hearing: on
o'c\^

Monday, the 15th day of April. 1985, a~ th^ hour of 2:')0
n.m.

Defendant apoearing

in person and \v his attorney

Dart, a.nc\ plaint iff appearing
David A. McPhio, dn6

;n person and by her

p

. !.

attorney

the Court having heard the a r g u m e n t an^

proffers of respective attorneys and having reviewed
and having made and entered

i f, s Findings of Fart drd

the f i UCone 1 -<^ i f-n^

ot Liw, now therefore,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Defendants Motion for an Order appproving and

enforcing the settlement agreement is hereby granted,
2.

The Stipulation of the parties is accepted by the

Court and the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered in this action
is hereby stipulated in accordance with that Stipulation as more
fully hereinafter set forth.
3.

The Decree of Divorce is modified to provide that

plaintiff's award of alimony shall be reduced from the amount of
$900 a month to the amount of $500 a month commencing with the
month of July, 1984, and continuing thereafter for a period of
two years or until plaintiff remarries whichever occurs first.
Upon the happening of either event, alimony will terminate.
Defendant's payment of alimony shall be due on or before the 5th
day of each month.
So long as defendant has an obligation for alimony,
he is ordered to maintain plaintiff as a named insured on a
currently existing life insurance policy in the face amount of
$50,000.

Defendant is ordered to provide plaintiff with evidence

that this life insurance is currently in force.
4.

The Decree of Divorce is modified to provide that

defendants obligation to plaintiff for support shall be
increased from a sum of $300 per month to a sum of $500 per month
per child for each of the three minor children of the parties

2
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commencing with the month of July, 1984,

Payments of support are

due on or before the 5th day of each month and defendant's
obligation for support shall continue to age 21 for any child who
shall elect to serve a mission for the LDS Church, or shall
elect to attend a college or university.

For any such child over

the age of 18 not living at home, the payment of support shall be
paid by defendant directly to said child.

If payment of support

is not paid to said child by defendant, plaintiff shall retain
the right for enforcement of collection.
As an additional obligation of support, defendant
is ordered to pay for orthodontia treatment which has been
provided to this time by Dr. Gary Stephens and to pay for any
orthodontia and dentist expenses for any child so long as there
is an obligation for the payment of support for said child.
Defendant is further ordered to continue to maintain the children
on his health and accident insurance which has a $100 per child
deductible.

Plaintiff is ordered to provide to defendant all

medical, dental and orthodontia bills within a reasonable amount
of time not to exceed 30 days of when they are received.

Any

medical expenses not described or covered by insurance will be
the responsibility of plaintiff.
As a further obligation for support, defendant is
ordered to maintain in force his currently existing life

3
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insurance with the children named thereon as beneficiaries so
long as defendant has an obligation for support.
insurance policy has a $50,000 death benefit.

This life

So long as the

life insurance policy is in force, if defendant's obligation to
pay support for any child terminates, plaintiff will have the
right to notify defendant of her desire to elect that the policy
have the name or names of the non-supported child or children
removed from the policy so that it retains only the supported
children as named beneficiaries.

Unless such an election is made

by plaintiff, defendant shall retain all children as named
beneficiaries on the life insurance policy until his obligation
to support the last child is terminated.
5.

Plaintiff is ordered to provide to defendant the

account numbers of the Jordan Credit Union, Valley Bank/Olympus
Branch, and Draper Bank accounts that are the accounts for the
children awarded in the Decree of Divorce to be transferred to
plaintiff.

Upon receipt of these account numbers, defendant is

ordered to take whatever steps are necessary to have his name
removed from the accounts so that plaintiff's name can be placed
upon the accounts.
6.

The Decree of Divorce is hereby modified to

provide, in addition to what other rights of visitation the
parties may in the future mutually agree upon, the following:

4

a.

Defendant shall have the right to have the

children with him on alternate weekends from Friday evening at
6:00 p.m. to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m.
b.

Plaintiff is ordered not to schedule any

activities for the children which will in any way conflict with
defendants visitation time without first consulting with
defendant and in the event the parties are not able to agree on
such an activity being scheduled for defendant's visitation time,
then either party will have the right to bring the matter before
the Court for determination.

In the event activities are

scheduled as agreed upon or determined by the Court during
defendant's visitation time, defendant is ordered to do whatever
is necessary to see the children participate in that activity.
c.

Plaintiff is ordered to provide defendant with

a reasonable advance notice of any of the activities in which the
children are involved and that there will be as much notice as
possible of any of the activities of the children in which they
are performing in a competitive activity or in which they are
participating or performing in front of an audience that includes
other adults or parents.
d.

Except for Christmas, defendant shall have

the right to have the children on alternate holidays, and when
those holidays are Monday holidays which come on the weekend
defendant has visitation, he shall have the full weekend for
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three days including Monday, and on those weekends visitation
shall be from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Monday at 6:00 p.m.
e.

Each Christmas holiday, defendant shall have

the right to have the children commencing on Christmas Day at
1:00 p.m. for the remainder of the Christmas vacation until the
commencement of school, unless there are less than five days of
Christmas vacation before Christmas, in which event the parties
agree time will be worked out so that plaintiff has the children
with her at least five days during the Christmas break.
f.

Defendant will have the right to have the

children with him each summer for a month.

During summer visitatio

while the children are in town, plaintiff will have the right to
contact the children by telephone and they will have the right to
contact her by telephone, and plaintiff shall be entitled to
have one visit with them during that time.
The visitation each summer will be agreed upon
between the parties.

Commencing in 1986 defendant shall notify

plaintiff at least 60 days in advance of when he would like to have
the month of visitation, and at the same time, the parties will rea
an agreement as to the one day during the month of summer visitatic
that plaintiff will have the right to visit.
The parties are ordered to consult with each
other at least 90 days before the beginning of the summer of
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their anticipated schedules to be sure there are no conflicts and
to try and resolve potential conflicts that might exist.

If

there is a conflict as to when defendants summer visitation
should occur, either party will have the right to ask the Court
to resolve the conflict if they are not able to do so.
If the children are offered an opportunity to
register for a summer activity that requires an early
registration, plaintiff is ordered to notify defendant so that he
can let plaintiff know whether this might conflict with his plans
in the hope of avoiding: a conflict.
g.

Defendant will have the right to visit with

the children frequently at times other than those outlined
provided the visitation does not conflict with important
activities in which the children are involved.
h.

Either defendant or his present wife shall

have the right to pick up and return the children.

In the event

defendant's current wife is picking up the children, she will
honk for the children in the driveway.

If the children do not

come or she is not notified when the children will be there, then
after waiting five minutes, she will have the right to go to the
door to get that information.
i.

At any time defendant is exercising

visitation and will be taking the children out of town, defendant
is ordered to provide plaintiff an itinerary so that she will

JL

know where the children are*

Plaintiff is ordered whenever she

takes the children out of town, to provide defendant with an
itinerary so that he will know where the children are,
7.

Defendant is ordered to pay the sum of $1,500

toward plaintiff's attorney's fees which shall be paid by
defendant within 30 days of billing by plaintiff's attorney.
DATED this /

day of /?P/jt^/^

, 1985.

BY THE COURT

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
Clerk
R
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District Judge
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A
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I hereby certify that on the 30th day of April, 1985,
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to:
David A. McPhie
Attorney for Plaintiff
147 North 200 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103

¥r £*«!&(

z
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Al^t^j

EARL S. SP\rFORD
Attorney for Plaintiff
4 31 S o u m Thxra East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
I'diUhon : 5 31-8020
ItJ l'HE DISTRICT COURT OV HIE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
114 AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STAVE Or UTAH

CAROL ANN 3ARKER BROWN
Plalntlff,

DECREE or DTVORCE

vs.
BRYVJT JEROHE BROWN
D f ndant.

ClVJl

I'HL ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER

No.
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MIIIH on f or hearing oefor^

tn

abov— ntitlea Court on the 2nd day of January, 19SO.

i\\

ilonoraoj - C h n s t m

j

Durham Distract Jucg*, pr-sid J.

I'h- Plaiitiff appeared in person ana through her ittornjv,
E^rl S. s juffora. L'h - Court heard -vioe'K" in suuoor*- of
PlditiLift'a Complaint anJ now being fully iuvisea in the
or ru s s, having heretofore -nt^r^d its

Einuincrs of Tact

ara Conclusions of Law, and for good cause aooearing therefore,
1

1 IS HERESY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:

1.

Plaintiff is hereby granted a Deer '»- of Divorce

from the Defendant, dissolving the bonds of matrimony
h^r to for- -xistmg b* tv»-~n the parti »s.
b~~onv

Said Decree shall

f.nuL forthwith.

2.

Plaintiff is awarded the minor children of the

parties suoj-ct to reasonable rights of visii-jvion by the
D'>nudnt, w-hi^h rights of visitation should include the folLowi^a:
fa)

D f-naant's visiting prav-»l-g«*s shall include

a minimum of >v-ry other w^ek-nd, not to int rf^re with the

Appendix "H"

children's regularly scheduled activities, such as Sunday
Scnool.

It is contemplated that the children will spend

Friday evening and Saturday with the defendant, and oe
returned to the plaintiff by Saturday evening.
(b)

Defendant shall be able to have the children

in his home on alternate holidays, with the exception

that

Christmas mornings, the children shall be with the plaintiff.
Defendant may be able to visit with the children in his home,
Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, or

as agreed mutually by the

parties.
(c)

Defendant's visiting privileges shall not be

limited to the above situations if the parties mutually agree
upon visiting privileges at other reasonable and convenient
times.
(d)

Defendant may have certain time during the summer

months where he would be able to take the children on a
vacation for a week or two.

It is reasonable that the defendant

be able to take the children on such a vacation if the olaintiff
defendant's and the children's schedule can accommodate said
vacation time.
(e)

It is reasonable that the plaintiff and defendant

cooperate with respect to notifying each other of their
respective schedules and the intended visits.
3.

During the marriage but prior to the separation

of the parties the parties have incurred miscellaneous debts
and obligations which the Defendant should be required
to pay,

except the home mortgage which plaintiff should pay.

4.

That the property of the parties should be divided.

5.

The residence of the parties located at 31^5 South

2794 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, to the plaintiff with the
understanding and provision that the plaintiff shall assume and
make the mortgage payments, tax payments, insurance payments,

ana otner payments associated with said house.

Defendant shall

provide the plaintiff with a Quit-Claim deed at the time of
the signing of the Decreee of Divorce.

The home furnishings,

including the grand piano and grandfather clock, to the
plaintiff with the exception of the antiques which belonged
to the defendant's grandmother and the stereo speakers be
awarded to the defendant.
6.

The dinner ring to the plaintiff.

It is reasonable that the defendant pay child support

in the amount of $300.00 per child ($900.00 per month for all
children) per month to continue until the child shall reach the
age of eighteen (18) ; the child shall marry; or t:he child shall
oecome self-supporting.

Said child support shall be continued

to age twenty-one (21) if a child shall elect to serve a mission
for the LDS Church or if a child shall elect to attend college
or university.
DATED this

f ' t \

day of January, 1980.
BY THE

COURT:

^'<*U sU"*,,*
XJDGE
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